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. Capital structure and hybrid capital
In understanding Corporate nance we continue to face a map with many white
and challenging spots. ¿e specic question - How does a company choose to
nance itself? - illustrates the breadth of the eld. What is a company? Which
sensible criteria dene a rm? Who make the choices? What are the incentives,
information, and rational, as well as less rational, drivers of these choices? Under
what conditions and limitations are the choices made - internally and externally?
Finally, what constitutes nancing, and motivates its various shapes and forms?
As economists, the standard approach consists of optimizing an objective function
given a set of constraints. ¿e complexity of a corporate nance setting with
usually confused objectives and simultaneity of events makes this optimization a
particularly demanding task.
¿eawareness ofmany of the issues of corporate nance is evident also amongst
early economists, even Adam Smith warned about the misdeeds of directors
managing other people’s money and even against the limited liability corporation
as such. In the specic eld of capital structure research, Miller and Modigliani
() marked the start of more formal research a er proposing their fundamental
’irrelevance argument’ where they claim that under strict assumptions, in particular
of ecient markets, no taxes or bankruptcy costs, how the cashows from a
rm’s assets are split between various nanciers cannot alter any combined values.
Subsequent research eectively introduces deviations from these assumptions
in an on-going attempt to better understand observed company behavior. As to
the current state of theoretical research in the eld, Tirole () on page 
states: "the [nancial contracting] theories ... are o en criticized for their lack
of robustness; it is also pointed out that they do not account for the diversity
of capital structures that characterizes modern operations". He (in Chapter )
sums up the key themes when studying capital structure as being, tax benets
and bankruptcy loss from leverage, information and incentives, (current) capital,
liquidity, collateral1 and external monitoring.
I include a brief overview of the main theories on capital structure in the rst
chapter of the thesis. Trade-o theories generally assumes that all rms are moving
Collateral is usually measured as xed assets in proportion to total assets and is an indicator
of available assets that may be used as security for debt.

- at dierent speeds - towards an optimal composition of their alternative sources
of nancing. Pecking order predicts that rms will prefer the least information-
ally sensitive forms of nancing, typically internal funds and secured debt, over
alternatives where the required return has to compensate for the informational
asymmetry and any incentive-related issues between insiders and outsider, the
standard example is equity. Within behavioral nance, market timing theories
predict that leverage ratios are the result of repeated attempts by management to
opportunistically issue equity at overvalued share prices. In addition, theories
motivated by ineciencies caused by adverse selection (of implemented projects)
and moral hazard (of ex-post behavior) between outside investors and inside man-
agement may be related both to the optimality of nancing as well as to marginal
nancing choices.
¿e current state of capital structure research includes an extensive empirical
literature and signicant insights have been gained. Frank and Goyal ()
provide a useful overview, and sums up the cross-sectional ’stylized facts of leverage’.
¿ese are based on US empirical ndings, but has also broader support. ¿ese are:
the stationarity of the leverage ratios, the correlation between rm and industry
median leverage, the positive relationship between leverage and collateral, log
total assets and expected ination, the negative relation to market-to-book ratio,
prots and dividend payment.
My own motivation for studying capital structure relates not only to the de-
scribed challenges in the eld, but also to many years of involvement in nancing
rms. As an issuer’s representative in charge of capital raising and investor rela-
tions, an implicit objective was to lower the level of informational asymmetries
towards outside investors - although never explicitly formulated in that manner.
As an investment banker, any transaction also had to be nanced optimally and
the expected impact on the shareprice, i.e. implicit shareholder value optimiza-
tion, was always a fundamental criteria. In this environment we also faced many
challenging incentive issues although seldom explicitly addressed. In addition to
providing a fundamental interest in the important eld of how rms are nanced,
I believe the experience represents valuable observations for a researcher.
¿is thesis consists of  empirical and  theoretical chapters on capital structure
and nancing alternatives in a corporate nance perspective. ¿e rst paper
describes the capital structure of the population of Norwegian companies. In

addition to document the current state, recent developments and variations of
capital structure, I also challenge the assumption that the reported balance sheet
represents the complete picture of a rm’s indebtedness. ¿e last part of the paper
runs a full dynamically specied panel regression of leverage. ¿e ndings in
terms of leverage dynamics are very much in line with mainstream US research on
listed rms (see e.g. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (). ¿e second paper, joint
with Professor Hans K. Hvide, study a selection of more than , Norwegian
start-ups to better understand why and with what eects external shareholders get
involved in start-up companies. ¿e incorporation, founder and rm data are all
observed at the start-up date without problems of path-dependency. ¿is allows
for a unique test of capital structure theories with limited endogeneity issues. Our
main ndings are that in the  % of sample rms with outside equity, outside
equity seems primarily be just an additional ’injection of cash’ not motivated by
other eects than facilitating the start-up and raising additional debt. ¿e third,
fourth and  h papers, joint with Professor Svein-Arne Persson, are all theoretical
papers related to a specic nancing instrument, hybrid capital, and model the
valuation and issuer bankruptcy impact from having such securities outstanding.
Hybrid capital is a perpetual continuously coupon paying debt instrument with a
level of risk exposure that makes it accepted as risk capital for nancial institutions.
¿e combination of perpetual maturity, junior position, embedded, nitely lived
issuer’s call option and reduced contingent rights in default makes the modelling
not trivial. Our models are developed in a corporate nance perspective although
not including optimization of capital structure. ¿e third paper develops the
fundamental valuation formula in a barrier option framework and the forth paper
expands the model to include realistic specications of hybrid capital and capital
structure. ¿e  h paper includes methodological support for the two other
papers. ¿is paper develops a methodology for valuing innite and nite claims
with dierent cashows for various xed levels of nancial distress. ¿e dierences
between the subjects of these papers are less than they may appear although both
capital structure theory, applied option pricing theory and alternative econometric
approaches are involved. Strebulaev () is a recent recognized example of a
paper that builds his analysis of capital structure tests on asset-based calibrated
structural model in the same tradition as our papers on hybrid capital.
To sum up, my thesis starts out with an overall empirical description of actual

capital structures, continues with a focused test of the main theories in under-
standing the eect of outside equity, and ends with theoretical models of the value
of a particular form of debt securities in a corporate nance setting. I will present
the papers in more detail in the following.
.. Norwegian Companies’ Capital Structure - an overview.
¿is paper is the rst comprehensive documentation of the capital structure of
the population of Norwegian private and public companies. By the use of a well
specied dataset with , rms and , rm-years for the years -,
I manage both to analyze overall capital structure as well as relevant and still
large sub-samples. ¿e subsamples reect size and listed/unlisted rms, as well as
groups expected to dier in terms of nancial constraints, e.g., dividend payers or
rms that have received formal notications from their auditors. I also include a
limited analysis of capital structure including capitalized rental agreements and
nd signicantly increased adjusted leverage ratios. Leverage ratios are analyzed
in a dynamic panel regression using the System GMM-method proposed by Blun-
dell and Bond (). ¿e results conrm known US ndings regarding ’partial
adjustment’ of leverage and shows in addition interesting variations by subgroups.
¿e analysis also highlights the sensitivity of the results to the choice of regres-
sion method. ¿e main contributions of the paper are to document a national
population of rms, show drivers of changes in leverage, illustrate the eects of
including capitalized rents in overall leverage and exemplify the importance of
panel regression methodology.
.. Start-up Financing: Outside Equity
¿is paper is joint work with Professor Hans K. Hvide of University of Aberdeen,
Business School and NHH.We investigate the extent to which start-ups use outside
equity, and interpret our results in relation to nancial contracting theory. We do
so by studying the start-up and founder characteristics that are associated with
the use of outside equity nancing, using a unique dataset from Norway. Our
ndings suggest that adverse selection are less of a concern for start-ups than ex-
post opportunistic behavior (risk shi ing) by the entrepreneur as in Myers ()

and Ravid & Spiegler (). One implication of this nding is that outside equity
and debt are complements rather than substitutes, and that an extra unit of equity
nancing has a multiplicative eect on total nancing through releasing additional
debt nancing. We do not nd convincing evidence that the use of outside equity
has detrimental eects on entrepreneurial eort, nor that a possible shortage of
available outside equity leads to investor monopolization and excessive investor
returns. ¿us we provide evidence that outside equity provides an important
avenue for entrepreneurs to escape liquidity constraints.
.. Callable Risky Perpetual Debt: Options, Pricing and
Bankruptcy Implications
¿is and the subsequent two papers are joint work with Professor Svein-Arne Persson
at NHH. Issuances in the USD  Bn global market of perpetual risky debt
are o en motivated by capital requirements for nancial institutions. However,
observed market practices indicate that actual maturity equals rst possible call
date. We develop a valuation model for callable risky perpetual debt including
an initial protection period before the debt may be called. ¿e total market value
of debt including the call option is expressed as a portfolio of perpetual debt and
barrier options with a time dependent barrier. We analyze how an issuer’s optimal
bankruptcy decision is aected by the existence of the call option using closed-form
approximations. In accordance with intuition, our model quanties the increased
coupon and the decreased initial bankruptcy level caused by the embedded option.
Examples indicate that our closed formmodel produces reasonably precise coupon
rates compared to more exact numerical solutions. ¿e credit-spread produced by
our model is in a realistic order of magnitude compared to market data.
.. Bundled Financial Claims - A Model of Hybrid Capital
A large class of innite horizon nancial instruments which incorporates elements
of both debt and equity, may collectively denoted "hybrid capital". ¿e Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) has devised the fundamental requirements for
how hybrid capital may qualify as a part of core ("Tier ") regulatory capital for
banks. We present valuation models for hybrid capital in the set-up of Black and

Cox () and Leland () and derive new valuation formulas incorporating
these special features. In particular, we take into account the issuer’s right to omit
hybrid coupon payments and to call the hybrid capital at par value starting from a
given date. In doing so, we build on formulas developed in the previous paper. We
show that hybrid capital actually carry risk and clarify interesting links between
their valuation and overall corporate capital structure as guidance both for market
participants and regulators alike.
.. Default of Multiple Degrees: ¿e Risk of Lost Debt
Coupons.
Motivated by the risk of stopped debt coupon payments from a leveraged company
in nancial distress we dene a multi-level annuity contract which pays an annuity
at a rate depending on the value of an underlying asset. ¿e range of possible values
of this asset is divided into a nite number of regions. ¿e annuity rate is constant
within each region, but may dier between the regions. ¿e annuity payments
end at a nite time horizon or upon an earlier bankruptcy, i.e., if the asset value
process hits an absorbing boundary. Such annuities occur naturally in models of
debt with credit risk in nancial economics. Suspension of debt service under the
US Chapter  provisions is one well-known example. We present closed-form
formulas for the market value of multi-level annuities contracts when the market
value of the underlying asset is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion.

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¿is paper is the rst comprehensive documentation of the capital struc-
ture of the population of Norwegian private and public companies. By the
use of a well specied dataset with , rms and , rm-years
for the years -, I manage both to analyze overall capital structure
as well as relevant and still large sub-samples. ¿e subsamples reect size
and listed/unlisted rms, as well as groups expected to dier in terms of
nancial constraints, e.g., dividend payers or rms that have received for-
mal notications from their auditors. I also include a limited analysis of
capital structure including capitalized rental agreements and nd signi-
cantly increased adjusted leverage ratios. Leverage ratios are analyzed in
a dynamic panel regression using the System GMM-method proposed by
Blundell and Bond (). ¿e results conrm known US ndings regarding
’partial adjustment’ of leverage and shows in addition interesting variations
by subgroups. ¿e analysis also highlights the sensitivity of the results to
the choice of regression method. ¿e main contributions of the paper are to
document a national population of rms, show drivers of changes in leverage,
illustrate the eects of including capitalized rents in overall leverage and
exemplify the importance of panel regression methodology.
I want to thank Trond Døskeland, B.Espen Eckbo, Gorm Grønnevet, Hans K. Hvide, ¿ore
Johnsen and Jarle Møen. Personal responsibility for all mistakes accepted.

. Introduction and motivation
¿is paper presents a complete description of the capital structure of all Norwe-
gian private- and public-companies for the period -2. I construct a set
of accounting based capital structure measures and study industries and other
relevant sub-samples both descriptively and by panel regressions. ¿e use of sub-
samples represent an important widening of the study by allowing dierences in
dynamic relationships not possible to include in a regression of undierentiated
samples. ¿e study of a large sample of predominantly private rms represents
a relevant comparison to conventional datasets of large, listed rms studied in
current literature. ¿e balance sheets of private companies lack market values of
assets and nancial claims and may also be incomplete in representing the overall
position. Whilst I do not attempt to estimate market values, I in a subsample
do adjust the scope of the balance sheets by including capitalized rented/leased
assets and calculate adjusted leverage-measures. ¿is approach shows that median
interest bearing debt as a percentage of total assets increases by  %.
Capital structure becomes interesting when a company deviates from the clas-
sical benchmark case - one owner that runs her business nanced fully by her own
capital. ¿e introduction of outside nancing, as debt with xed return and con-
tingent control or equity with residual return and current control, makes capital
structure choices important. Outside capitalmay serve dierent purposes in nanc-
ing growth beyond the entrepreneur’s own limits, redistribute risk more eciently,
help liquidate the entrepreneur’s investment or be more operationally-related mo-
tivated. We know that outside capital also may cause losses or increased risks due
to misaligned incentives or asymmetric information between the entrepreneur
and new nanciers (Jensen ()). Examples of these issues include incentive
eects for the owner/manager herself, dierent risk, return and tax-eects between
various nanciers, changed distress- and bankruptcy probabilities and -costs and
various eects on the operations of the company. Agrawal and Knoeber ()
test the eect of seven mechanisms used to control agency problems between
managers and shareholders and conclude that since none of them, except outside
directors, have signicant eects on rm performance, a given rm’s use must be
All companies excluding subsidiaries where parent company nancing policy is expected to
prevail, se later discussion.
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endogenous and assumed economically rational. ¿ey dene rm performance
by Tobin’s Q. ¿e causal relationships between nancing, related problems and
measures to mitigate them, and thus the empirical analysis of capital structure, are
particularly challenging to dene; why do we observe a particular capital structure
and what have been the driving - or limiting - factors?
¿e immediate dierence between a study of private (unlisted) - compared to
public companies is the lack of a market in shares issued by private companies. A
public listing creates a running valuation of the equity capital of the company and
also disciplines the insiders’ with respect to nancial reporting and otherwise. In a
private company, the owner/manager has, limited if any focus on daily valuations
and no specic incentives for disclosures beyond the minimum3.
My analysis of capital structure takes the conventional approach of studying
incorporated limited liability companies or consolidated groups as the relevant
entities, making rational nancing choices that are subsequently reported annu-
ally in their accounts. ¿is research approach is increasingly challenged with the
growth of new, dynamic, networking business structures (Grossman and Hart
()). Partnerships, licensing arrangements, outsourcing, complex return- and
risk-sharing contracts with partners and employees combined with increasingly
globalized operational- and legal-structures undermine the validity of a traditional
study of corporate nancing. Such structures are typically situation-specic and
seldom disclosed in a way that allows for outside analysis. One attempt to ac-
commodate to this development is to capitalize the values of all sorts of expected
cashows as assets or liabilities for the rm. By capitalizing of rented assets I
include a rst step towards a more complete understanding of how companies use
dierent nancing means to get assets under control.
I initially present some theoretical foundations for capital structure research
as well as selected relevant precedent empirical studies. ¿e remainder of paper is
structured around ve main parts; section  presents data and develop and moti-
vate the composition of a comprehensive data-set for the population of Norwegian
companies. ¿e descriptive part in section  includes a general overview of the
leverage all Norwegian companies’ using accounting items and ratios, and also
by selected categories, including industries. I nd fairly large dierences leverage
¿e exception being information prepared for outside nanciers.

between subsamples. In section  studies a subsample where the leverage is ad-
justed for capitalized rented assets and shows large adjustments to both leverage
and protability. Section  analyze leverage and potential drivers empirically both
by univariate- and dynamic panel-regressions. Conclusions are in found Section .
Variable denition, data quality discussions, some tables and references are found
in the appendices.
. ¿eories on capital structure
Modigliani and Miller () is a natural starting point for an analytical under-
standing of capital structure. All research that have followed study various forms
of deviations from their idealized setting with fully symmetrical information, no
taxes, no bankruptcy costs, exogenous cashows, and ecient markets in all assets.
Myers () denes the two main competing theoretical directions; ’Trade-o
theory’ and ’Pecking order theory’. Harris and Raviv () and Frank and Goyal
() provide comprehensive overviews.
.. Trade-o theory.
Trade-o theory assumes that rms optimally balance the costs of debt, e.g., distress
risk and bankruptcy frictions with the benets, typically tax savings, but also
management discipline and optimal scale. Firms are expected to move towards a
target leverage and do their marginal nancing accordingly, although time their
transactions due to costs of adjustments. In a dynamic setting, rms see their
targets develop over time and consider today’s adjustments through new nancing
or payouts also in light expected future optimal leverage. Recent papers on dynamic
capital structure include Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (), Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland () and Hennessy and Whited (). Most of this literature assume a
xed rm scale and that productmarkets and cash ows as exogenous, disregarding
any interaction between leverage and operations. An example of the opposite is
Maksimovic () who shows that a rm’s debt capacity is a function of industry
and rm characteristics, e.g. elasticity of demand and discount rate.
Agency issues are relevant in any nancing discussion and the seminal paper
is Jensen and Meckling (). ¿ey develop a theory based on agency costs in

structures with separation between ownership and management and as well as
outside lenders. ¿e theory predicts that a manager who owns less than %
of the shares of a rm will have incentives to consume private benets at the
expense of the other owners (’moral hazard’). Shareholders in a leveraged limited
liability company will also have incentives to take on riskier projects than without
debt since they will receive all positive outcomes, but only a limited share of the
downside (’adverse selection’). ¿e authors present these costs as problems that
will impact the optimal capital structure for a rm. Agency problems are one of
the reasons why the pecking order theory predicts that outside capital is more
expensive.
.. Pecking order theory.
Pecking order theory predicts that due to the information asymmetry between a
rm and outside investors regarding the actual value of both current operations
and future prospects, outside capital will always be relatively costly compared to
internal funds, and equity more so than debt. Outside investors will, as described
by Akerlof (), require a compensation for their expected informational disad-
vantage.
Myers and Majluf () argue that information asymmetry will lead to a
mispricing of a rm’s equity in the marketplace. Aware of the resulting dilution
of current shareholders’ actual values, rms may not raise new equity even for
projects with positive net present values, o en denoted ’¿e under-investment
problem’. ¿ey predict that rms will choose to nance new investments in ways
which minimize this problem and thus avoid new equity issues.
Myers () extends this theory into a ’pecking order’ theory of nancing.
¿is theory predicts that the existence of asymmetric information will lead a rm
to rstly use retained earnings and funds from current owners, then risk-free debt
and nally risky debt before eventually raising new equity from outside investors.
A development in this area, Halov and Heider (), takes a more sophisti-
cated approach to the issue of asymmetric information by separating uncertainty
from risk. ¿e paper is primarily empirical, but novel in that they nd that rms
prefer to issue equity when risk matters relatively more and debt otherwise. ¿eir
argument is that by issuing equity rather than debt, risky rms avoid the adverse

selection costs of debt. Berger and Udell () applies a related approach to the
issue of credit availability for small- and medium sized companies, discussing how
the opaqueness of rms impacts the relevant lending assessment technology.
Pecking order theory predicts marginal nancing ows, but has no views as to
overall optimal capital structure. It is hard not to assume that extremely high or
low leverage will have to impact marginal nancing, but this is outside the pecking
order theory.
.. Other attempts to explain capital structure
In a more behavioral attempt to explain capital structure, many, e.g., Baker and
Wurgler () strongly argue in favor of ’market timing’. ¿e idea is that rms
tend to issue new equity when they perceive the market value of their shares to be
high, relative to past book- and market-values. ¿ey nd that such timing is the
best explanation of changes in capital structures and that current leverage is the
cumulative eect of historical attempts to time the issuance on new capital. ¿is
line of research is in contrast to classical assumptions regarding market eciency
and investor rationality.
. Related empirical studies of capital structure
¿ere are relatively few broad empirical studies of the capital structure of private
companies. Most empirical papers analyze either public companies, survey-data
on small- and medium companies or start-ups. I am not aware of any papers
attempting to describe the whole population of rms in a country, although some
papers conduct a between-country test of capital structure theories. Rajan and
Zingales () is a classical paper comparing public companies between G-
countries and Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic () studies
public companies in  developing countries.
In the eld of small businesses or start-ups, Berger and Udell () include
an overview of the capital structure of small businesses in the US, with average
debt ratio of ., signicantly lower than my ndings. Huyghebaert and de Gucht
() studies a range of nancing features of  Belgian start-ups nding an
average total debt ratio of . (median .), very close to my overall ndings.

Frydenberg () analyzes Norwegian private manufacturing companies’
capital structure using data for the period  - . He nds a total debt-ratio
of ., a short-term debt ratio of . and a long-term debt ratio of .. ¿is is based
on slightly dierent denitions of debt, but are still in line with my ndings as
shown in Tables . and . in Appendix C. He nds that xed assets, size, growth,
taxes, return on assets and industry category are the key determinants of capital
structure. Hol () examines default-probabilities and debt-maturity choices
by studying Norwegian private companies’ capital structures using a sample for
the period -.4 Carlsen and Nilsen () represent an earlier study on
Norwegian listed companies for the years  - . Failing to nd strong support
for any of themain theories, Carlsen andNilsen () conclude on certain specic
relations between leverage and company features. ¿ey in particular nd that
leverage is increasing in size and long-term assets and decreasing in protability, a
commonly found result.
¿e economic stability and statistical persistence of capital structure arguments
in favor of modelling the changes in capital structure in a panel data set by using
a partial adjustment model which includes last years leverage as an explanatory
variable as in, e.g., Fama and French (), Chang and Dasgupta () and
Flannery and Rangan (). Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender () takes this
further in demonstration that initial (IPO)-leverage actually have a lasting impact
on rm leverage, not only last year’s realization. ¿is set up implicitly assume a
trade-o explanation of leverage, since the lagged leverage ratio plays no role in a
pecking-order explanation of nancing behavior.
¿e thesis lacks a summary which would have made comparison of results possible.

. ¿e data
.. ¿e data source
I use accounting data for all Norwegian limited liability5 private and public com-
panies for the years  - 6. ¿e data-set is a combination of single company
accounts and consolidated accounts as presented in Table .. ¿e data is made
available by Dun&Bradstreet. Companies owning subsidiaries (ownership ≥ %)
have to le both company accounts and consolidated accounts. ¿is results in
two partially overlapping panel-data sets. I make the assumption that the capital
structure of a consolidated group is dened by the parent company alone and
imposed upon the subsidiaries7. I thus merge the two data-sets and exclude single
company lings for parent companies, using only their consolidated accounts. I
also exclude subsidiary companies as they are consolidated into a Norwegian or a
foreign group. ¿e inclusion of all consolidated group accounts will also necessar-
ily include foreign subsidiaries of Norwegian companies, obviously stretching the
assumption of parent company nancing policy outside its national domicile. ¿e
indication of subsidiary status is only given for the year  and my procedure
is thus decreasingly accurate for earlier years.8 ¿e sample remains suciently
representative and thus appropriate for the purpose of studying capital structure
of a national population.
Common with most capital structure research, this paper focuses on the cap-
ital structure of privately held limited liability non-nancial companies, since
nancial institutions have fundamentally dierent nancing structures.9 I have
I include only limited liability companies and exclude legal forms which are not expected to
make shareholder-value maximizing nancing decisions, e.g., mutual companies and foundations.
Sole traders are also excluded.
Norwegian legislation requires companies to have a nancial reporting year equal to the
calender year and to le their nancial accounts with the central company registry "Brønnøysund-
sregisteret" by end June the following year.
E.g., Rajan and Zingales () study only consolidated accounts.
¿e annual numbers in Table . do not add together precisely since a large share of the
separate parent company accounts seem to be missing. Parent companies may also themselves be
subsidiaries causing hierarchical consolidations and in part explaining the eects.
I have excluded the following industries, according to the classication of NACE Rev.
.(NACE: Nomenclature statistique des activiés économiques dans la Communauté Européenne,
EU’s industry-classication system):  Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension
funding,  Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security,  Public ad-

also excluded observations (rm years) with turnover or total assets below NOK 
mill (app. , USD, September ’).
Table .: Composition of the data-set. ¿e table shows the composition of the data-set
applied in the analysis. ¿e two rst columns show the number of reporting companies and
consolidated groups per year. ¿e third column shows the number of consolidated subsidiaries.
¿e fourth column shows the sum of companies and consolidated groups less parent companies
of consolidated groups, and subsidiaries. ¿e nal column shows the applied dataset a er a
symmetric, per-year,  % ’Return on assets’-winsorization as described in Appendix B.¿e data-set
excludes companies with turnover and total assets below NOK  mill and nancial and public
sector related industries, company forms or ownership.
Combined Applied
(Firm Single Consol. Subsi- population winsorized
years) Companies Groups diaries set data-set
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
Totals ,, , , , ,
Averages , , , , ,
Dun&Bradstreet provides a range of company-specic additional variables like
ownership categories, industry-codes, CEO-salary, reported accounting mistakes
and any auditor remarks.
ministration and defence; compulsory social security,  Activities of business, employers and
professional organizations and  Activities of households as employers of domestic sta.

.. ¿e combined data-set - key levels and ratios.
Appendix B discusses quality issues related to private company accounting data
in general and also analyzes the eects of alternative economical and statistical
standardization of the data-set. Appendix C includes the main accounting items,
performance- and leverage-ratios of the companies in the data-set. ¿e accounting
items are presented as ratios relative to total asset, calculated by entity and then
aggregated. To support clarity, the data is presented for the individual years 10,
 and  as well as aggregated across the whole sample. ¿e tables provided
are11:
• Table .: Balance sheet items.
• Table .: Balance sheet ratios.
• Table .: Income statement items.
• Table .: Performance ratios.
• Table .: Leverage ratios.
• Table .: Univariate table with absolute values of the items analyzed.
I will in the following discuss briey some aspects of the observed capital
structure related data.
Time variations.
¿e assets reported in Table . shows increased holdings of cash, (nancial)
investments and real estate, where the latter two have rather skewed distributions.
¿is may be linked to increased protability, close owner/manager-links and/or
prevalence of agency issues. ¿e nancing is increasingly long-term and formal,
with reduced use of trade credit and short term interest bearing debt, and increased
use of long term interest bearing debt and equity. In Table . net working capital,
invested capital (interest bearing debt + equity) and bank debt show a growing
 is preferable to  since several ow variables are calculated by using balance sheet
dierences between years and are thus missing for .
All variables and ratios are dened in Appendix A.

trend. ¿e working capital grows since dividend provisions (particularly in )
and trade debt falls. In parallel, with improved protability, both new debt and
equity show relatively large increases. ¿e income statement variables in Table
. reect an overall trend of improved protability, both relative to turnover
and capital. Average (relative) EBIT goes from . to . and net prot from .
to .. Firm cashow has also almost doubled, except for the drop in the year
. ¿e planned increase in dividend taxation caused a large drop in declared
dividends as shown in Table . resulting in a large net reduction in cashows.
Dividends shows a growing trend with some large shi s due to years of taxation
changes as discussed below. ¿e capital intensity also increases, shown by the asset
turnover-ratio moving from . (.) to . (.) (means, medians).
Table . converts the increased protability into increased returns, in par-
ticular ROAE12, whilst ROAA13 is more stable. ¿e operating margin shows a
large dispersion between years, but with a slightly growing median. Table .
compares well with Table . and shows a trend towards more equity and interest
bearing debt and less nancing by trade credit, particularly in the early years. ¿is
apparently negative relation between protability and leverage over time supports
the pecking order theory. Increased protability and reduced interest rates seem
to result in improved gearing and interest cover.
Dividend taxation changes
Norway has since the -tax reform, with some exceptions, had a fairly neutral
taxation of debt vs. equity nancing for companies and investor combined14. Taxes
still have an impact on capital structure. Sophisticated listed companies adapt
to an international investor base, and individual Norwegian investors’ have been
taxed on capital gains beyond their individual share of the company’s accumulated
retained prots during their holding period. Dividends in Norway are declared
annually and normally paid out within  months a er the end of the nancial year.
Norwegian-based individual investors have received dividends tax-free throughout
Return on Average Equity, see Appendix A.
Return on Average Assets, see Appendix A.
¿emodications being that rstly, the tax neutrality is directly relevant to domestic investors
only. Before this tax-reform debt had large tax advantages which would be expected to have lasting
eects on debt-levels.

the sample-period except for the period from th September  until end-.
During these  months the eective investor dividend tax-rate was  %, paid
one year in arrear. A er st January  dividends were again subject to investor
taxation, eectively dividends declared for the accounting year . Corporate tax-
rates were stable at  % during the period. Directly aected individual investors
held15 . (.) % of the Oslo Stock Exchange as of end  (, correcting for
some large partial privatizations of state-held companies). Foreign investors held
 % of the Oslo Stock Exchange as of ...
Table .: Dividend taxation changes, dividends and new nancing. ¿e table
shows mean payout ratios, dividends relative to total assets, new interest bearing debt, new equity
and combined investor cashows for the years -. New nancing is measured relative to
beginning-of-year total assets. Investor cashow is the sum of last year’s declared dividend and
current year’s actual net changes in new equity, both relative to total assets. Dividends received are
taxed in the last  months of , all of  and from  onwards.
Years, means        
Payout rate . . . . . . . .
Dividends/ . . . . . . . .
Total assets
New nancing:
-Int.bear.debt . . . . . . . .
-Equity . . . . . . . .
Investor cashow . . . . . . . .
Table . shows a marked positive trend in relative dividend-payouts, inter-
rupted by large shi s around the years of tax-changes, even if they only have a
substantial eect on relatively few shareholders. ¿e payout rate shows a drop
in 16 followed by a large increase in  whilst dividends relative to total
assets shows a large increase in  followed by a marked drop in  and a
more normal level from . An even more dramatic increase in both rates is
seen in  followed by almost no dividends declared for the year . ¿ese
changes indicate that companies time their dividends in response to announced
or expected tax changes. It is dicult to assess the changes in net new nancing
between the marketwise optimistic year  and the problematic year . All
¿e share only includes shares held directly by Norwegian individuals, not those they may
hold through mutual funds or other savings vehicles.
¿is discussion relates to the year for which dividends are declared, as they are received by
the investor and taxed the following year.

new nancing fall, but new debt more than new equity which is contrary to the
expected partial eects of tax on the relative attractiveness of debt vs. equity. ¿e
relative investor cashow across the whole period (total of dividends, new issues
and share repurchases) shows a stable growth trend which indicates that on av-
erage, companies repurchased shares to stabilize their transfers to shareholders.
We also see very large annual standard deviations across rms, particularly in
the years around the tax changes. ¿ese statistics necessarily also reect overall
market developments beyond the tax changes.
Impact of new accounting legislation
With eect from  January , the accounting regime for Norwegian companies
was subject to amajor revision. Except for the payable tax-rate, all selected numbers
and ratios seem to be continuous at the same level across the change. I have not
explored this subject in more detail at this stage.
.. Supplementary data on rental-charges.
I include data on annual leasing- and rental-expenses for a limited subsample for
the years -. ¿ese expenses are split between charges for rented real estate
and for equipment (cars, machinery etc.), but we lack any contractual details. ¿e
data comes from the Norwegian capital database provided by Statistics Norway
and documented in Raknerud, Rønningen, and Skjerpen (). ¿e database
only covers selected industries, primarily manufacturing. Table . provides an
overview. ¿e capital database covers  % of the companies in the same -digit
industry sectors found in the main database and the table includes a comparison
of the relevant industry groups. In , a total of , ( % of the sample)
companies reported rental expenses for either real estate or equipment17. ¿e
rental expenses have a meaningful magnitude compared to interest expenses.
Assuming that assets rented or leased are not owned by the company’s own
shareholders, these additional data-items allow for a broader denition of leverage
beyond reported debt. In principle, this is achieved by capitalizing the rented assets
and adding this value to assets and to interest bearing debt. Rented assets replicate
All Norwegian companies have a unique -digit identication number which allows for exact
linking of data from dierent sources, in this case the capital database and the accounting data-set.

regular debt to a large degree in that their use is subject to regular cash-payment,
seeMyers, Dill, and Bautista () for an early discussion. However, non-payment
of rental charges leads to the loss of a specic rented asset whilst non-payment
of debt may lead to liquidation of the whole company. ¿e probability of loosing
a rented asset is larger than for a debt-nanced one, but likely consequences are
smaller. Whilst the balance sheet inclusion of rented equipment is easily motivated,
owning or renting real estate are two more fundamentally dierent positions. An
owner will experience market value changes on real estate whilst the tenant has
no such exposure. When capitalizing real estate rents, I thus only dene a ’loan’,
to avoid imposing a real estate investment decision on a tenant. In this analysis I
apply a modied version of the ’Constructive Capitalization’ - method introduced
by Imho Jr., Lipe, and Wright ().
¿emotivation for including rental charges in a study of capital structure is to
achieve a more economically correct understanding of the companies’ access to
alternative sources of nancing.18 In the analysis where rental charges are included,
I limit the study to companies covered by the capital data-base, supplemented with
single-company19 accounting data for the relevant years. ¿e limited size of the
sample makes it relevant for a targeted analysis, but the overall panel regressions
will be done using the main data set.
. Main descriptive ndings
¿is section presents and discusses the capital structure of Norwegian limited
liability companies overall, by dierent measures and categories.
.. Denitions of debt and leverage
Relevant debt
¿e broadest denition of ’debt’ is as ’non-equity’-nancing. A company usually
has both short-term liabilities like taxes due and trade credit20 which do not claim
One might in principle wish to capitalize any longer term obligation or contractually received
cashows, but this is for obvious reasons not currently possible.
¿e capital database only includes single companies and no consolidated groups.
Trade creditors may safely be expected to charge indirectly for their lending, e.g., through
discounts for immediate payments. It is, however impossible to calculate these borrowing costs

Table .: Overview of the capital database. ¿e table presents selected univariate
statistics for the companies included in the capital database -. ¿e columns marked ∆
show the relative dierences between the mean/median of these companies and the sample of
single entity companies in the same -digit industry-segments in the accounting database. Interest-
expenses and -cover are estimated by using annually winsorized credit margins plus annual NIBOR
 mnth. interest rates. Variable descriptions are found in Appendix A.
(NOK , rates) n Mean ∆(%) Median ∆ (%) St.dev.
Total revenues , , . , . ,
Total assets , , . , . ,,
Interest bearing debt , , .  . ,
Equity , , .  . ,
Interest expenses, est. , , .  . ,
Property rentals ,  n.a.  n.a. ,
Equipment rentals ,  n.a.  n.a. ,
Total debt/assets , . (.) . - 
In.bear.debt/assets , . (.) . . 
Int.bear.debt/EBITDA , . (.) . . 
Interest cover, est. , . (.) . . ,
explicit interest-payments. Table . shows that across the sample, liabilities other
than equity, interest bearing debt and trade credit constitute on average  % of
total assets.
I focus on interest-bearing debt (IBD) as the relevant non-equity nancing
from a nancial capital structure perspective. IBD can be expected to have all the
regular contractual features of the theoretical concept of ’debt’ (Tirole (), p.
) in terms of cashow, liquidation rank, contingent control rights and possibly
security, and will have been raised through active nancing negotiations between
the company and its’ lenders. Debt contracts vary by maturity, call-features, senior-
ity, convertibility, xed or oating interest rate, security, covenants and possibly
other features which indicates that even IBD is a fairly generic term.
Leverage measures
Table . provides an overview of selected leverage ratios which are dened
in Appendix A.. ¿e total debt ratio (mean  % / median  %) shows the
precisely by outsiders and trade credit is thus not included in the narrow term "Interest bearing
debt".

overall importance of non-equity capital for the nancing of companies. ¿e other
leverage ratios use interest bearing debt as nominator, and total assets, invested
capital and EBITDA21 as denominators. ¿e IBD/total asset ratio (mean  % /
median  %) shows the relative importance of interest bearing debt as part of the
overall nancing of the company. ¿e IBD/invested capital ratio (mean  % /
median %) is the narrowest measure. It tells the company’s choice between these
two fundamental sources of capital. ¿e two other leverage measures constructed
are ’ow’ measures, Interest bearing debt/EBITDA (mean -. / median .) and
interest cover (mean . / median . ). ¿ese measures indicate ’debt capacity’
in that they relate the debt to the company’s cashows and prots and thus ability
to service debt. In comparison, the balance sheet measures are indicators of the
security behind the debt in case of default and liquidation.
¿e last ratios included in Table . covers IBD-maturity and trade credit use.
On average  % (median  %) of interest bearing debt is long-term, although
the short-term may be underestimated in the data due to lack of specication.
Trade credit represents on average  % (median  %) of the sum of IBD and
trade credit. ¿is shows the large importance of trade credit as a nancing source,
but the lack of specic terms causes me to exclude it from the denition of relevant
debt.
It is particularly challenging for the study of leverage ratios that in spite of the
standardization as described in Appendix B,  % of the rm-year observations
have negative equity capital causing analytically ’impossible’ ratios. As for now,
these observations are not excluded from the data-set.
.. Capital structure by company categories.
Table . introduces the subsamples in the analysis. ¿ese are dened by dividend
payment, scale, auditor’s formal remarks and ownership categories as separately
reported in Table .. ¿ese subsamples will also be separately studied in the panel
regressions in section .
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciations and amortizations.

Dividend payers
Dividend-payment is shown in the data to be a strong indicator of what may
collectively be called ’nancial health’. Dividend-payers are typically not nancially
constrained and use much less debt by any measure, they obtain far more outside
new nancing both as debt and equity, and deliver a total return twice that of
the non-payers, and has a lower return volatility. Although the group-means
are signicantly dierent, stable dividend payment may be more of a signal than
reecting current performance.
Table .: Leverage by dividends, scale and auditors’ remarks. ¿e table presents
debt-ratios, nancing sources and risk and return ratios split by dividend payment last year, listing
and auditor’s remarks. Auditor’s remarks are those formally noted in the auditor’s statement to
the annual accounts for at least one of the two years before. All ratios are medians of the variables
measured relative to total assets by rm-year. Variable descriptions are found in Appendix A.
***,**,* indicates signicantly dierent means at  %,  % and  %-levels, respectively (T-test).
Dividend Auditor
payers? Scale remarks?
Yes No Smallest Largest Yes No
Split(n) .% .% % % .% .%
Debt ratios:
IBD/TA .*** . .*** . .*** .
IBD/Inv.cap .*** . .*** . .*** .
IBD/EBITDA .** . . . .** .
Bank debt .*** . .*** . .*** .
New nancing:
-CF rm . . .** . .** .
-IBD .*** . .*** . .*** .
-LT-debt .*** . .*** . .*** .
-Equity .** . . . .*** .
Risk & return:
ROAA .*** . .*** . .*** .
ROAA, st.dev. .*** . .*** . .*** .
Small and large companies
I scale the companies by the sum of log total asset by sample median and log
turnover by sample median, and study rms in the st and th quintiles of this scal-

ing distribution. Skewed distributions causes all mean debt ratios, except gearing,
to be larger for small rms whilst the medians are lower. Lower protability an
more limited access to outside funds explains why small rms get less new funds
from cashow and debt, compared to the largest rms. Our univariate comparison
indicates that the expected informational disadvantages of small rms impact only
debt nancing negatively, not equity.
Companies with historical auditor remarks.
¿e term ’Auditor remarks’ refers to formally noted qualications by the appointed
auditors as to signicantly negative accounting or reporting issues. Assuming
sequential causality, I classify a company as having auditor remarks if such are
noted in at least one of the two years preceding the reporting year. . % (,
rm-years) of the sample falls in this category.22 ¿e auditors are entitled to full
access to all information underlying companies’ accounts and negative remarks
will only come a er hard negotiations with the company and can therefore be
seen as a reliable, negative signal. ¿e prediction is that such remarks will impact
capital structure in the years to follow. Table . shows that leverage is signicantly
larger, most likely caused by historically lower cashows and returns. Mean bank
debt ratio(not reported) is  %-points higher, suggesting that the renancing-role
of banks a er distress dominate the credit-eects of these negative remarks, low
returns and higher volatility. Companies with historic auditor remarks both deliver
high cashows and raise relatively more outside nancing. ¿is may indicate a
dominance of renancing a er a crisis, and gives more support to the trade-o
than the pecking order theory. ¿ere is probably also a survivor bias in these
statistics.
Ownership and capital structure.
Table . splits the sample by main ownership categories. Since subsidiaries are
excluded,  % of the companies are owned by individuals. Listed and foreign
owned companies have the largest (median) overall reliance on equity. Companies
owned by individuals use the least IBD as part of their overall nancing, whilst
those held by other rms have the highest use of bank debt. In terms of debt
¿e remarks are of dierent gravity, but I do not distinguish them here.

capacity, the typical listed company has the largest gearing and those with unspec-
ied owners the lowest, relative to EBITDA. Companies owned by individuals
deliver the largest cashows and have almost no annual changes in interest bearing
debt, raise no new equity and deliver the highest return. Listed companies, as
commented above, have generally better access to outside nancing probably due
to lower information asymmetry. Companies held by foreigners have generally
the largest variations and the lowest return of all, both results may be caused by
corporate structures and transactions outside the nancial accounts.
Capital structure by size and protability.
Trade-o theories predict that leverage will increase in company size due to re-
duced risk and information asymmetry. Pecking order theory predicts that leverage
will fall in protability since cashows will be retained or used to repay debt. I
have conducted two simplistic illustrations of these two predictions in Figure ..
¿e lines show the changes23 in selected leverage ratios (Debt/Total assets, IBD/TA,
IBD/Inv.cap, Trade debt/TA) by deciles of total assets and EBIT, respectively. Both
explanatory variables were lagged one year. ¿e gures are created with equally
scaled y-axes for improved comparability. ¿e size graph shows that the relative
use of interest bearing debt increases by company size, but the other ratios fall,
although all changes are moderate. ¿is graph supports the trade-o theory’s
predicted increased use of interest bearing debt and also indicates that other debt
may be relatively stable. Somewhat contrary, the protability graph supports the
pecking order prediction in that the IBD/TA ratio falls as prots grow. ¿e graph
indicates that prots both are retained and used to repay debt, illustrated by the
large reduction in the IBD/Invested Capital ratio by prot. ¿e very limited sensi-
tivity of trade debt to the changes both in total assets and in prots supports the
separation between Trade debt and Interest bearing debt in this paper.
¿ese graphs are constructed by regressing the selected leverage ratios on dummies for each
size-/prot-decile as well as annual industry-leverage levels and year-dummies. In addition, I
included lagged EBIT in the total asset-decile-regressions and lagged log total assets in the EBIT-
decile-regressions to provide additional controls. ¿e regressions were done with no intercept,
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Figure 1. The figures shows how four balance sheet leverage
ratios vary by grouping the sample into deciles by total assets and
profits (EBIT), lagged one year. The lines are drawn between the
coefficients for decile dummies in clustered OLS-regressions with
no intercepts, but including industry and year dummies, as well as
lagged log total assets and EBIT, respectively. All coefficients are
significant at 10 % or lower levels, except for IBD/Inv.cap. in the
total asset deciles 9 & 10.
Figure .:¿e gures shows how four balance sheet leverage ratios vary by grouping the sample
into deciles by total assets and prots (EBIT), lagged one year. ¿e lines are drawn between the
coecients for decile dummies in clustered OLS-regressions with no intercepts, but including
industry and year dummies, as well as lagged log total assets and EBIT, respectively. All coecients
are signicant at  % or lower levels, except for IBD/Inv.cap. in the total asset deciles  & .

.. Leverage variations across industries
Industry-groups represents a common, secondary grouping approach to capital
structure analysis. Industries vary across many dimensions, Frank and Goyal
() nd that the median industry leverage-variable is the factor with the largest
explanatory power on company leverage. ¿is is also conrmed in the panel data
regressions to follow in section . Table . in the text and Table . in Appendix
C, give an overview of how industry-groups vary with respect to business prole
and capital structure measures. ¿e industry-grouping follow the aggregation of
industry codes used by Statistics Norway and are dened as follows:
. Farming and shing, including sh-farming which is particularly important.
. Petroleum related, reecting the reliance on the oil sector.
. Manufacturing industry and mining.
. Construction and energy-production.
. Retail and wholesale trade, tourism.
. International shipping and pipelines.
. Other transport and communications including telecom.
. Services, R&D, real estate and other rental providers.
. Culture, media etc.
. Information technology
Many capital structure studies are limited to manufacturing industries (e.g.,
Frydenberg ()). ¿e scale of my dataset allows for describing and comparing
the capital structure of all industry groups to highlight relevant dierences.
Industry operating comparisons.
Table . in Appendix C shows that Oil, Manufacturing industry and Trade
& tourism are of comparable size and together cover more that / of sample




























































































































































































































































































































































































including real estate companies, uses the largest share ( %) of sample assets. ¿is
structure is also evident in the asset turnover-numbers where Trade & tourism
shows , Services . andOil . compared to an overall average of .. Oil, Shipping
and Services have the largest entities with the highest asset-intensity. In terms of
performance, these sectors achieve the largest operating margins. A er deducting
depreciations and debt service, IT and Construction which have very high asset
turnover and the lowest asset tangibility, achieve the highest ROAA and ROAE-
numbers, although their operating margins are only average.
Industry leverage comparisons.
In the following, I will comment on the leverage position by industry-groups,
with reference to Table .. ¿e perspective is on typical companies rather than a
more macroeconomic sector view, thus the focus on medians rather than mean
ratios. To allow for details on bank debt, I have only used data from the year 
onwards.
Agriculture and shing ¿is small and fragmented sector has the highest use of
interest bearing debt with an IBDR ratio of . and an ICL ratio of .. Given this
high leverage, it is not surprising to also see the second highest ratio of new equity
raising (.).
Oil ¿e oil sector is large, concentrated and protable to the extent that annual
average cashow represents  % of total assets (not reported). ¿is cashow is
subject to tax-rates of ≥ %. ¿e protability explains low net changes in debt
and equity and the third largest interest cover. ¿e sector also has the highest
equity-ratio ( %)and seems nancially sophisticated with a bank debt ratio of
. indicating use of market or internal24 debt.
Manufacturing industries ¿e manufacturing sector is close to the averages
across the included variables, the exception being trade nancing and the large
use of new equity.
Many rms in this sector are subsidiaries of international parent companies which may also
be a source of debt nancing.

Construction & energy. ¿e construction and energy sector consists both of
regular construction companies and large hydroelectric power companies. ¿e
sector has the second lowest equity- and IBDR-ratios of . and . respectively.
¿e largest nancing item is trade credit with a ratio of .. ¿e low amount of
IBD also gives the sector the highest interest cover (ICOV).
Trade & tourism ¿is sector has the lowest equity ratio, but the nancing prole
is otherwise comparable to Construction & energy although the use of both trade
credit and IBD is somewhat higher at . and ..
Shipping Shipping has traditionally been an important industry in Norway, al-
though globalized legal and operational structures may well lead to an underrep-
resentation of companies reported here. ¿e sector has the largest rm cashow
(CFfi) of . and no average net outside nancing. ¿e nancing consists of equity
at . and IBD at .. Debt capacity is stretched with ICOV of only ., the second
weakest a er Agri/Fish. Asset-appreciation beyond book-values have traditionally
been an important source of prot in shipping and may partly explain the high
book leverage.
Transport& telecom Transport& telecomhas overall the highest leverage (Debt/Total
assets: .) and the third highest IBD-ratio. ¿is leverage in combination with
average protability gives a low interest cover of . and a GE-ratio above average
at .
Services Services is a mix of pure service companies with primarily human
capital and asset-intense real estate companies. ¿e sector has above average use
of IBD (IBDR: .) probably due to good security. New funds come primarily
from cashows.
Culture ¿e culture sector has both a high cashow (.) and is also one of very
few sectors with positive net new equity. ¿e other ratios are close to the overall
averages.

Information Technology Information Technology (IT) has the largest revenue
growth and return ratios as shown in Table .. Consistent with the funding
needs of this growth, net rm cashow is the lowest amongst the industries. IT is
typically expected to have lower leverage due to large information asymmetries,
in particular with regards to development of new products and services. ¿at the
median IBD-related ratios are  and the overall equity ratio (.) is second only
to Oil, are thus consistent. ¿e use of trade credit is also below the average.
¿ese results show how leverage and factors related to leverage vary signi-
cantly between industries supporting the use of industry factors when analyzing
capital structure. However, I nd almost no industry variation in the debt maturity
variable.
. Leverage with capitalized rental expenses.
Analysis of ’on-balance-sheet capital structure’ for private companies has some
important qualications, primarily due to lack of market valuations and capitaliza-
tion of additional signicant contractual receipts and obligations. In an attempt to
compensate for the latter, I estimate a more complete leverage measure by reden-
ing rented assets as eectively ’owned’ assets which are debt-nanced.25 Research
involving capitalization of leases was introduced by Nelson (). Imho Jr., Lipe,
and Wright () developed a methodology denoted ’constructive capitalization’
for operational leases. Fülbier, Lirio Silva, and Pferdehirt () present the empir-
ical literature in the eld and apply the approach on German listed companies. I
will use a simplied version of this methodology in the following and explore the
impact on assets, debt, measures of leverage and specication of prots. I do the
analysis on the smaller capital database, see Table ., combined with the single
company data-set from Dun&Bradstreet shown in the rst column of Table ..
¿is approach assumes that no assets kept under nancial leases are already on the balance
sheet, which is a fair assumption under Norwegian GAAP during this period.

.. Capitalizing rented equipment.
¿e estimated value of rented equipment, EV, is calculated using a standard
annuity-formula:
EV = FSE ∗ RE ∗ (( + rn)T − )rn ∗ ( + rn)T (..)
whereRE is the annual rental payment, nominally xed, FSE is the xed share of the
payment that covers the nancing costs, rn is the nominal discount-rate andT is the
remaining duration of the contract in years. Table . shows the sensitivity of the
valuemultiplier for rented equipment to remaining contract duration and assumed
nancial share of the rental payment. ¿e discount rate is  % in this illustration,
equal to the median borrowing interest rate of the companies the data-set. ¿e
interest rates are estimated with errors from insuciently specied accounting
numbers, but by winsorizing the credit margin symmetrically by  % annually and
adding the adjustedmargin to the nominal annual average NIBOR mnth. interest
rates, the distribution becomes reasonable. ¿e interest rates are for simplicity
not dierentiated between real estate- and equipment-rentals. I implicitly assume
that the rental charges can be analyzed as one, representative contract. I also
assume that a company’s equipment rental contracts have a nominally xed annual
payment, last for more years and that %of the annual rental charge is eectively
interest payment for the implicit nancing.26 ¿e remainder of the charge covers
servicing costs and instalments. ¿is approach results in a typical capitalization
value multiplier on the annual rental charges of .. In the subsequent analysis,
capitalizations use the estimated annual borrowing interest rates for each company.
Compared with the methodology in Imho Jr., Lipe, and Wright (), I leave
aside any periodic valuation dierences due to straight-line depreciation of the
asset and the delayed implicit reduction in the liability from a xed annual annuity
contract. ¿e adjustments thus do not impact the book equity of the companies.
Analytically, the objective of broadening the the scope of the balance sheet does
not suer from these simplications.
Leasing contracts o en have a  % downpayment at the start - I disregard this as a on-
balance-sheet asset.

Table .: Capitalized rental charges - sensitivities. ¿e table presents valuation
multipliers for annual equipment rental charges. ¿e multipliers vary by contract length and the
share of the rental charge that eectively covers the interest element of the implicit nancing. All
values are calculated as present values of annuities using a nominal discount rate of  %, equal to
the median of the data-set studied.
Rental contract duration in years:
  
Financial % . . .
rental % . . .
share % . . .
% . . .
% . . .
.. Capitalizing real estate rentals.
Real estate rentals dier by the long expected life and the value appreciation over
time. As introduced earlier, I leave out the equity element by assuming that the
company either owns the property but has written a call option which cancels all
upside potential, or has lent to the landlord an amount equal to the capitalized
rents and hold this loan as an asset. ¿ese positions are nancially equal. Real
estate rents are assumed xed in real value27 and should be capitalized by a real
discount rate, calculated by adjusting the annual company-specic interest rates by
the annual changes in the CPI-levels.  % of the rents are assumed to be nancial
and the remainder operational costs. ¿e value of rented real estate, denoted REV,
is thus calculated as:
REV = FSRE ∗ RRErr (..)
where rr denotes a real discount rate and the other variables retain their earlier
interpretations.
.. ¿e impact of capitalized rents.
¿e values of EV and REV are added to the adjusted operating and real estate
asset classes respectively, and the combined liability to adjusted interest bearing
Norwegian real estate rental contracts typically have an annual indexing clause linked to the
ocial Consumer Price Index(CPI)-changes.

debt. ¿e adjusted EBITDA28-prot following these adjustments is calculated as:
EBITDAadj. = EBITDA− FSE ∗ RE − FSRE ∗ RRE (..)
and the adjustment is added to interest costs keeping net prot unchanged.
¿eNorwegian interest rate- and ination-changes have uctuated a lot during
this period, creating volatile discount rates. ¿e ’rm-year’-approach thus creates
large swings in capitalized values between years, similar to an annual market-value
adjustment of other assets.
Table .: Capitalized rental charges. ¿e table shows the eects of capitalizing real estate
and equipment rental charges. ¿e top part shows means, percentiles and standard deviations for
original accounting items, capitalized values and combined estimates including the capitalized
rentals. ¿e lower part of the table shows the relative shares of capitalized rented assets and nancial
rental charges of the adjusted numbers for real estate, operating long term assets, total assets and
EBITDA in percentages in decimal form calculated for the years  -  only, due to data
availability. Variable and ratio descriptions are found in Appendix A.
Mean p Median p St.dev.
Real estate, bookv. ,    ,
Rented property, cap.v. ,   , ,
Total real estate, est. ,   , ,
Operational assets, bookv. ,   , ,
Rented op.assets, cap.v.     ,
Total op.assets, est. ,   , ,
Total assets, bookv. , , , , ,,
Tot. Assets incl. cap.v. , , , , ,,
Interest bearing debt ,   , ,
Interest bearing debt, incl. cap.r. ,  , , ,
EBITDA ,   , ,
EBITDA, rentals adjusted ,   , ,
Interest costs ,    ,
Interest costs incl. n.rent. ,    ,
Capitalized rental charges as share of adjusted items:
-Real estate . . . . .
-Operational assets . . . . .
-Total assets(liabilities) . . . . .
-EBITDA . . . . .
-Interest expenses . . . . .








































































































































































































































































































Table . shows how the capitalized asset/debt adjustment impacts asset-, debt-,
EBITDA- and interest expenses levels for the sample. Real estate has the largest
share of rentals where rented assets are on average  % (median  %) of the
adjusted values. ¿e distribution of this share is polarized with high densities at 
and  % rented share. Rented operating assets make up only  % (median  %) of
this adjusted asset-class29. ¿ese dierences are due to both the size of the annual
rental charges and the capitalization methods. ¿e rented assets’ share of total
assets is  % (median  %) showing the signicant importance of rented assets
as an alternative nancing source for Norwegian companies. ¿e adjustments to
EBITDA represents  % (median  %) of the adjusted number30. Financial rents
represents  % of total adjusted interest expenses, but the polarized distribution
and inclusion of more observations causes a reduced mean. Table . reports
the original debt-ratios compared with those a er the rental adjustments. As
shown, the increases are large and consistent with increased leverage, except for the
reduced mean of IBD/Invested Capital which is probably caused by distributional
reasons. ¿e overall picture illustrates the importance of including rented assets
for a more complete capital structure analysis.
Table . splits the impact of rented assets by the industry groups analyzed
in the previous section. Manufacturing industries represent  % of the capital
database and the representativeness of the ratios for other industries necessarily
suers from small samples. It is clear that companies in the Services-sector rent
less real estate and equipment than the average. ¿is is intuitively correct since
Services includes the real estate companies letting out properties themselves. ¿e
numbers also indicate that Agriculture/sheries rent much less than the average
and Transport & telecom and IT rent most real estate. Construction & energy,
Oil and Trade & tourism are the sectors renting most operating equipment. ¿e
relative eect on EBITDA is highest for manufacturing industries.
¿is analysis of the eect of capitalized rents dier from existing literature in
the magnitude of the data-set ( , companies across  years), the dominance
of private companies and the inclusion of real estate. ¿e overall conclusion is that
¿ese numbers are necessarily dependent on the fairly conservative assumptions chosen, se
Table ..
¿e EBITDA-ratio has been winsorized by  % symmetrically due to some large outliers since
the adjusted EBITDA-level came close to .

Table .: Use of rented assets by industry group ¿e table shows the eects of
capitalizing real estate and equipment rental charges by main industry groups. ¿e table shows the
relative shares of capitalized rented assets and nancial rental charges of the adjusted numbers
for real estate, operating long term assets, total assets and EBITDA in percentages in decimal
form calculated for the years  - . ¿e EBITDA-ratio is winsorized by  % symmetrically.
Variable and ratio descriptions are found in Appendix A.
Industry Real estate Oper.assets Total assets EBITDA
group n Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med.
Agri/sh  . . . . . . . .
Oil  . . . . . . . .
Mfg.ind. , . . . . . . . .
Constr./  . . . . . . . .
energy
Trade & , . . . - . . . .
tourism
Transport  . . . - . . . .
&telecom
Services , . . . . . . . .
Culture  . . . - . - . .
IT  . . . . . . . .
All , . . . . . . . .
an inclusion of capitalized rents adds important understanding to an analysis of
capital structure.
. Company characteristics explaining leverage.
An important descriptive nding is that rms are heterogeneous and show large
dierences in chosen capital structure. ¿is heterogeneity is of course more ap-
parent in this sample, since the whole population of rms is included, than in
conventional samples which are limited to publicly listed rms. ¿e detailed se-
lection of variables including indicators like auditors’ remarks makes additional
categorizings possible.
In the present section, I will apply regressionmethodology to better understand
what explain observed capital structure. In doing so, I also test the robustness of
earlier studies on this data set, particularly in the ’partial adjustment’ eld (see e.g.,
Flannery and Rangan ()). To be able to utilize the scale of the data set, as well
as signicant subgroups, and also get results that are comparable to earlier studies,

I limit the analysis to the more conventional measures found in the literature. In
the rst subsection I select and analyze single explanatory variables of leverage and
turn in the next subsection to a full scale multivariate dynamic panel regression.
To anticipate this analysis, I nd that the study of subgroups to a signicant degree
may cancel out the heterogeneity of the total sample. When estimating annual
adjustment rates, we also get relevant dierences between the groups.
.. Univariate drivers of leverage.
¿ere are no denite selection of suciently exogenous explanatory variables for a
regression of capital structure. Frank and Goyal () discuss theories of leverage
and what factors may reliably explain it.31 ¿ey group variables into growth,
rm size, asset tangibility, protability, industry leverage, dividends and expected
ination. ¿eir selection is broadly supported by papers like Fama and French
(), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (), Frydenberg () and Petersen
(), although variables covering volatility, accounting based growth indicators
and rm age also are common. Generally following those found in the literature, I
have selected  company characterizing variables based on expected economical
relevance. Due to the dominance of private companies, any market-value related
factors are necessarily le out:
• Scale: Total assets and total revenues, logged annual observations.
• Prole: Firm age in years, asset tangibility measured as long term assets over
total assets and payable tax-rate measured relative to pre-tax prot.
• Cashow: Cashow to equity and to rm, average cashow to rm for the
years preceding the observation.
• Performance: Dividends (including intra-group contributions), one-year
growth in net prot, return on average total assets, pre-tax (ROAA), current
year and average across the rm-years preceding the observation.
• Risk: Standard deviation of ROAA and cashow to rm for the years pre-
ceding the observation.
¿e discussion is based on their empirical ndings in Frank and Goyal ().

Average and volatility variables are measured across at least  years up to and
including the current year. Univariate statistics for these variables are given in
Table .. ¿e loss in number of observations from the original sample reported
in Table . is primarily caused by the inclusion of mean and standard deviation
measures which are not available for the rst years of the panel.
Table .: Company characteristics. , observations, the same subsample
as applied in Table ..
(NOK , rates) Mean p p p St.dev.
Total Assets , , , , ,
Revenues , , , , ,
Age . . . . .
Tangibility . . . . .
Tax-rate, payable . - . . .
Cashow, eq. () ()   ,
CF, rm , ()   ,
CF rm, avg.  ()   ,
Dividends  - -  ,
Prot growth,  y. . - . . . .
ROAA, pre-tax . . . . .
ROAA, average . . . . .
ROAA, st.dev. . . . . .
CF rm, st.dev. ,   , ,
I analyze the linkages between the selected variables and leverage for TDR,
IBDR and ICL. Table . in Appendix C shows the Spearman correlation matrix
between the leverage ratios and the variables. Table . shows the standardized
(beta) coecients of OLS-regressions of these leverage ratios on each of the char-
acterizing variables32, adding year-dummies and annual industry group leverage
medians. I report signicance level, F-values and R for each variable/model. ¿is
approach allows for a partial analysis of how each variable explains leverage whilst
controlling for industry- and calender year-eects.
Since the total debt ratio and the equity-ratio necessarily must sum to unity, the
coecients and signicance levels may also be interpreted as explanations of the
equity ratio. All ’positioning’-variables and those related to prots (log total assets,
Both in the univariate andmultivariate regression analysis to follow, I use accounting variables
relative to total assets and all variables lagged one year, except for averages and volatility variables

Table .: Leverage and company characteristics. ¿e table presents standardized
(beta-) coecients, F-values and R for models with the dierent leverage measures Interest
bearing debt/Total assets, Int.bearing debt/Invested Capital and Int.bearing debt/Invested capital
as dependent variables. ¿e independent variables are each variable independently, measured
relative to total assets if not already being a ratio and lagged one year, calender year dummies
and industry group average leverage ratios. Regression with robust standard errors clustered by
rms over the years. Signicance of coecients at  %,  % and  % levels are conventionally
marked with ***,**,* respectively. Variable univariate statistics are given in Table . and variable
descriptions are found in Appendix A. , observations.
Debt/TA IBD/TA IBD/Inv.Cap.
Coe. F R Coe. F R Coe. F R
Scale:
ln Total assets -.***  . .***  . -.***  .
ln Tot.Revenues .***  . -.*** , . .***  .
Prole:
Firm age -.***  . -.***  . -.***  .
Asset tangibility .***  . .*** , . .***  .
Tax rate, paybl. -.*** , . -.*** , . -.***  .
Cashows:
-CF equity -.**  . -.**  . -.**  .
-CF rm -.  . -.**  . -.*  .
-CF rm, avg. .  . .  . .  .
Performance:
Dividends -.***  . -.*** , . -.***  .
Revenue gwth,y. -.*  . -.  . -.*  .
ROAA, pre-tax -.***  . -.*** , . -.***  .
ROAA, avg. -.***  . -.*** , . -.***  .
Risk:
ROAA, st.dev. .***  . -.***  . .***  .
CF rm, st.d. .**  . .**  . .*  .
age, payable tax rate, cashows, dividends, ROAA) are signicantly negatively
related to the total debt ratio, supporting the view that prots are used to reduce
debt-levels over time. Of these, tax rate and average ROAA have both the largest
coecients and most explanatory powers. ¿e standard deviation of ROAA and
of rm cashows carry positive coecients which indicate that previous volatility
either has depleted equity or created a need for new debt of some kind. An
alternative explanation may be that with increased risk, equityholders’ would want
to ooad more risk onto lenders through increased leverage. Total revenues has a
positive coecient, the explanation may be that increased revenues creates more
trade debt, although the growth itself is weakly negative. Asset tangibility reects

the security available for lenders and is unsurprisingly positively related to leverage
across all ratios.
¿e IBD-ratio gets the same signs, magnitude and signicance as the total debt
ratio on almost all the variables. ¿e exception, in addition to total revenues, is
the large, negative and strongly signicant coecient for the volatility of ROAA.
¿is indicates that past volatility is viewed negatively by lenders and reduces
the availability of formal, interest bearing debt for the company. Similarly, the
positive coecient on total assets supports an argument that increased size reduces
informational asymmetry making outside nancing more ecient. ¿e negative
coecient for total revenues may be a proxy for prots as discussed above since
any increases in trade debt necessarily are not included in the IBD-ratio.
¿e nal ratio, ICL, is eectively the company’s mix between two alternative
forms of capital employed33. Most variable coecients are signicant and some
models get sensible F-statistics, although none provide any meaningful explana-
tions in terms of R. Most coecients have the same signs and signicance as
for IBDR and the magnitude also reects that the dependent variable have larger
absolute values.
.. Multivariate panel regression analysis of leverage.
I have so far analyzed the capital structure of Norwegian companies descriptively
and by univariate regressions which provide an overview and primarily partial
explanation of capital structure. Given the low R-values from the univariate
regressions in the previous section, it is clearly a demanding task to dene an
appropriate regression strategy with this heterogeneous sample. I have chosen
to proceed with a regression of the book-leverage ratio in order to analyze both
private and public rms. Since the data-set lacks any market values reecting
the cost-of-capital and also have limited information regarding outside nancing
events, I nd it in any case less suitable for a test of the pecking order theory.
¿e book leverage ratio I study is ’Interest bearing debt relative to total assets’
(IBDR). It is well known that this measure is highly persistent. E.g. Lemmon,
Roberts, and Zender () shows that in their sample of all non-nancial rms
Capital employed and invested capital are synonyms.

in the CRSP/Compustat database for the years  - , an ADL-regression34
on book leverage, the coecient on last year’s ratio in explaining the current
level is . with an R of .. Similarly, my sample including SMEs and primarily
private rms shows a coecient of . with an R of .. Decomposed, the IBDR’s
standard deviation of . is separated into . between the , rms and .
within the on average . yearly observations by rm. Industry median leverage
shows the same pattern of within group persistence with an overall standard
deviation of ., a between statistic of . and a within statistic of .. By testing
this autoregressive feature of IBDR using simple pooled-OLS, I get residuals with
signicantly positive coecients between current year and across the whole sample
(up to  years).
Methodological considerations.
Given the persistence in the leverage ratio, I need to include last year’s IBDR as
explanatory variable in what is denoted a ’dynamic panel regression’. By including
the lagged IBDR-measure, I regress a partial adjustment- model following recent
papers like Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (), Chang andDasgupta () and
Flannery and Rangan (). Partial adjustment refers to the degree of adjustment
a company does from last year’s IBDR towards the assumed optimal leverage ratio.
¿e optimal IBDR is predicted annually by a set of current35 explanatory variables.
¿e generally applied regression model is
Yit = αYi,t− + βXi,t− + νi + εit (..)
where
i = , ...,N; t = , ...,T,
and Yit is interest bearing debt ratio and Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables for
the i rms across the t years, νi is a rm specic xed eect and the residuals are
assumed to be εit ∼ IID(,σε). ¿e lagged le -hand variable introduces mutual
interdependencies between the current level of Y and last period’s residuals and
vice versa creating a downward bias in xed eect panel coecients as shown by
Nickell (). ¿e dynamic eect on Pooled OLS-coecients is an upward bias
No additional control variables included.
¿e actual variables applied are usually lagged one year to reduce the endogeneity problem.

and the estimators are inconsistent for xed T, whilst the xed eect estimators
regain consistency for large T.
Arellano and Bond () developed a rst dierence General Methods of
Moments (GMM)-model for dynamic panels utilizing as instruments all available
lagged rst dierence of the dependent variable and the rst dierences of the
other explanatory variables. ¿is rst dierences regression method accepts both
sequentially exogenous explanatory variables, and rst order autocorrelation in
the explained variable, and utilizes as all previous realizations of the variables as
instruments. It is regarded as particularly suitable for panels with a large number
of cross-sectional observations across relatively few time periods. ¿ese models
will typically have more instruments than endogenous variables and thus allows
for testing whether the model is overidentied or has unobserved variables using
Sargan/Hansen test (Hansen ()). Arellano and Bover () and Blundell
and Bond () demonstrate that rst dierence GMM performs poorly if the
autoregressive coecient, α, is large and approaches unity and the data has large
variance in the xed eect relative to the idiosyncratic variance. My dataset most
likely falls into this category. Blundell and Bond () develop a ’system GMM’-
model which estimates the regression in levels by utilizing both lagged levels and
rst dierences as instruments and as such obtain more instruments for a given
panel. In my application of this approach in Table . I also compare the results of
this model with more conventional pooled- and panel xed eect- instrumental
regressions, all in levels.
Choice of explanatory variables
As my research focus is to better understand the capital structure choices of
rms’ managers, I use only lagged variables and no year-dummies to replicate the
likely information set of the decision maker for each observation. I do include
lagged median industry IBDR to control for common industry eects. ¿e use of
lagged variables either directly or as instruments also limits the endogeneity of
current-year observations. Starting out with the previously discussed set of  likely
explanatory variables as analyzed in Table ., I did a stepwise OLS-regression
procedure usingWald-tests to suggest variables formultivariate analysis of leverage.
¿e regressions applied Rogers’ standard errors (clustered on rms) which are also

robust for heteroscedasticity by the Huber/White-sandwich estimator, following
Petersen (). With the help of this procedure and the univariate analysis of
relevance, I selected the reported variables.
Regression results
Table . reports the results from alternative regressions of IBDR in levels. Col-
umn one reports a pooled instrument(IV) regression where  lags of IBDR are
included as exogenous explanatory variables and the current values of the remain-
ing variables are instrumented by  lagged levels. Column two reports the same
specication as panel IV regression with a xed rm eect. Column three reports
the system GMM regression following Blundell and Bond () with the same lag
structure as in the previous regressions. System GMM also instruments the lagged
values of IBDR and diers in this respect dierent from the two previous specica-
tions. Due to the size of the dataset and computational demanding method, I had
to apply the system GMM-regression on smaller samples. To avoid any selection
bias, I randomly selected  samples (with replacement) of  % each from the
data-set. Each individual regression sample included approximately , rms
and , rm-years. ¿e table reports average coecients and p-values from the
system GMM-regression as well as calculated long term steady state coecients.36
¿e IV regressions are run on the whole sample, although the inclusion of lagged
variables has caused a reduced regression sample.
¿e comparison of the results shows that as predicted, the pooled IV- over-
states and xed eect IV-regression understates the coecient on the lagged IBDR
variable. ¿e coecients on the other variables show no systematic relationship,
neither in the short- or long-run. When comparing these three similarly speci-
ed regressions, the most striking dierence, in addition to the magnitude of the
coecient on the lagged IBDR-variable, is that the other β-coecients change
both sign, signicance and magnitude. Most of the variables get the smallest and
least signicant coecients in the System GMM-regression and the largest in
the pooled IV regression. ¿ese results are perhaps not surprising since both
pooled IV and xed eect IV are inconsistent in a dynamic panel specication.
With reference to equation (..), the long term coecients of the explanatory variables are
calculated as α(−β) , implicity assuming that the rm is in a steady state.

Table .: Panel regressions of leverage. ¿e table presents current and long-term coecients and
p-values for cross-sectional and xed eect instrument-regressions, and a system GMM regression of leverage (Interest
Bearing Debt Ratio, IBDR) in a dynamic specication. ¿e system GMM regression result is the average from  ran-
domly selected (with replacement)  % samples from the dataset. Signicance of coecients at %,  % and  % levels
are conventionally marked with ***, ** and *, respectively. ρ is the autoregressive coecient of ε in a regression with no
constant term. Variable descriptions are found in Appendix A.
IBDR IV IV LT XTIV XTIV LT GMM GMM LT
IBDRt− .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
IBDRt− .*** -.*** .*
(.) (.) (.)
ln Total Assets .*** . .*** . -. -.
(.) (.) (.)
ln Total Assets(t-) .
(.)
ln Turnover, rel. .*** . -.*** -. . .
(.) (.) (.)
ln Turnover, rel.(t-) -.
(.)




















Industry IBDR(t-) -. . -. . -.* -.
(.) (.) (.)
Industry IBDR(t-) .* .* .
(.) (.) (.)
NIBOR -. . -.*** . -.* .
(.) (.) (.)
NIBOR(t-) .*** .*** .**
(.) (.) (.)
NIBOR(t-) . .*** -.
(.) (.) (.)
Constant -.*** .*** -.
(.) (.) .
No. of observations: , , ,
R . . Repeated
ρ(εt, εt−) -.*** -.*** samples

¿e unbiased system GMM-regression is useful for estimating the speed of ad-
justment, but the limited selection of signicant explanatory variables reduces
the applicability weaker. When comparing the results with Lemmon, Roberts,
and Zender (), Table , there are similarities in terms of switching signs on
coecients between methods, although more of their coecients are signicant.
As assumed for the system GMMmethod, there is rst-order autoregression in
the residuals, and except for a few samples, no signicant autoregression of higher
order. However, the Sargan test of overidentication rejects the null-hypothesis of
no overidentication in  % of the sample regressions. Given that the samples are
large, referring to Davidson and G.MacKinnon () page , misspecication
or unobserved variables may also cause signicant rejections of this test. ¿e far
fewer rejections of the test in the study of more homogeneous subsamples below
indicate that unobserved variables present in the large sample may be the actual
cause of the high rejection rates.
.. Panel data analysis by subsamples
Table .37 reports selected results of the panel data regressions for the whole
sample, the smallest and the largest size-quintiles, rms paying dividends at least
/ of the reported years and rms having auditor comments in their accounts
in more than / of the years. ¿ese denitions of groups reect rstly the view
that as a consistent dividend payer, a rm have to deliver a stable dividend stream.
Secondly, since auditor remarks are assumed to inict lasting reputational damage,
I assume that remarks in / of the years is sucientas a classication.
In these regressions, selected variables get meaningful coecients that allows
for comparisons between subsamples. We will return to a discussion of the dier-
ences in the speed of adjustment below and leave it for now. ¿e smallest and most
distinct group, listed companies, also has the most signicant coecients and
broadly conrm conventional results in that leverage is growing in size, tangibility
and industry leverage, and falling in protability and interest rate levels. Another
fairly distinct and probably nancially distressed group, are the rms with auditor
comments. ¿e main dierence from the listed rms is that dividends get a large
and signicant coecient. Assuming that these rms are nancially constrained
Since only signicant coecients are reported in this table, a complete table is found in ..

Table .: Regressions of leverage by subsamples. ¿e table presents the signicant
coecients from a System GMM regression of leverage (Interest Bearing Debt Ratio, IBDR) in a
dynamic specication. ¿e system GMM regression result is the average from repeated sampling
from the dataset. Only signicant variables are reported. A complete table including all coecients
and p-values is found in Table . in the Appendix. Variable descriptions are found in Appendix
A.
Dividend Auditor
All Scale: payers? remarks?
rms Large Small Yes No Yes No Listed
IBDRt− .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***












ROAA, avg. -.* -.**
ROAA, a.(t-) .**
Ind.IBDR(t-) -.* -.*** -.** -.* -.** .**
Ind.IBDR(t-) .*
NIBOR -.* -.* -.*** -. .***
NIBOR(t-) .** .*** .* .** -.***
NIBOR(t-) -.***
N(rms, avg.) , , , , , , , 
N(rm-yrs., avg.) , , , , , , , ,
Samples        All
Sample size (%) . . . . . . . All
Sargan***(%) . . . . . . . .

and have limited access to debt, this indicates that when there is cashow available
to pay dividends, this is also a useful indicator of access to debt. Comparing the
coecients with the coecients in Table ., all variables except relative dividends
retain their signs although the magnitude may not be compared due to dierences
in methodology and specication. As to the methodological choices, the regres-
sions by subgroups show that the most distinct groups, small companies, listed
and those with auditor remarks, somehow have less problem with unobserved
variables and/or overidentication whilst the broader groups, e.g., large rms and
dividend payers are still very heterogenous and the Sargan-test rejects the null as
discussed above.
Flannery and Rangan () test rm’s annual adjustment towards the optimal
leverage by dening ( − α) as the adjustment speed from last year’s leverage
ratio. Our coecient on lagged IBDR as reported in Table . represents a target
leverage adjustment speed of  %, very close to the  % found by Flannery and
Rangan () in a xed eect regression on US Compustat data for the years 
- . ¿eir long time dimension may be part of the explanation why there is no
apparent bias between their result andmy systemGMMresults. It is also somewhat
surprising that the fundamental dierences between the selection of rms do not
seem to matter in this aspect. We see large variations across the subsamples,
between large rms that close  % of the gap per year and the the dividend-payers
that close only  % and thus have the most persistent leverage ratio. ¿e latter
may indicate no eective rm-related nancing constraints and that dividend-
paying rms are less concerned about optimizing their capital structure. Towards
the other end of the range, rms with auditor comments may be expected to be
more nancially constrained and as it seems, be more inclined to optimize their
capital structure given today’s situation and less satised with keeping last year’s
leverage ratio. ¿e inclusion of ’Speed of adjustment’ calculated using xed eect
IV regression highlights how vulnerable such analyzes are to choice of method, as
theoretically predicted. As reported in Table ., neither the magnitude of the
coecients nor the internal ranking between the subsamples show similarities
between the methods.

Table .: Speed of adjustment - FE vs. SystemGMM.¿e table presents the estimated
speed of adjustment coecients from a System GMM regression of leverage (Interest Bearing Debt
Ratio, IBDR) in a dynamic specication compared with a xed eect instrumented panel regression.
¿e unreported explanatory variables are log total assets, log Total return, payable taxrate, dividends
relative to total assets, return on average total assets (current and average historic), industry median
IBDR and annual average NIBOR  mnth. interest rate. ¿e system GMM regression result is the
average from repeated samplings from the dataset. Variable univariate statistics are given in Table
. and variable descriptions are found in Appendix A.
Method: Fixed eect System GMM
Speed of Adj. Rank Speed of Adj. Rank
All . .
Largest quintile . () . ()
Smallest quintile . () . ()
Dividend payers. . () . ()
Non-dividend payers . () . ()
Auditor-comments . () . ()
No auditor comm. . () . ()
Listed . () . ()
.. Summary on the regressions
¿e panel regression results have illustrated the challenging task of building a
useful regression model for testing capital structure-theories. ¿e well motivated
’System GMM’-method produce both statistically weak and economically less
useful coecients. Compared with other papers that apply this method, the short
time-span of the data-set may be part of the explanation. On the other hand, the
model seems to produce reasonable estimates for the leverage ’speed of adjustment’
between years which allows for comparisonswith related research. ¿e comparison
in in Table . is in itself a useful example of the xed eect bias for shorter panels.
Another methodological issue is the variations in the rejection rates of the Sargan
test by subsamples as reported in Table .. Only distinct subsamples of either
listed rms, small rms or rms with auditor remarks seem to be suciently
homogenous to eliminate the eects of a potentially common unobserved variable.
¿e comparable sizes of the regression samples implies that these eects are not
related to number of observations as such. Future research may further explore
alternative sample denitions including industry groups.

. Conclusion
¿is paper is a comprehensive documentation of the capital structure of a pop-
ulation dataset of private and public Norwegian companies. I conduct a com-
plete descriptive analysis of leverage by alternative ratios, over time, by company
categories and nally by regression methods. I show that although Norwegian
companies’ capital structure has been fairly stable over the period -, there
are several generic discoveries.
Firstly, the very high degree of persistency in rm-leverage in this data set of
primarily private companies gives an estimated speed of adjustment very close
to the levels found in far longer dated samples including US publicly listed rms.
Using the breadth of the dataset, clear dierences in this speed of adjustment are
found betweenmore or less distinct subgroups. ¿e latter refers both to the general
commonality between rms in a subgroup and similarities in terms of nancing
possibilities.
Secondly, I document large operational and nancial dierences between
company categories and industry groups through the descriptive analysis ¿is
compares well with the US ndings on public companies in Frank and Goyal
() regarding the importance of industry leverage.
¿irdly, the paper includes an analysis of the capital structure of a selected
subsample adjusted by capitalized rents. ¿is analysis nds signicantly increased
leverage ratios for large parts of the sample, although varying by sectors, and is a
rst attempt to recognize the importance of o-balance-sheet commitments in
the complete study of capital structure. ¿e small sample made it less relevant to
base the panel regression analysis on these rms.
Fourthly, the Norwegian taxation of companies and investors allows for a test
of use of debt without tax benets. ¿e results show large debt ratios (Total debt
ratio, median:  % / Interest bearing debt ratio, median:  %). Selected periods
with taxation of dividends at investor level show large and predictable swings in
dividend payouts, but no changes in the sources of new nancing. Univariate data
actually indicate reduced use of debt in years with dividend taxation. ¿is subject
is in itself an interesting area for further research.
Overall, the dominanting impression from the analysis is the persistence in
leverage ratios across the whole sample, although with dierences by subgroups.

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
.A Specication of variables.
.A. Accounting and rm variables.
¿e accounting variables are included as annual observations for -. Com-
pany xed variables are given only as of . Selected variables are described
below:
• Investments consists of securities and other nancial investments held as
short-term assets and are not netted against debt.
• Intangible assets is the sum of goodwill, immaterial assets and, before ,
activated costs.
• Interest bearing debt is the sum of long-term debt, excluding provisions,
deferred tax liability or similar items, plus short term specic interest bearing
debt. Long-term debt is a reliable number from the accounts. Short term
debt includes bank-debt, overdra s and short-term market debt, but lacks
a complete specication of other interest bearing short-term debt. "Short
term interest-bearing debt" is probably underestimated.
• Equity consists of total shareholders funds plus minorities in the case of
consolidated accounts.
• Invested capital is the sum of interest bearing debt and equity. Due to no
information regarding operationally required levels of cash nor whether
investments are nancial or strategic, these items have not been deducted
to get to invested capital.
• Net working capital consists of total short term assets less accounts payable,
taxes and duties due, dividends and group contributions payable.
• New interest bearing debt is a calculated item being the change in debt over
the year plus any instalments paid during the year. Payments on short-term
debt within the year is not fully specied in this approach.
• New equity is the net change in equity excluding prots and dividends,
recorded in cases where the nominal share capital has changed between the
years.

• Interest cost is calculated as total nancing costs less any write-downs. ¿is
is a crude measure and the spread a er deducting the NIBOR-rates have
been symmetrically winsorized by  % to standardize the most extreme
outliers.
• NIBOR ¿e  month NOK Norwegian Interbank Oered Rate, annual
average as reported by Norges Bank, the Central Bank of Norway.
.A. Denition of calculated variables and ratios
¿e subscript t denotes the current year.
Leverage related ratios
• Total debt ratio(TDR) is dened by:
TDR = Debt
TA
where Debt: All non-equity liabilities of any kind on the balance sheet and TA:
Total Assets.
• Interest bearing debt ratio(IBDR) is dened by:
IBDR = IBD
TA
where IBD: Interest Bearing Debt.
• Invested Capital Leverage (ICL) is dened by:
ICL = IBD
IBD + EQ +MINT
where EQ: Common shareholders’ funds and MINT: Capital belonging to mi-
nority shareholders in consolidated groups. ¿e combined denominator equals
Invested Capital (IC).
• Gearing (GE) is dened by:
GE = IBD
EBITDA
where EBITDA: Earnings before (net)interest costs, taxes, depreciations and amor-
tizations.

• Interest cover (ICOV) is dened by:
ICOV = EBIT + FI
IC
where EBIT: Earnings before (net) interest and tax, FI: Financial income and IC:
Estimated interest costs using average IBD and winsorized nominal interest rates.
• Debt maturity is dened by
GMAT = LIBD
IBD
where LIBD: Long-term interest bearing debt, maturity  year.
Performance variables and ratios.
• Asset turnover is calculated as:
ATO = TR((OPAt +OPAt−)/)
where TR is total revenues and OPA is long term operating assets.




• Cashow to rm is calculated by:
CFfi = OP + DA− TAXO ± NINV ± NPROV + FININAT.
whereOP is operating prot,DAdepreciations and amortizations,TAXO is payable
tax attributable to operating prot, NINV is net new investments, NPROV is net
new provisions and FININAT is nancial income a er tax.
• Cashow to equity is calculated by:
CFeq = CFfi − ICAT − DPAY
where ICAT is interest costs a er tax and DPAY any other payment to debtholders
including instalments. ¿ese items are mostly calculated as dierences between
years since explicit cashow statements are missing.

• Operating margin is dened by:
OPM = OP
TR
• Return on average assets (pre-tax) is dened by:
ROAA= EBIT + FI((TAt + TAt−)/)
• Return on average equity (pre-tax) is dened by:
ROAE = NP((EQt + EQt−)/)
where NP is net prot a er tax.
• Payoutrate is dened by
PR = (DIV + IGC)
NP
where DIV is dividends and IGC is intragroup contributions.
All standard deviations are estimated over no less than the  years up to and including
the current reporting year.
.B Data-set issues and adjustments
Reported accounting data are produced by companies at xed intervals rather
than being the result of a market clearing process like, e.g., the time-series of
share-prices. Any accounting data-set therefore includes a number of potentially
important sources of mistakes, in addition to the eect of only yearly frequencies.
¿e accuracy of accounts is subject to a range of managerial considerations which
outsiders cannot verify. ¿ese include e.g., depreciation-periods/rates/methods,
asset valuations or write-os, immaterial assets and timing of revenues and costs.
In particular, publicly listed companies may conduct ’earnings management’ in
an attempt to improve perceived performance. Coppens and Peek () nds
dierences in earnings management between public and private rms. ¿e current
data-set consists predominantly of private companies (. % share by number, 
% by assets) exposed to the the additional risk of:

• Mistakes, either in the accounts or, more likely, in the entering of items into
the database.
• Negative equity and/or debt caused by o-balance sheet contractual arrange-
ments, large dierences between market- and book- values of assets or any
undisclosed transitory eects between reporting years.
• Tax-motivated depreciation and timing practices disregarding the impact
on nancial reporting.
• General disregard of the principles of true and fair accounting for prot and
capital elements. ¿is may either be due to irrelevance of outsiders or that
relevant outsiders receive reliable information through other channels.
¿e overriding purpose in this paper of describing Norwegian capital structure
is to present the companies’ typically chosen nancing structure by extracting
empirical understanding from leverage data and control-variables. Observations
which with reasonable certainty can be deemed extreme or directly inconsistent
will not add value to the analysis. Table . shows the eects of alternative ways
to limit the data-set and their eects on the number of observations and on the
rst moments of total return and leverage. ¿e starting point is the combined
population data-set from column  in Table .. I analyze the eects from the
alternative limitations on two central ratios, return on assets (pre-tax, end-of-year
assets) and total debt-to-total asset ratio. ¿e rst set of limitations are economical
in that ’unreasonable’ observations are dropped. Positive equity, interest-bearing
debt-ratio (IBD/Totalassets) below  and return on assets (ROA) ≥- % are
all sensible overall exclusion criteria. Observations for companies outside these
criteria must either have explanations outside the nancial accounts or simply
be mistakes. As an example, real estate-companies with low book asset values
compared to market values may have negative book equity but still be viewed
as solvent, also by informed outsiders, but may violate the suggested limitations.
Table . indicates the outlying observations in the original data-set shown by the
large drops in standard deviations even with moderate reductions in the number
of rm-years.
¿e alternative approach is to winsorize the data-set by excluding the tails of
the distributions. I illustrate this by excluding the top and bottom ,  and  %

of the ROA-observations in each calender year. ¿e ROA- and the debt-ratios
have obvious outliers, e.g., a % cut in both tails of the ROA-distribution gives
a reduction in the standard deviation of ROAby . % and of the debt-ratio of
. %. ¿is method is purely statistical and involve no economical reasoning or
subjective judgement, but highlights the impact of outliers when using the data.
Table . shows that the two alternative approaches to limiting the data-set
works in dierent ways. ¿e economical limitations increase the means and
medians and reduce the variation in the data-set by excluding loss-making and
over-levered rm-year observations. ¿e statistical criteria decrease the means,
necessarily leave the medians unchanged, and provide a large drop in the variation,
since the method cuts the data-set symmetrically.
Based on this, I have chosen to limit the data-set by a  % winsorization of the
ROA-distribution, each year. ¿e outliers have been dropped and not replaced by
the  % and  % percentiles. ¿is  % cut in the number of rm-years leads to
a . % reduction in the ROA -ratio standard deviation and a . % reduction
in the Debt/(TotalAssets)-ratio standard deviation. ¿e mean ROA -ratios are
unchanged and themean(median)Debt/(TotalAssets)-ratio decrease by .(.)
%-points.
I have chosen to leave out observations which are excluded by the respective
criteria on the grounds that if one variable is an outlier, all data-elements in the
whole observationmay bemisguiding. ¿is applies to single rm-year observations
only and not to all observations for a given rm.

Table .: Alternative adjustments to the accounting data-set. ¿e table shows the
eect on return and leverage statistics of dierent economical and statistical limitations applied to
the original combined population set of accounting data presented in Table .. ¿e economical
limitations are: Non-negative equity, the sum of interest-bearing debt(IBD) being smaller than
total assets, and nally a pre-tax total return on end-of-year assets ≥ -% (ROA=(EBIT+nancial
income)/end-of-year total assets). ¿e statistical limitations include winsorizing the two tails
of the ROA-distribution by ,  and %, respectively, each calender year. ¿e table shows mean,
median and standard deviation for ROAand overall debt-to-total assets-ratio as well as the relative
reduction in number of observations resulting from the dierent limitations. ¿e annual number
of companies a er the  % ROA limitation is shown in Table .,  h column.
ROA (pre-tax, end-of-year)
Alternative limiting criteria: n & ∆ Mean Median St.dev
Unadjusted , . . .
Non-negative equity -.% . . .
Interest bearing debt < total assets -.% . . .
ROA - % -.% . . .
All combined: -.% . . .
Winsorizing - ROA:
% -.% . . .
% -.% . . .
% -.% . . .
Debt/(Debt+Equity)
Alternative limiting criteria: n & ∆ Mean Median St.dev
Unadjusted , . . .
Non-negative equity -.% . . .
Interest bearing debt < total assets -.% . . .
ROA> - % -.% . . .
All combined: -.% . . .
Winsorizing - ROA:
% -.% . . .
% -.% . . .




Table .: Key relative balance sheet values ¿e table rst shows the annual cross-
sectional mean, median and standard deviation of selected balance sheet items calculated relative
to company total assets for the years ,  and , and then means, percentiles, standard
deviations and kurtosis for the whole sample at company level. Operational- and intangible assets
are only reported as from  due to data-availability. I LT = Long-term and ST = Short-term.
Interest bearing debt is dened and calculated as described in Appendix A.
Annual values Whole sample
Balance sheet items:    Mean p p p St.dev. Kurt.
Assets:
ST assets, Mean . . . . . . . . 
excl. cash Median . . .
& investments St.dev . . .
Cash Mean . . . . . . . . 
Median . . .
St.dev . . .
Investments Mean . . . . - - - . 
Median - - -
St.dev . . .
LT assets Mean n.a. . . . - - . . 
(excl. op.ass. Median n.a. - -
from ’) St.dev n.a. . .
LT Oper.assets Mean . . . . . . . . 
Median . . .
St.dev . . .
Real estate Mean . . . . - - . . 
Median - - -
St.dev . . .
Intang. assets Mean n.a. . . . - - . . 
Median n.a. - -
St.dev n.a. . .
Financing:
ST debt Mean . . . . . . . . ,
excl. Trade- Median . . .
& int.bearing St.dev . . .
Trade credit Mean . . . . . . . . 
Median . . .
St.dev . . .
Int. bear. debt:
-Short-term Mean . . . . - - . . ,
Median - - -
St.dev . . .
-Long-term Mean . . . . - . . . ,
Median . . .
St.dev . . .
-Total Mean . . . . - . . . ,
Median . . .
St.dev . . .
Provisions Mean . . . . - - - . ,
Median - - -
St.dev . . .
Equity Mean . . . . . . . . ,
Median . . .
St.dev . . .

Table .: Balance sheet ratios ¿e table rst shows the annual cross-sectional mean,
median and standard deviation of selected balance sheet ratios for the years ,  and ,
and then means, percentiles, standard deviations and kurtosis for the whole sample at company
level. Bank debt is only reported as from  due to data-availability. ¿e ratios are dened and
calculated as described in Appendix A.
Annual values Whole sample
Balance sheet ratios:    Mean p p p St.dev. Kurt.
Net working Mean . . . . . . . . 
capital Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Invested Mean . . . . . . . . ,
capital Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Bank debt Mean n.a. . . . - . . . ,
Median n.a. . .
St.dev. n.a. . .
Net annual increases:
-Interest Mean . . . . - . - . . ,
bearing Median - - -
debt St.dev. . . .
-LT debt Mean . . . . - . - . . ,
Median - - -
St.dev. . . .
-Equity Mean . . . . - - - . ,
Median - - -
St.dev. . . .

Table .: Key relative income statement items¿e table rst shows the annual cross-
sectional mean, median and standard deviation of selected income statement items calculated
relative to company total assets for the years ,  and , and then means, percentiles,
standard deviations and kurtosis for the whole sample at company level. Tax rate is calculated
relative to prot before tax and dividends are calculated relative to net prot. EBIT = Earnings
before interest and tax.
Annual values Whole sample
Income statement items:    Mean p p p St.dev. Kurt
Total revenues Mean . . . . . . . . ,
Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
EBIT Mean . . . . - . . . . 
Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Net prot, Mean . . . . - . . . . ,
a er tax Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Cashow to Mean . . . . - . . . 
rm, pre-tax Median . . - .
St.dev. . . .
Tax rate/(pre- Mean . . . . - . . 
tax prot), Median . . .
payable St.dev. . . .
Dividends Mean . . . . - - . . ,
incl. group c./ Median - - -
(net prot) St.dev. . . .
Dividends Mean . . . . - - . . ,
incl. group c./ Median - - -
(Total assets) St.dev. . . .
Table .: Key performance ratios¿e table rst shows the annual cross-sectional mean,
median and standard deviation of selected performance measures calculated for the years ,
 and , and then means, percentiles, standard deviations and kurtosis for the whole sample
at company level. ¿e ratios are dened and calculated as described in Appendix A.
Annual values Whole sample
Performance ratios:    Mean p p p St.dev. Kurt
Return on Mean . . . . . . . . 
average assets, Median . . .
pre-tax St.dev. . . .
Return on Mean . . . . - . . . ,
average equity, Median . . .
post-tax St.dev. . . .
Operating Mean - . - . - . - . . . . . ,
margin Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Revenue Mean . . . . - . . . . ,
growth, Median . . .
annual St.dev. . . .
Prot Mean . . . . - . . . . ,
growth, Median . . .
annual St.dev. . . .

Table .: Key leverage ratios¿e table rst shows the annual cross-sectionalmean, median
and standard deviation of selected leverage ratios calculated for the years ,  and , and
then means, percentiles, standard deviations and kurtosis for the whole sample at company level.
¿e ratios are dened and calculated as described in Appendix A.
Annual values Whole sample
Leverage ratios :    Mean p p p St.dev. Kurt.
Total debt/ Mean . . . . . . . . ,
Total assets Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Int. bearing debt/ Mean . . . . . . . . ,
Total assets Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Int. bearing debt/ Mean . . . . . . . . ,
Invested capital Median . . .
St.dev. . . .
Int.bearing debt/ Mean -. -. -. -. . . . , ,
EBITDA Median . . .
St.dev.   .
Interest cover, Mean   . . . . . , ,
winsorized credit Median . . .
spread St.dev.  , ,
Debt maturity, (LT/ Mean . . . . . . . . ,
Total interest Median . . .
bearing debt) St.dev. .  .
Trade credit/ Mean . . . . . . . . 
(Trade credit Median . . .
+Int. bearing debt) St.dev. . . .

Table .: Summary statistics combined population data-set - Long-
term operating assets, intangible assets and bank debt are only present as from
.
(NOK ) N Mean p Median p St.dev.
Income statement:
Total revenues , , , , , ,,
Operating prot , , ()   ,
Net prot , , ()   ,
Cashow to rm ,  ()   ,
Dividends ,  - -  ,
Assets:
Current assets , ,  , , ,
Cashow to rm , ,    ,
Investments , , - - - ,
LT assets , ,   , ,
Operational assets (LT) , ,   , ,
Real estate , , - -  ,
Intangible assets , , - -  ,
Total assets , , , , , ,,
Financing:
Short-term debt , ,   , ,
Trade credit , ,    ,
-Interest bearing debt:
-Short-term , , - -  ,
-Long-term , , -  , ,
-Total , , -  , ,
Provisions , , - - - ,
Equity , ,   , ,
Balance sheet based measures:
Net working capital , ,   , ,
Invested capital , ,  , , ,
Bank debt , , -  , ,
New outside nancing:
-Interest bearing debt , , () -  ,
-Long term debt , , () - - ,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Start-up Financing: Outside Equity

coauthored with Hans K. Hvide 1
Abstract
We investigate the extent to which start-ups use outside equity, and
interpret our results in relation to nancial contracting theory. We do so by
studying the start-up and founder characteristics that are associated with
the use of outside equity nancing, using a unique dataset from Norway.
Our ndings suggest that adverse selection are less of a concern for start-ups
than ex-post opportunistic behavior (risk shi ing) by the entrepreneur as in
Myers () and Ravid & Spiegler (). One implication of this nding
is that outside equity and debt are complements rather than substitutes,
and that an extra unit of equity nancing has a multiplicative eect on
total nancing through releasing additional debt nancing. We do not nd
convincing evidence that the use of outside equity has detrimental eects
on entrepreneurial eort, nor that a possible shortage of available outside
equity leads to investor monopolization and excessive investor returns. ¿us
we provide evidence that outside equity provides an important avenue for
entrepreneurs to escape liquidity constraints.
¿anks to ¿ore Johnsen, Eirik G. Kristiansen, Kjell Nyborg, and seminar participants at
Aberdeen and NHH for comments and suggestions. ¿anks also to Robert Holm at Brønnøysun-
dregisteret, and to LenaMari Johnsen for excellent research assistance. Hvide has received nancial




While a large body of research studies the role of debt in the outside nancing
of new and small companies (e.g., Bond & Townsend, , Petersen & Rajan,
, Cassar, , Paulson et al., ), much less is known about the role of
outside equity nancing. Outside equity nancing is apparently quite commonly
used by start-ups; aggregate evidence on small rms in the US suggests that equity
provided by other than the principal founder amounts to about  percent of total
funding (Berger & Udell, ). ¿is gure is comparable to the amount of lending
from commercial banks ( percent) and trade credit ( percent), both sources of
funding that have been studied extensively. ¿e purpose of this paper is to analyze
the extent to which, and why, start-ups use outside equity. In addition, we attempt
to analyze the eectiveness of outside equity nancing.
We view understanding the role of outside equity as important for two reasons.
First, a large theoretical literature has investigated how the outcome of negoti-
ations between entrepreneurs and investors can be understood as responses to
informational asymmetries. Little is known, however, about which informational
problems are empirically more important for the nancing choices of young rms.
¿rough an analysis of outside equity we hope to inform theory about this ques-
tion.2 Second, many government policies, such as subsidies and tax breaks, aim to
alleviate liquidity constraints of entrepreneurs. As argued by Paulson et al. (),
to be able to better design policies in this area, we need an improved understanding
not only of whether young rms are credit constrained, but also why.
We assemble a unique dataset from Norway that combines initial ownership
stakes for a representative sample of start-ups with data on subsequent protability
and on the sociodemographic characteristics of the owners. Dening an external
investor as a shareholder who owns at least  percent and is neither the largest
owner nor employed by the start-up during the rst two years of operations, we
nd that  percent of rms in our sample use outside equity.3 Outside equity is
¿e need to inform theory on the use of outside equity is illustrated by the following quote
from Tirole (, p. ): "the [nancial contracting] theories ... are o en criticized for their lack
of robustness; it is also pointed out that they do not account for the diversity of capital structures
that characterize modern operations, and that even small rms sometimes admit outside equity".
¿is denition of outside investors does not exclude family members. In the current version
of the paper we are only able to exclude female spouses, but hope to be able to exclude other close

also a substantial source of nancing in absolute terms; at the end of the rst year
of operations, outside equity comprises on average about  percent of outside
nancing for the whole sample, and  percent for rms that use outside equity.
¿ese gures are fairly constant across robustness checks, such as constraining
attention to companies where the largest owner has a majority stake in the start-up.
Why do start-ups use outside equity? ¿eory tends to emphasize that start-ups
are informationally opaque and prone to problems of asymmetric information be-
tween founders and outside investors. One can think of all security design papers
as attempts to understand nancial contracting under a variety of assumptions
about the informational problem. At one end of the spectrum are papers that
assume that both parties know the distribution function generating the rm’s cash
ows, but the investor cannot costlessly observe the realized prot (Townsend,
), or cannot force the entrepreneur to stay on in the rm (Hart &Moore, ).
Papers in this tradition tend to predict that debt is the optimal external nancing
source.4 Somewhat related are papers that view prots as observable but the under-
lying eort of the entrepreneur as non-observable. Papers in this tradition, such as
Aghion & Bolton (), Aghion & Bolton (), and Holmstrom & Tirole ()
emphasize the distortion in eort incentives arising from outside equity nancing
and also tends to predict the use of debt as the sole source of outside nance.
¿eories that can explain the use of outside equity contain some notion of the
entrepreneur having special knowledge of the underlying cash ow distribution.
¿ese theories come in two variations. In Myers & Majluf () it is assumed
that the return distribution is xed and known only by the insiders in advance.
¿is informational asymmetry leads the entrepreneur to take up debt if he has
favorable private information about the rm’s prospects, and to raise outside equity
if he has unfavorable private information. According to this pecking-order theory,
where equity and debt are substitute nancing means, one would expect rms
that use outside equity to subsequently perform worse, controlling for observable
family members in later versions.
One exception is Myers () who argues that outside equity can be optimal in a setup
resembling Hart & Moore (). Myers’ setup is not able to generate an optimal nancing mix.
Hvide & Leite () derive an optimal mixed capital structure in a variation of the costly state
verication model of Townsend (). Although Hvide & Leite’s paper provides new insights on
entrepreneur repayment and investor monitoring behavior they need to assume that outside equity
bears a lower monitoring cost than debt to justify its existence.

characteristics of the start-up such as founder human capital and wealth.
In the second variation of models with asymmetric information about project
returns, entrepreneurs, a er nancing has taken place, can manipulate the distri-
bution of cash ow through the choice of projects (Myers, , Ravid & Spiegel,
). If the amount of equity is small, debt nancing would give entrepreneurs
incentives to take on projects with a highly dispersed return prole, in order to
exploit the upside. ¿is "risk shi ing" would make nancing with unsecured debt
not feasible. If additional equity is provided, however, these risk-shi ing incen-
tives can be mitigated and investors willing to provide debt nancing.5 According
to this theory, equity is a complement to debt rather than a substitute as under
pecking-order, and an extra unit of equity nancing has a multiplicative eect on
total nancing, since it releases additional debt nancing.
¿e pecking-order theory and the risk shi ing theory have the similar im-
plication that the founder will use external funding only a er internal resources
have been exhausted. ¿e theories dier in at least two respects. First, while the
pecking-order theory predicts that rms with higher leverage should subsequently
perform better, the risk shi ing theory is mute in this respect, since there is no
necessary connection between the possibility to shi risk and overall returns. Sec-
ond, the risk-shi ing theory implies that rms with less wealthy entrepreneurs
(and thus less access to inside equity) are more likely to use outside equity, while
the pecking-order theory is mute on this relationship. We would thus, if the risk
shi ing theory has more validity, expect outside equity to primarily be used by
small start-ups with relatively poor entrepreneurs.
Our analysis of which theory best can explain why start-ups use outside equity
is only preliminary but yields some interesting results. First, we nd that the
start-ups that use outside equity are predominantly smaller and have less wealthy
founders than those that do not. ¿is gives support to the risk shi ing theory.
Second, we do not nd that a more extensive use of outside equity is associated
with worse future protability. ¿is nding is in contrast to pecking-order theory.
Overall, our ndings give support to the risk shi ing theory and little support to
Rather than requiring more equity, another way for creditors to mitigate the ex-post oppor-
tunism problem of these models is for lenders to monitor, as in e.g., Holmstrom & Tirole ().




Under the risk shi ing theory, equity serves the dual role of providing funding
per se, and to release debt nancing. Our estimates of the magnitude the "equity
multiplier" are highly uncertain but suggests that it is signicant. For example,
evaluated at the means, an increase in initial equity by NOK K leads to an
increase in debt by about NOKK. For rms that use outside equity, the estimated
equity multiplier is larger.
Does the use of outside equity have any negative eects? ¿eory emphasizes
that outside ownership dilutes insiders’ stake and therefore undermines insiders’
incentives to exert eort. To evaluate whether there indeed is such a negative
eect of using outside equity, we investigate whether start-ups that use outside
equity subsequently perform worse. Our analysis of this question, which follows
much the same lines as the test of the pecking-order theory, somewhat surprisingly
suggests that this eect is weak or non-existing.
Who provides outside equity? Our ndings suggest that outside equity is
provided by a relatively small circle of individuals in the social vicinity of the
founder. For example,  percent of the investors are former co-workers of the
founder. A natural question is whether a limited circle of potential investors gives
rise to investor monopolization and a shortage of funds available. We investigate
this question by analyzing whether start-ups that use outside equity have a higher
investor returns than start-ups that do not use outside equity. Our results show
that investor returns, as measured by dividend returns, are not signicantly higher
for start-ups that use outside equity than for start-ups that do not use outside
equity. ¿is nding does not suggest that a shortage of outside equity is a major
problem. ¿us we provide evidence that outside equity provides an important
avenue for entrepreneurs to escape liquidity constraints.
¿e paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, we review some prior
empirical work. In Section , we present the data and provide summary statistics.
In Section , we analyze why start-ups use outside equity. In Section , we evaluate
the eectiveness of outside equity nancing.

.. Related empirical literature
To our knowledge, this paper is the rst that relates nancing choices of start-ups
to both subsequent protability and to founder sociodemographic characteristics.
Berger et al. () study the nancing choices of small businesses in the
U.S. based on data from the National Survey of Small Business Finance. ¿eir
main question is whether rms go through a nancing cycle, where they are
initially nanced by informal sources of nance, and then gradually make use
of more structured forms of external nance. ¿ey nd empirical support for
this hypothesis, as do Fluck et al. (). In contrast, our aim is to understand
initial nancing. We use far more detailed data on both start-up and founder
characteristics than accessible to both Berger et al. () and to Fluck et al. ().
Using structural methods, Evans & Jovanovic () nd that virtually all the
entrepreneurs in their sample are liquidity constrained. Gertler & Gilchrist ()
contains evidence on the importance of credit constraints for small rms in the
U.S., a nding mirrored by Aghion et al. () who use recent rm-level data
from  countries. Petersen & Rajan () study how relationship lending from
banks to small companies can alleviate credit constraints, but do not analyze the
role of equity. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the role of outside
equity in easening credit contraints.
A large literature tests the pecking-order hypothesis in the context of ma-
ture, publicly listed rms (see e.g., Leary & Roberts, , and Frank et al., ,
for reviews). While this literature has the advantage of having access to cost of
capital measures based on market values, a persistent problem is to account for
path dependencies and adjustment costs. In this respect, our setting for testing
the pecking-order hypothesis is better suited since our sample consists of new
companies.
. Data and Summary Statistics
.. Data
We construct a dataset consisting of , incorporated limited liability rms
started up by individuals between  and  in Norway. ¿e dataset contains

incorporation and accounting information on the start-ups in addition to sociode-
mographic information about the founders based on tax records and other public
registries. ¿e dataset is compiled from three dierent sources:
. Accounting information from Dun & Bradstreet’s database of accounting
gures based on the annual nancial statements reported by the companies.6
¿is data includes variables such as sales, assets, and prots for the years
 - , as well as -digit industry codes.
. Data on individuals from  to  prepared by Statistics Norway. ¿ese
records include the anonymized personal identication number and yearly
sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, education in years, taxable
wealth, and income.7
. Founding documents submitted by new rms to the government agency ‘Brøn-
nøysundregisteret’.¿ese data includes the total capitalization of the start-up,
the personal identication number of all founders withmore than  percent
ownership share, and each founder’s ownership share.
For each start-up identied in )we compile a list of founders identied through
) and match their associated sociodemographic information from ). Due to
alterations in the reporting requirement in  we were able to match around
% of the founders in companies founded a er  and around % before. We
are then le with about , unique founding individuals, of which , are
dened as external investors.8
We will understand as the "principal founder" the owner with the largest
ownership share. To ensure that we are not counting spin-os from existing
companies as start-ups, we eliminate all new companies that have a company as
the principal founder. We also eliminate all start-ups where / of the ownership or
more cannot be identied, either because ofmissing data or because incorporations
Dun & Bradstreet is Bureau van Dijk’s Norwegian subsidiary.
Earnings and wealth gures are public information in Norway. ¿is transparency is generally
believed to make tax evasion more dicult and hence our data more reliable.
Because of the tax benets of incorporation status, many of the start-ups are expected to be
continuations of sole proprietorships. Since moving into incorporation status likely indicates some
expansion in activity that is a feature we would like to capture, we do not view this as a major
problem.

own more than /.9 In the remaining sample, there exists a largest owner for 
percent of the start-ups. In  percent of the start-ups, two founders are tied for
the largest ownership stake and in  percent of the start-ups, three founders are
tied. In such situations, we dene as principal founder the individual dened as
internal. In cases where the principal founder is still undetermined, we apply a
random selection procedure.
Whilst the principal founder is dened as an insider irrespective of the size of
her holding, outside shareholders are those not dened as principal founders and
who are not employed by the company for the rst two years. Moreover, female
founders other than principal founders are excluded as a crude, but conservative,
mechanism to avoid dening female spouses as external investors.
Setting up an incorporated company carries tax benets relative to being self-
employed such as more benecial expensing of items like home oce, company
car, and computer equipment. Incorporation also implies limited personal risk
exposure and certain employment benets compared to being self-employed. Since
the nancial barrier to start up an incorporated company in Norway is quite low
(one needed to raise NOK K in equity until  and NOK K therea er)
for any founder with a business above a minimum level, incorporation status will
be more tax ecient than becoming or remaining self-employed. Incorporated
companies are required to have an authorized auditor certifying the annual reports
including the accounting statements, which makes the reliability of the data higher
than for the self-employed persons.
An adverse consequence of the low barriers to starting up an incorporated
company and its favorable tax treatment, is that many start-ups in Norway are
tax-shelters or have minimal activity. ¿is is particularly common within real
estate. We deal with this problem in twoways. First, we over-sample start-ups from
the manufacturing and IT industries. We believe that tax shelters are less likely to
occur in these industries. Moreover, over-sampling these industries creates high
variation in the sample since, relative to manufacturing, the IT industry has a high
proportion of service-oriented rms with a low capital intensity. We selected all
start-ups within the high tech sectors NACE - and  from -, and all
start-ups within manufacturing and IT, NACE - and  from -. We
Our results are robust to including these companies in the analysis.

added a random  percent sample of other non-nancial private sector start-ups
from -. We expanded the sample a er  because the cost of collecting
data for the more recent period is lower. Second, to further reduce the share of
“empty shells” we only include companies that have at least NOK K in sales
and at least two persons employed during one of the rst two years of operation.10
We note several advantageous features of our data compared to data used in
earlier work on start-ups. First, we have access to a long panel with veried yearly
measures of founder previous income and wealth, and of start-up protability.
¿is enables us to investigate the relation between founder characteristics such as
wealth and the nancial structure. It also allows us to relate nancial structure and
subsequent protability, controling for founder characteristics. Second, that the
sample is representative means that a whole range of selectivity problems usually
associated with datasets on start-ups are not present. Due to the representativeness
of the sample, the vast majority of the start-ups are too small or have a too limited
growth potential to be of interest for highly structured nance such as venture
capital nancing. It is also reasonable that for most of the companies, intensive
monitoring by banks or other investors would not pay o.
.. Summary statistics
¿emain founder variables are age, years of education, gender, previous income
and wealth, all evaluated at the start-up date. Age, years of education, and previous
income are measures of the founder human capital. Age, gender and education
are also likely to be correlated with risk preferences. Wealth captures founder
liquidity. ¿e value of property investments and investments in unlisted stocks
have an articially low tax value. Debt, on the other hand is deductible at nominal
value (nancing property and unlisted stocks by debt, therefore, is a common way
to avoid the taxation of wealth). For this reason, we use gross wealth rather than
net wealth as our liquidity measure.11 For previous income and wealth, we reduce
To avoid sampling empty companies is important as the incorporation documents have to
be hand-collected by research assistants at a non-negligible cost per unit. However, our selection
criteria are deliberately set low in order not to exclude companies of interest.
In Norway, individuals are liable to pay wealth and income tax every year throughout their
lives. In contrast, the U.S. tax system requires wealth reporting only in connection with estate tax,
which is imposed only on the very rich at the time of death (Campbell, ). Our wealth variable

measurement error by constructing the variables as averages across the ve years
preceding the start-up year.12
¿emain start-up variables can be divided into nancing and operating vari-
ables. ¿e main nancing variables are equity at the incorporation date, and debt,
as measured by the sum of interest bearing debt and trade credit. Our main mea-
sure of leverage ratio is debt relative to total outside nancing. ¿e main operating
variables are turnover and EBITDA. We measure protability by yearly EBITDA
margin, that is EBITDA relative to average assets. Our main performance measure
will be the asset-weighted average of second and third year EBITDA margin (e.g.,
Lemmon et. al. ).
Annual EBITDA-margin is winsorized symmetrically at the  percent level.
Variables in absolute levels are reported in NOK , unless stated otherwise.
USD  equals about NOK  as of Summer . All accounting variables are
indexed to -levels using Statistics Norway’s CPI. Our nal sample, which has
non-missing values for all main variables, consists of , rms.13
Table  presents descriptive statistics for principal founders and the start-ups,
at the end of the rst operating year. Founders tend to be experienced, on average
 years old, and are relatively wealthy. Start-ups are small, on average they have
NOK .M in assets at the end of the rst year, with the median being considerably
lower, and . employees.  percent of the start-ups use outside equity, and the
average ownership share held by an outside investor is  percent.
. Outside equity
.. Prevalence of outside equity
Table  describes the nancing mix of all companies in the sample versus those
that have at least one external shareholder.
therefore has much better coverage than the measures used in previous research on U.S. data. ¿e
only other work we are aware of with a comparable richness in income and wealth measures is
Calvet et al. () using data from Sweden. Hvide & Møen () analyzes the eect of founder
liquidity on entrepreneurial performance using the same dataset as in the present paper.
To construct the previous income average, we omit years where the founder is self-employed.
We require that the start-ups survive for three years. Of the , initial start-ups,  do
not survive three years of operations, and for  principal founders we are unable to calculate a
previous income measure.

Table .: Summary statistics, rst year
-year EBITDA-margin is computed as an asset-weighted average of the margin in the second and
third year of operations. Turnover and asset growth are dened as growth between the end of the
rst year and end of the third year of operations. Debt ratio is the sum of interest bearing debt and
trade credit relative to total assets. External debt ratio is interest bearing debt and trade credit
relative to the sum of such debt and external equity (outside nancing). Turnover and cashow
are annualised by using number of months from incorporation until rst reporting year-end to
make rst year operating periods comparable.
Median Mean St. Dev
Principal founder:
Wealth  , (,)
Previous income   ()
Age . . (.)
Education . . (.)
Female  . (.)
Start-up:
Start-up year   (.)
Turnover , , (,)
Cashow   (,)
Total assets  , (,)
Equity   (,)
Growth in turnover . . (.)
Growth in assets . . (.)
EBITDA-margin,  year . . (.)
Debt ratio . . (.)
External debt ratio . . (.)
Employees . . (.)
Internal founders . . (.)
External founders  . (.)
Outside ownership?  . (.)
Outside ownership share  . (.)
N = ,
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Table .: Financing mix by external ownership
¿e table reports the relative shares of each nancing claim as part of total invested capital.
Invested capital is dened as the sum of the claims included in the table. Interest bearing debt is
debt of all maturities which is explicitly categorized as interest bearing.
All With external investors
First report, Mean Mean
percentages Median (St. Dev) Median (St. Dev)
Equity Total . . . .
(.) (.)
Inside . . . .
(.) (.)
Outside  . . .
(.) (.)
Debt Total . . . .
(.) (.)
Interest  .  .
bearing (.) (.)
Trade . . . .
(.) (.)
N , ,
¿e invested capital is on average  percent equity and  percent debt. ¿is
is similar to evidence from the U.S. reported by Berger et al. (), Table , and to
ndings of Van Auken & Carter ().
For companies founded a er  our data allows us to split debt into bank
and non-bank interest bearing debt. Figure  illustrates the nancing mix for
the companies started up a er  that use outside equity.14 Outside equity
constitutes on average  percent of start-up nancing ( percent of total equity
capital), a similar share to bank debt and trade credit.
.. Firm and entrepreneur characteristics
¿e following table breaks up summary statistics on rms with and without outside
equity.
Table  shows that principal founders of start-ups that use outside equity are
/ of the start-ups are founded in  or later.













very similar to those that do not use outside equity in terms of age, education and
previous income. ¿e most striking dierence is that principal founders that use
outside equity are considerably less wealthy than principal founders that do not
use outside equity. ¿e use of outside equity can seemingly not fully compensate
for the lack of wealth; at the end of rst year, the rms using outside equity are
signicantly smaller than rms not using outside equity, as measured by assets
or by turnover. Also, start-ups using outside equity grow faster. ¿ese ndings
suggest that using outside equity is an indication of being credit constrained.15
Table  runs a probit regressions on whether a company uses outside equity
or not. To control for founder liquidity prior to start-up we include a measure of
founder wealth. To control for observable aspects of founder human capital, we
include founder age, sex, education and previous wage.
We have also analyzed how the maturity of debt varies with ownership structure and start-up
size. Maturity increases in the use of equity and increases in start-up size. We are not aware
of theories that link the use of outside equity with the maturity of loans and have therefore not
pursued these ndings further.

Table .: Summary statistics, rst year
See the notes to table .
External investors? Yes No
Median Mean St. Dev Median Mean St. Dev
Principal founder:
Wealth   (,)  , (,)
Previous income   ()   ()
Age . . (.) . . (.)
Education . . (.) . . (.)
Female . . (.) . . (.)
Start-up:
Turnover , , (,) , , (,)
Cashow . . (,) . . (,)
Total assets  , (,)  , (,)
Equity   (,)   (,)
Growth in turnover . . (.) . . (.)
Growth in assets . . (.) . . (.)
EBITDA-margin, -year . . (.) . . (.)
Debt ratio . . (.) . . (.)
External debt ratio . . (.) . . (.)
Employees . . (.) . . (.)
Internal founders . . (.) . . (.)
External founders  . (.)   
Outside ownership share . . (.) . . .
N , ,
¿e regressions in Table  conrm the impression from the univariate analysis
that less wealthy founders are more likely to use outside equity. We note that more
educated founders, and founders with higher previous income, are more likely
to use outside equity. ¿is could be because a higher human capital is associated
with better access to potential sources of outside equity.
.. Outside investor characteristics
Who are the outside investors? One reason to be interested in this question is
to see whether outside investors are likely to provide other scarce resources than
nancing, such as business experience or reputational capital. ¿e following table

Table .: Determinants of external ownership
¿e dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of  if the rm has at least one external
shareholder, and  otherwise. Two digit industry dummies and dummies for the year of the start-up
are included in () and (), but not reported. ¿e regression method is probit. Robust standard




ln Wealth -.*** -.*** -.***
(-.) (-.) (-.)
ln Previous income .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Age -.*** -.*** -.***
(- .) (- .) (- .)
Age, sq. .** .** .**
(.) (.) (.)
Education .** . .
(.) (.) (.)





Constant . . .
(.) (.) (.)
R . . .
N , , ,
Correctly classied . . .

compares the sociodemographic characteristics of the principal founder versus
the largest outside investor for start-ups that use outside equity.16
Table .: Principal founders and largest investors
Principal Founders Largest investor
Mean Mean
Median (St.dev.) Median (St.dev.)
Wealth    ,
(,) (,)
Previous income    
() ()
Age . . . .
(.) (.)
Education . . . .
(.) (.)
Female  .  
(.) 
Industry experience:
- -digit NACE . .
- -digit NACE . .
N , ,
Table  shows that the principal founder and the largest outside investor are
similar in terms of age and education, and outside investors have slightly higher
previous income. Principal founders are on average far less wealthy than the largest
outside investor. In about / of the start-ups, the principal founder is less wealthy
than the largest outside investor. In terms of industry experience,  percent of
the investors have at some point in time worked within the same -digit- and 
percent within the same  digit industry-code as the newly founded company.
In comparison, the principal founders have  percent and  percent industry
experience.  percent of the outside investors are self-employed in the start-up
year.17 Overall, it seems that the outside investors are chosen more for their wealth
than for their competence.
We include only the largest external investor as he is the investor with the largest exposure
and thus likely impact on the start-up.
We do not have information on industry codes for self-employed investors. Given the small
percentage of outside investors that are self-employed, this seems unlikely to have any eect.

Where do entrepreneurs and investorsmeet?  percent of all external investors
are previous co-workers of the principal founder, having worked with the same
employer at some point in time before the new company was incorporated. ¿is is
consistent with the typical external investor being a person in the social vicinity of
the founder.
.. Is there a pecking-order?
¿emain prediction of the pecking-order theory is that rms using outside equity
should perform worse than rms only using debt as outside nancing. To test this
hypothesis, we study whether the use of outside equity is associated with lower
protability.
We use two main econometric specications. In the rst specication, the le 
hand side variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of zero if the start-up
uses outside equity, and the value one if not. In the second specication, the le 
hand side variable is the external debt ratio. To control for founder liquidity prior
to start-up we include a measure of founder wealth. To control for observable
aspects of founder human capital, we include founder age, sex, education and
previous wage. We report regression results both including and excluding a control
for the level of assets.
In the probit specication of () we nd a negative but nonsignicant relation-
ship between leverage ratio and protability. In () - (), where start-ups using only
inside equity are excluded, we get a signicantly negative relationship between
protability and the leverage ratios, directly opposite to the positive relationship
predicted by the pecking order theory.
External leverage is growing in the total assets of the rm, as is commonly seen
in capital structure research. ¿e lack of any signicant coecients onwealth when
controlling for total assets indicates that whilst wealth is important in explaining
whether a founder seeks outside equity, it plays little role in the subsequent scale
of external debt versus external equity.
Previous wage has a negative eect on external leverage ratio. ¿is is some-
what puzzling, since founders with high human capital should be more likely to
have access to debt nancing. One possibility is that founders with high human
capital are more likely to have private information about the prospects of their

Table .: Determinants of nancing ratios
¿e dependent variable in () is a dummy variable which equals  if all external funding is in the
form of debt, and  if not. ¿e regression method is probit. ¿e dependent variable in () is the
external debt ratio. ¿e dependent variable in () is the same as in (), except that we exclude trade
credit. ¿e dependent variable in () is debt ratio. ¿e regression method in ()-() is OLS. Two
digit industry dummies and dummies for the year of the start-up are included, but not reported.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at  %,  %
and  % levels, respectively.
() () () ()
All debt D/ (D - trade cr)./ D/
nancing? (D + Ex) (D + Ex - trade cr.) Total Assets
Founder:
ln Wealth .*** . .*** -. .*** -. . -.
(.) (.) (.) (-.) (.) (-.) (.) (-.)
ln Prev income -.*** -.*** -.*** -.*** -.*** -.*** -. -.
(-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
Age .** .** .** .** .** .** .** .**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Age, sq -.** -.** -.** -.** -.** -.** -.** -.**
(-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
Education -.** -.* -.* -.* -.*** -.*** -. -.
(-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
Female . . . . . . -.*** -.**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (-.) (-.)
Start-up:
EBITDA- -. -. -.*** -.*** -.** -.*** -.*** -.***
margin (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
ln Total Assets .*** .*** .*** -.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Constant -. -.** .*** . -. -.*** .** .***
(-.) (-.) (.) (.) (-.) (-.) (.) (.)
N , , , , , , , ,
R . . . . . . . .

start-up, and use equity as a substitute for debt in a manner consistent with the
pecking-order theory. To evaluate this possibility further, we split the sample
into two groups; start-ups with principal founders that have low previous wage
(less than NOK K) and high previous wage (more than NOK K). We then
estimated the relationship between protability and leverage for the founders with
a high previous wage. Neither this regression gave support to the pecking-order
hypothesis.
One explanation for the lack of a positive relation between protability and
leverage could be that rms that are more highly leveraged are slower at becoming
protable. To assess this possibility, we investigated the relation between protabil-
ity and initial leverage in yearly regressions. We found that the relation between
protability and initial leverage is signicantly negative in the second year of oper-
ations, and not signicantly dierent from zero in either the rst, third or fourth
year of operations.
To test for the robustness of our results, we performed a variety of exercises.
First we constructed a debt ratio measure excluding trade credit. ¿is regression,
reported in column (), gives almost identical results to column (). Second, col-
umn () reports the regression of the conventional debt ratio. Neither here does
the pecking-order theory get any support. ¿ird, we used alternative measures of
start-up protability, such as return on equity. ¿e results were the same. Fourth,
we investigated whether the prevalence of outside investors impacts survival prob-
ability. We found no such relationship. Fi h, the results are robust for exclusion
of rst year equity and total assets, as well as replacing total assets by turnover. We
conclude that there is little or no support for a pecking-order in the data.
Figure  used the estimated coecients of column () to depict predicted
leverage ratio for varying deciles of EBITDA-margins, holding the other variables
at mean values.
We see that the relation between protability and leverage is initially at or
slightly increasing and then quite strongly negative in the upper quartile. A possible
reason for the drop in the upper quartile is reverse causality: companies that are
very protable in the rst year tend to pay down their debt and rely on their cash
ow for nancing. To investigate this possibility, we looked at a subsample of rms
that are started up in October or later in the calendar year. ¿ese companies are
unlikely to generate enough cash to pay down substantial amounts of debt during

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their rst calendar year. ¿e predicted relation between protability and leverage
ratio is almost identical to for the full sample.
.. Discussion
Let us rst briey summarize our ndings so far. Outside equity is a commonly
used source of nancing:  percent of the start-ups in our sample use outside
equity nancing, and for these companies outside equity is of equal magnitude
to the use of bank debt and trade credit. ¿e start-ups that use outside equity are
more likely to have poorer founders, be smaller, and to have less inside equity. ¿e
relation between low founder wealth and the use of outside equity is well in line
with the risk shi ing theory. ¿e empirical relevance of the risk shi ing theory is
further corroborated by the main rival, the pecking-order theory, receiving little
or no support in the data.
In the next section, we try to assess the eectiveness of outside equity as a
nancing means. Let us rst briey discuss two alternative explanations for why

the start-ups use outside equity. First, the trade-o theory posits that the optimal
amount of outside equity balances gains from decreased nancial distress costs
against reduced tax benets of debt. Since debt under the Norwegian tax system
does not have any advantages over equity nancing, this theory cannot explain
why rms in our sample are typically heavily leveraged. Second, the more risk
averse founders could use outside equity in order to share risk. ¿e age, gender
and education variables provide a crude control for risk preferences. Also, if risk
preferences explain the use of outside equity, we would expect founders that use
outside equity to invest a smaller fraction of their wealth in the start-up. We nd
that principal founders’ median investment in the start-up represents  % and
 % of their gross wealth, for founders that use and do not use outside equity,
respectively. ¿us it does not seem that risk preferences have a powerful inuence
on the propensity to use outside equity.
. ¿e eectiveness of outside equity
In this section we try to assess the eectiveness of outside equity in capitalizing
the start-ups. ¿e risk shi ing theory suggests that equity infusion from outsiders
can generate more debt nancing for credit constrained start-ups through an
"equity multiplier". ¿is section rst tries to assess the magnitude of the equity
multiplier. We next assess two mechanisms that could limit the eectiveness of
outside equity; moral hazard and investor monopolization due to scarce supply of
outside investors.
.. ¿e equity multiplier
Table  analyzes the determinants of the amount of debt that a company has raised
at the end of rst year of operations. To control for founder liquidity prior to
start-up we include a measure of founder wealth. To control for observable aspects
of founder human capital, we include founder age, sex, education and previous
wage.
In the rst column, we use the full sample to investigate the relation between
total equity and debt level. We see from the rst column that both founder wealth

Table .: Determinants of debt
¿e dependent variable is the natural logarithm of debt plus trade credit. Regression () include all
start-ups, regressions () and () include start-ups with external owners. Two digit industry
dummies and dummies for the year of the start-up are included, but not reported. ¿e regression
method is OLS. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are
signicant at  %,  % and  % levels, respectively.
() () ()
Founder:
ln Wealth .*** . .
(.) (.) (.)
ln Previous income -. . -.
(-.) (.) (-.)
Age .* .* .*
(.) (.) (.)
Age, sq. -. -. -.
(-.) (-.) (-.)
Education -.* -. -.
(-.) (-.) (-.)
Female -.** . .
(-.) (.) (.)
Start-up:






Constant .** . .
(.) (.) (.)
N , , ,
R . . .

and equity get positive and signicant coecients in explaining debt level.18 Based
on these coecients, NOK K of additional equity at incorporation gives an
increase in debt of NOK K, calculated at mean levels for debt and equity. In the
main regression, reported in column (), we conne attention to the start-ups that
use outside equity. Here we see that the elasticity of debt with respect to equity is
around .. Since not all the start-ups need be credit-constrained, the estimate of
the equity-multiplier gives a conservative picture of the maximum debt increase
possible a er an equity infusion (Evans & Jovanovic, , contains a very similar
point).
To examine the role of outside equity further, in column (), we break up equity
into inside and outside equity. Here we see that inside equity seems to have a
stronger role in explaining debt level than outside equity.19 To further analyze the
relation between outside equity and debt capacity, Table , repeats the regression
analysis fromTable  with inside and outside equity separated and split by quartiles
of principal founder wealth.
¿e relation between outside equity and debt level is of considerablemagnitude
for the rst two wealth quartiles (although only weakly signicant), while there
is no relation between outside equity and debt for the upper two quartiles. ¿is
result conrms the impression that outside equity is of particular importance to
less wealthy founders. ¿e estimated coecients suggest that, evaluated at the
means, NOK K increased outside equity gives about NOK K additional debt
nancing. Assuming that all rms that use outside equity is credit constrained,
this implies that the equity multiplier is around ..
Of the other variables, age carries a large and signicant coecient for the
wealthiest quartile, although the squared term is negative, penalizing the oldest. A
surprising result is that none of the variables can explain any of the debt-raising
for the smallest quartile. Industry dummies explain large parts of the volume of
debt, as expected.
A question we plan to pursue is how debt capacity varies with investor human capital (positive
since better reputation) and with external share (negative by Holmstrom-Tirole).
Preliminary regressions of debt on investor characteristics indicate that these may provide
additional explanations as to the level of debt. We plan to pursue this further in later versions.

Table .: Sample with external investors: Debt determinants by founder wealth
quartiles
¿e dependent variable is the natural logarithm of debt plus trade credit. Regression  include all
start-ups, regressions  and  include start-ups with external owners. Two digit industry dummies
and dummies for the year of the start-up are included, but not reported. ¿e regression method is
OLS. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at  %,
 % and  % levels, respectively.
() () () ()
Founder:
ln Wealth -. -. . .*
(-.) (-.) (.) (.)
ln Previous income . . -. -.
(.) (.) (-.) (-.)
Age . . -. .**
(.) (.) (-.) (.)
Age, sq. -. -. . -.**
(-.) (-.) (.) (-.)
Education . -. -. .
(-.) (-.) (-.) (.)
Female . -. . -.
(.) (-.) (.) (-.)
Start-up:
ln OUTSIDE Equity . .* . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
ln INSIDE Equity . .** .** .***
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Constant . . -. -.**
(.) (.) (-.) (-.)
N    
R . . . .

.. Moral hazard
¿eory emphasizes that using outside equity could have a detrimental eect on
insiders’ incentives to exert eort. To evaluate whether there indeed is such a
negative eect of outside equity, we investigate whether companies that use outside
equity have lower protability. As performance variable we use EBITDA-margin.
To control for founder liquidity prior to start-up we include a measure of founder
wealth. To control for observable aspects of founder human capital, we include
founder age, sex, education and previous wage. To control for start-up type, we
include level of assets and initial equity, in addition to year and industry controls.
In column () we regress protability on a dummy that equals one if the start-
up uses outside equity, controlling for other characteristics of the start-up. We
do not nd any detrimental eect on performance from using outside equity as
a nancing source. In column () we regress protability on external ownership
share and again nd no eect of outside equity. ¿e robustness of the regression
has been conrmed by median and robust regressions as well as replacing the
return-measure by weighted ROAA for the same period with unchanged results.
.. Investor returns
Start-ups that use outside equity are more likely to be liquidity constrained, and it
is natural to ask whether there is enough outside equity available in the market.
For example, if outside equity nancing primarily is taken from the entrepreneur’s
existing network, a notion that our evidence supports, then this network may be
too small to provide sucient equity nancing.
Although this hypothesis is dicult to test directly, we can perform an indirect
test. If the entrepreneur’s network of potential outside investors is small, then it is
likely that these investors can exert monopoly power and require a high rate of
return to provide nancing. With this backdrop, we investigate investor returns.
Our empirical strategy is simple. We compare the cash returns of companies
with and without external investors, respectively, and view a higher return for
companies with external investors as evidence of investor monopolization.
We should note that there are several qualications to our analysis. First,
our data lacks information as to any dierences in the share premiums, i.e., the
premiumpaid on top of nominal value for the shares, between internal and external

Table .: Determinants of return
¿e dependent variable is the asset-weighted average EBITDA-margin over year  and . Two digit
industry dummies and dummies for the year of the start-up are included, but not reported. ¿e
regression method is OLS. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Coecients marked ***, ** and
* are signicant at  %,  % and  % levels, respectively.
() ()
External owners ? -.
(-.)
External ownership (%) -.
(-.)
Founder:
ln Wealth .** .**
(.) (.)











ln Equity -.*** -.***
(-.) (-.)







founding shareholders. We cannot rule out that external investors might have
paid a premium which would impact their subsequent investment returns. ¿e
more fundamental issue when analyzing returns is that we obviously do not have
any market values for the shares in these private companies and any measures of
investor returns are thus only based on cash dividends and book equity.20
Table  compares the investor cash return for companies with and without
outside equity. ¿e cash return is calculated annually as declared dividends divided
by average invested equity capital for the passed year.21 ¿e observations are
weighted by average invested equity for each cell. ¿e interpretation of the yearly
cash return is thus the expected returns for a randomly invested krone of equity
capital. We also report averages on whether start-ups pay a dividend or not,
and on the payout ratio. Yearly cash return and payout ratio annual measures
are winsorized annually by  percent symmetrically. To ensure comparability, all
returns as well as the subsequent regression analyses are conducted on a subsample
where we are able to calculate  year cash return.
In Table , we nd very small dierences between the two subsamples across
the cash return measures.22 Firms with external shareholders seem to receive a
dividendmore seldom, which implies that dividends, if paid, are larger. ¿e payout
ratio for start-ups with outside equity is smaller than for rms that do not use
outside equity, which again suggests that using outside equity is an indication of
being liquidity constrained.23
Since the survival rate of the companies in the sample is quite high, we would expect the cash
returns to understate the actual returns, so that our estimates of investor returns are conservative.
We do not calculate cash return for the rst reported year to avoid any adjustments for
dierences in operating periods up until rst report. Invested equity is the accumulated sum of
intial and subsequent equity-issues by the rm. ¿e  percent of rm-years with negative average
invested equity are le out.
Moskowitz & Vissing-Jorgensen () analyze the returns to private equity using a variety of
data sources and nd that the average yearly returns are around  percent. Given that the rms in
the current sample are likely to carry higher risk, the overall risk-adjusted returns seem of similar
magnitude.
A natural question is how investors enforce repayments. Potentially there is opportunity
for the internal founders to divert funds, by for example raising their wages and lower dividend
payments. ¿eory suggests that such diversion problems should be met by outside investors
requiring a debt contract rather than an equity contract (e.g., Townsend, ). ¿e fact that
outside equity is used to a considerable extent, and that investor returns reported in Table  are
relatively high, suggests that the diversion problem is not of great importance to the external
investors of the start-ups we observe. It could still be that the lack of enforcement mechanisms

Table .: Shareholders’ return – descriptive statistics
External investors? Yes No
Median Mean St. Dev Median Mean St. Dev
Dividend?
nd year . . (.) . . (.)
rd year . . (.) . . (.)
th year . . (.) . . (.)
Payout ratio
nd year . . () . . (.)
rd year . . (.) . . (.)
th year . . (.) . . (.)
Cash return
nd year . . (.) . . (.)
rd year . . (.) . . (.)
th year . . (.) . . (.)
 year cash return
. . (.) . . (.)
N , ,
In Table , we regress shareholder cash return on founder and start-up charac-
teristics.
Column () shows that a er controlling for founder and rm characteristics,
start-ups using outside equity are somewhat less likely to pay dividends. Our
estimates in column (), however, only weakly suggest that the investor returns
in companies that use outside equity is lower than in companies that do not use
outside equity. It therefore does not seem monopolization on the supply side of
the outside equity market poses a grave problem to the start-ups in the sample.
could stop would-be entrepreneurs from obtaining outside equity.

Table .: Determinants of shareholders’ return
¿edependent variable in column () is a dummy variable that equals  if the start-up pays dividends
in that year, and  if not. ¿e regression method is probit. ¿e dependent variable in column () is
payout as a percentage of net prot. ¿e dependent variable in column () is annual cash return,
measured as dividend by average invested equity capital. ¿e dependent variable in column () is
the rst  years weighted average cash return. ¿e regression method in column () - () is OLS.
In all regressions, two digit industry and start-up year dummies are included, but not reported.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at  %,  %
and  % levels, respectively.
() () () ()
Dividend- Payout Cash  year cash
dummy ratio return return
External ownership, % -.* -.* -. -.
(-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
ln Wealth .*** .** . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
ln Previous income .*** .** . .***
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Age -. . . .
(-.) (.) (.) (.)
Age, sq. . -. -. -.
(.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
Female . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Education . . -. .*
(.) (.) (-.) (.)
ln Total assets .*** .*** . .***
(.) (.) (.) (.)
ln Equity, inc. -.*** -. -.*** -.***
(-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
Firm age: nd year .*** -. .*
(.) (-.) (.)
Firm age: rd year .** . (dropped)
(.) (.)
Firm age: th year . -. -.***
(.) (-.) (-.)
Constant -.** -. -. -.
(-.) (-.) (-.) (-.)
N , , , .
R . . . .

. Conclusion
We have investigated the extent to which start-ups use outside equity, and inter-
preted our results in relation to nancial contracting theory. We have also tried to
evaluate how well outside equity performs as a source of nancing. We have done
so by studying the start-up and founder characteristics that are associated with
the use of outside equity nancing, using a unique dataset from Norway.
Our ndings suggest that adverse selection are less of a concern for start-ups
than ex-post opportunistic behavior (risk shi ing) by the entrepreneur as inMyers
() and Ravid & Spiegler (). Actual nancing looks similar to what one
would expect from the risk-shi ing theory of Myers ().
One implication of this nding is that outside equity and debt are complements
rather than substitutes, and equity serves the dual role of providing funding per se,
and to release debt nancing. Our estimates suggest that the "equity multiplier"
for outside equity is at least ..
According to theory, nancing by outside equity could have the negative eect
of reducing insiders’ incentives to exert eort. To evaluate whether there indeed is
such a negative eort eect, we investigated whether companies that use outside
equity show signs of having weaker protability. Although our ndings here are
preliminary, we do not nd convincing evidence that the use of outside equity
has detrimental eects on start-up performance, nor that a possible shortage of
available outside equity leads to investor monopolization and excessive investor
returns. ¿us we provide evidence that outside equity provides an important
avenue for entrepreneurs to escape liquidity constraints.
We should caution that although adverse selection in its traditional form do
not seem to be main problems for the start-ups that we observe, we cannot rule
out that these mechanisms could stop potential entrepreneurs from obtaining
nancing to start up a business. To make headway on this question, one needs a
more structural approach, which seems like a promising avenue for future research.

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Callable Risky Perpetual Debt:
Options, Pricing and Bankruptcy
Implications
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Abstract
Issuances in the USD  Bn global market of perpetual risky debt are
o en motivated by capital requirements for nancial institutions. However,
observed market practices indicate that actual maturity equals rst possible
call date. We develop a valuation model for callable risky perpetual debt
including an initial protection period before the debt may be called. ¿e
total market value of debt including the call option is expressed as a portfolio
of perpetual debt and barrier options with a time dependent barrier. We
analyze how an issuer’s optimal bankruptcy decision is aected by the exis-
tence of the call option using closed-form approximations. In accordance
with intuition, our model quanties the increased coupon and the decreased
initial bankruptcy level caused by the embedded option. Examples indicate
that our closed form model produces reasonably precise coupon rates com-
pared to more exact numerical solutions. ¿e credit-spread produced by
our model is in a realistic order of magnitude compared to market data.
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Genser, Hans K. Hvide, ¿ore Johnsen, Elyès Jouini, Hayne Leland, Kristian R. Miltersen, Tommy
Stamland, Gunnar Stensland, and Josef Zechner. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented
at FIBE , NHH Skinance  (Hemsedal), Essec Business School Paris , European
Financial Management Conference Madrid , th Conference of Swiss Society for Financial




Perpetual debt securities seldom turn out to be particularly long-lived - in spite
of their ex ante innite horizon. ¿e contractual horizon gives the securities a,
using regulatory language, permanence, which is crucial when banks and other
nancial institutions are allowed to include them as regulatory required risk capital.
However, the contracting parties, the issuing institution and the investors in the
securities, typically appreciate nancing exibility and may thus prefer a more
tractable nite horizon. ¿ese apparently conicting objectives are resolved by
embedding such perpetual securities, almost without exceptions, with an issuer’s
call-option, facilitating a nite realized horizon.
We develop a closed form valuation model for perpetual debt securities in-
cluding this option. Our model allows for calibration of coupon rate and optimal
bankruptcy asset level. We also show, analytically and through examples, how the
nitely lived option embedded in the perpetual security impacts coupon rates and
bankruptcy for alternative assumptions in the period before the option expires.
¿ese securities are junior and unsecured and thus far more exposed to the issuer’s
credit quality than regular senior bonds. Market practise indicates that issuers’
typically pay a credit margin on top of a market reference interest rate, and are
thus not directly exposed to the nominal interest rate levels. We reect this in
our model by including risk through the volatility of the cashow(EBIT)-process
and not using a stochastic interest rate process. ¿is is in line with the corporate
nance perspectives of precedents like Black and Cox () and Leland (),
but contrary to related research in the asset pricing eld like, e.g., Acharya and
Carpenter ().
¿e riskiness of deeply subordinated perpetual debt securities typically favors
issuers that are heavily regulated, highly rated, well capitalized and have previously
issued securities in the capital markets. Consequently, the issuers of such securities
are typically banks, but also include insurance companies and utilities. Favorable
changes to US tax treatment of coupons/dividends, RBC-factors2 for US insurers
and the rating agencies’ views have caused a strong growth in new issuance in
RBC: Risk Based Capital requirements is used by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) to regulate the capital adequacy of US insurers. Within this system,
investment assets are assigned capital requirements according to their riskiness.

/. Table . provides an overview of estimated outstanding large issues
of perpetual debt securities as of end- from Pomper and Varma ().
Table .: Global outstanding large perpetual debt capital securities end-.
Amounts and relative shares are calculated from Lehman Brothers’ index of debt- and debt-like
risk capital securities. Percentages relate to share of each market. Source: Lehman Brothers.
Outstanding Tier Upper Non-
amount I Tier II nancials’
Market (USD Bn) (%) (%) share(%)
U.S. dollar .   
Euro .   
Sterling .   
Total .   
Table . shows that the total issuance is evenly spread across the main markets,
but that there are large regional variations in mix of securities. ¿e largest category,
denoted ’Tier I’, refers to securities that qualify as the highest quality risk capital for
issuing nancial institutions3. ’Upper Tier II’-capital is also perpetual but less risky
and within the subordinated debt-category for nancial institutions. ¿e latter
dominates the GBP Sterling market whilst utilities and other non-nancial issuers
have a large share of the Euro-market. ¿e globally accepted principles for capital
adequacy and classication of risk capital were specied by Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) in 4. National variations are caused by regulatory, tax and
capital market dierences.
Mapondera and Bossert () include  large European banks in their re-
search universe and show that amongst those, the volume of new perpetual securi-
ties equals % of the volume of newly issued senior market debt for the years 
- . ¿is category is split between Tier I capital, representing %-points and
Upper Tier II capital covering the remaining %-points. ¿e report also lists all
individual new issues of new perpetual securities by these banks during /
and all of them have a delayed issuer’s call option, typically exercisable  years
from date of issue. ¿ese calls are contractually American in that they may be
In this context, nancial institutions primarily represent banks and insurance companies.
See Committee on Banking Supervision ()

exercised at any coupon-paying dates a er year . ¿e coupon rate is also typically
stepped-up by - bp at the rst call date. In this paper we, however, model the
call as a European, nitely lived option expiring at the rst possible exercise date.
In any case, the obtained European option values are lower bounds for American
options. Practice indicates that all issuers exercise them at the rst possible date
see, e.g., Ineke, Guillard, and Mareels () who state: ’To our knowledge, there
has only ever been one instance of an issuer not calling a bond and allowing it to
step-up and this was actually done unintentionally’.
We follow the approach by Black and Cox () and Leland (), including
full information and ecient market assumptions. In line with Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland () we assume that the issuing company’s assets produce a stream of
cashows that follows a geometric Brownian motion. For a given capital structure,
including an innite horizon debt contract, there exists a constant asset value level
where it is optimal for the company to go bankrupt. A er introducing a nitely
lived option on the debt, this bankruptcy level is no longer independent of time
to expiration of the option. ¿e bankruptcy level a er expiration of the option
equals the constant Black and Cox ()-level.
One could alternatively consider the situation where third parties trade options
on publicly traded debt. Naturally, the existence of such options would neither
inuence the pricing of the bonds at issue or in the marketplace nor the issuing
company’s optimal choice of bankruptcy level. In this paper, however, we con-
sider a corporate setting where the issuer’s call option is an integrated part of the
bond(debt) contract. ¿at is, the option is written by the debtholders in favor
of the equityholders. We refer to such a call option as an embedded option. ¿e
existence of this option will inuence both the issue-at-par coupon on the debt
and the issuer’s bankruptcy considerations before the option’s expiration date.
Intuition suggests that the coupon is increased to compensate for the embedded
option, whereas the optimal bankruptcy level is decreased due to the option value
- both compared to the case without an option.
We show in Section  that the market value of innite horizon debt is not
lognormally distributed and this fact impacts the valuation of options on such
instruments. ¿e standard Black and Scholes () and Merton () option
pricing formulas are thus not directly applicable. ¿e time  market value of
perpetual debt according to Black and Cox () can be interpreted as a risk-

free value of an innite stream of coupons, from which the market value of the
debtholder’s net loss in case of bankruptcy is subtracted. ¿e market value of
the debtholder’s net loss is equivalent to the market value of the equityholders’
default-option in a limited liability company. ¿e market value of this net loss has
the required lognormal properties and can be used as a modied underlying asset
replacing the market value of innite horizon debt itself. By this reformulation
the standard Black-Scholes-Merton formulas can be applied using modied time
 market value, exercise price and volatility.
We develop pricing formulas for both plain vanilla European options and
down-and-out barrier European options on innite horizon continuous coupon
paying debt. Down-and-out barrier options are relevant since the debt options
may only be exercised at the future time T if the issuing company has not gone
bankrupt earlier. ¿e asset-level which denes optimal bankruptcy before the
option expires is thus the barrier used in the barrier option formulas.
For analytical tractability we assume that the time dependent barrier is an
increasing exponential function. ¿is is a straightforward way to model a time
dependent barrier and a natural rst attempt, but still an arbitrary choice. To
investigate the signicance of time dependency, we test the eect of alternative
bankruptcy barrier assumptions. Our examples show that the eect of time de-
pendency on the coupon-rate is limited, but increasing in cashow volatility and
time to expiration of the option.
.. Economic interpretation and insights from our analysis
In our application of the barrier option formulas on debt with embedded options,
we want in particular to analyze the impact on debt payo and optimal bankruptcy
decisions. In this paper we denote the market value of total company assets at time
t by At and the market value of its’ debt at time t by Dt.
¿e payo to debtholders at expiration of the embedded option
¿e payo to debtholders when the option expires is illustrated in Figure .5.
¿is and the next graphical presentation use the same base case parameters as in Table . in
Section  of the paper: Time  EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) δ = , asset level A = ,
par value of debt D = , expiration date of option T =  years, volatility of EBIT and assets

















Figure .: Payo from perpetual debt with and without embedded option at time T as a function
of asset level AT. See Table . for parameter values.
¿e payo to debtholders is shown as a function of asset value, AT, for debt
with and without embedded option, assuming that the absolute priority rule is
followed. ¿e le most part of the graph shows that in bankruptcy, debtholders
receive all assets as payo, indicated by the -degree line. Beyond the bankruptcy
asset level, the thicker/upper line indicates the payo to debt with embedded
option whilst the thinner/lower line represents payo to regular perpetual debt.
¿e optimal bankruptcy asset levels for these structures are dierent due to the
dierent coupons. At time T the option does not impact optimal bankruptcy level
anymore and it is only the higher coupon that causes a higher optimal long-term
bankruptcy asset level.
¿e more interesting issue is for which levels of AT the option is rationally
σ = ., constant riskfree interest rate r = % and dri of the EBIT(cashow) process, µ = %.
¿ese parameters yield issue-at-par coupon rates of . % for perpetual debt without option and
. % for the equivalent with embedded option, solved analytically.

exercised. Ceteris paribus, perpetual debt with a higher coupon will be more
valuable than debt with a lower coupon. In our model, all uncertainty stems from
the EBIT-process. By not exercising the option at time T, the issuer is le with
regular perpetual debt with a higher coupon than time T issued identically risky
debt. ¿e explanation is that the coupons were xed at time  and that a part of
the historical coupon was a compensation to debtholders for the embedded, but
at time T expired, option. ¿e issuer is therefore willing to exercise the option at
lower levels of AT relative to the time  value of A to avoid paying this relatively
high coupon in the future. In the example in Figure ., where the exercise level
of the option is par value of the debt, (), the indierence asset level is appr.
, compared to the time  asset level6 of . At this indierence level, the
issue-at-par optimal coupon for newly issued straight debt will exactly equal the
original coupon for debt with option. ¿is is valid irrespective of any renancing
considerations which are in any case outside our model7.
¿e ’smiling’ bankruptcy-level
Our analysis combines the innite debt contract with an embedded nite op-
tion. ¿e classical innite setting from Black and Cox () leads to a constant
bankruptcy level. ¿e market value of a nite option depends on its’ time to
expiration. A er introducing a nite embedded option, the optimal bankruptcy
level therefore becomes time-dependent. Intuition tells us that the existence of
an option with positive value will lower the optimal bankruptcy asset level. ¿e
value of such options is also in itself dependent on the bankruptcy risk of the
issuer. To model options with inherent bankruptcy risk, we use barrier options.
We have illustrated this in Figure ., using the same parameters as above. ¿is
gure shows how the combined market value of all option-elements taken from
expression (..) in Section  varies varies by elapsed time. ¿e graph shows the
Our analysis provides the calibrated coupon level for debt with embedded option to ensure
issue-at-par. ¿e indierence level of AT is found by using this coupon in the valuation expression
for regular perpetual debt (..) setting D(AT) equal to the exercise level (par) and solve for AT.
 Mauer () also claims that the value of a call-option is the value of the opportunity to
repurchase a non-callable bond with the same coupon and principal. ¿is approach is intuitive
at the time when the option expires, but in a case without any exercise premium implicit in the
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Figure .: Value of the debtholders’ short barrier call option position as a function of calender
time when call option expires at time T = . See Table . for parameter values.
value to debtholders and is therefore negative. ¿e explanation of the ’smile’-shape
is that the market value of barrier options do not vary monotonically with time
like regular options due to the inherent changes in bankruptcy risk. King ()
study empirical the implicit value of embedded options in various U.S. agency
bonds, their levels and relationship to maturity and interest rates. ¿e issuers are
less risky than banks, but it is still interesting to see that embedded calls in bonds
issued by Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation on average represents . %
of the bond values in the call protection period of up to  years.
.. Literature overview
¿e related literature may broadly be separated into research on debt-based deriva-
tives on one hand and on perpetual debt on the other hand.
Central to the classic literature on valuing bonds with embedded derivatives
are papers like Ingersoll () and Brennan and Schwartz (). Our paper

diers from these primarily with regards to the analysis of long deferral of the
embedded option, its impact on bankruptcy risk, the revised formulation of the
underlying security in options on bonds and the use of barrier optionmethodology
to reect default risk before expiry of the security. Kish and Livingston () test
for determinants of calls included in corporate bond contracts. ¿eir ndings
are that the interest rate level, agency costs and bond maturity signicantly aect
whether a bond comes with an embedded call option. Sarkar () is the closest
precedent to our paper in his focus on callable perpetual bonds modelled in the
tradition of Leland (). ¿e main dierence is that the calls are assumed to
be American and immediately exercisable, i.e., without a protection period, and a
main part of the paper thus deals with the optimal exercise timing of the call. ¿e
paper does neither include analytical valuation of the options nor optimal coupon-
or bankruptcy levels. Bank () values call options on debt in a similar manner,
but without calibrating coupons nor taking into account the fact that debt-values
are not log-normally distributed. ¿e paper also lacks a clear distinction between
innite securities and nite options.
Jarrow and Turnbull () model various derivatives on xed maturity debt
securities, but do not include any analysis of the impact on endogenous bankruptcy
decisions. Acharya and Carpenter () develop valuation formulas for callable
defaultable bonds with stochastic interest rates and asset values. ¿rough decom-
posing the bonds into a riskfree bond less two options, they explore how the call
option impacts optimal default in line with our results. ¿ey analyze xedmaturity
bonds and the hedging aspects of callable bonds through the options’ impact on
bond duration, but without developing exact valuation formulas for the specic
bonds. To and Prucyk () develop modied equity option expressions based
on Leland () for leveraged equity and various capital structure and bankruptcy
assumptions. ¿e innite horizon property of equity makes it comparable to our
work although the specic issues related to embedded options on debt are not
covered directly. Rubinstein () is related to our approach with the use of
a modied asset process, labelled a ’displaced diusion process’, to modify the
standard Black-Scholes approach. Johnson and Stulz () dened the concept of
’vulnerable options’ i.e. options where the counterpartymay default on the contract.
Hull and White () categorize risky derivative contracts into classes by default
risk of counterparty and credit-risk of underlying asset. Embedded options which

are the focus of our paper are thus in a class of vulnerable options with credit-risky
underlying assets in that the two risks may not be separated. Whilst these authors
focus primarily on the risk at option maturity, the literature on barrier options,
in particular Bjork (), eectively include the risk of bankruptcy before the
option matures.
In the perpetual debt pricing tradition, starting with Black and Cox (),
this paper is related to the paper by Emanuel () which develops a valuation
of perpetual preferred stock, based on the option-methodology of Black-Scholes.
Preferred stock can be viewed as perpetual debt for analytical purposes. Emanuel’s
analysis allows unpaid dividends to accumulate as arrearage due to the junior
position of the instrument, which is relevant for nancial institutions, but beyond
the scope of our paper. He does not cover options on preferred stock as such. Sarkar
and Hong () extend Sarkar () and analyze the impact from callability on
the duration of perpetual bonds and nd that a call reduces the optimal bankruptcy
level and thus extends the duration of a bond. ¿eir reduced optimal bankruptcy
level matches our intuition and results.
.. Outline of the paper
Our main contribution is a complete valuation expression for callable perpetual
continuous coupon paying debt. To this end we develop option and barrier option
formulas on perpetual debt contracts, handling both the lack of lognormal distri-
bution of the market values of debt and the nite option expiration embedded
in an innite security. We thus expand the results of Black and Cox () to
integrate an issuer’s call option into the valuation. ¿e level and time-dependency
of optimal bankruptcy for a given capital structure are consequently also changed.
Our analysis forms a basis for improved understanding of the pricing of such
securities and their impact on the optimal bankruptcy level of the issuing company.
Numerical examples indicate that our closed formmodel produces correct coupon-
rates compared to more exact numerical solutions. Compared to market data the
spread produced by our model is in a realistic order of magnitude.
¿e structure of the paper is as follows: In Section  we present the model
and the basic results. In Section  the option formulas are developed and Section
 contains the complete expressions for perpetual debt with embedded options.

Section  compares the base case analytical solutions with a numerically solved
binomial tree, Section  tests the assumptions regarding the time dependency in
the bankruptcy barrier, Section  covers the numerical sensitivities, and Section 
concludes the paper. Supporting technical derivations and results are enclosed in
an appendix.
. ¿e model and basic results
We consider the standard Black-Scholes-Merton economy and impose the usual
perfect market assumptions:
• All assets are innitely separable and continuously tradeable.
• No taxes, transaction cost, bankruptcy costs, agency costs or short-sale
restrictions.
• ¿ere exists a known constant riskless rate of return r.
.. ¿e EBIT-based market value process
We study a limited liability company with nancial assets and a capital structure
consisting of two claims, innite horizon continuously coupon paying debt and
common equity. In line with Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (), we assume that the
assets generate an EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) cashow denoted δt
given by the stochastic dierential equation
dδt = µδtdt + σδtdWt, (..)
where µ and σ are constants representing the dri and volatility parameters respec-
tively, and δ is the xed initial cashow level. HereWt is a standard Brownian
motion under a xed equivalent martingale measure. ¿e total time t market
value Aˆt of the assumed perpetual EBIT stream from the assets equals




r − µ (..)

¿emarket value of this EBIT stream is the solution to the stochastic dierential
equation process
dAˆt = (rAˆt − δt)dt + σAˆtdWt= µAˆtdt + σAˆtdWt. (..)
¿e quantity Aˆ is elsewhere in the literature referred to as the unlevered value of
the rm’s assets.
In this setting there is a level of Aˆt where it is optimal for the company to
stop paying debt coupons and declare bankruptcy. In the classic case this level is
independent of time, i.e., constant.
.. ¿e standard Black and Cox () results









where c is the constant coupon rate, D is the par value of the debt-claim and cD is
the continuous coupon payment rate. ¿e ratio (AA¯)−β can be interpreted as the
current market value of one monetary unit paid upon bankruptcy, i.e., when the
process At hits the bankruptcy level A¯. Here
β = µ − σ +√(µ − σ) + σr
σ
. (..)
Expression (..) for themarket value of debt carries a nice intuition. Observe
that cDr is the current market value of innite horizon default-free debt. Upon
bankruptcy the debtholder looses innite coupon payments which at the time of
bankruptcy have market value cDr . On the other hand the debtholder receives the
remaining assets with a value equal to A¯. We can therefore interpret ( cDr − A¯) as
the debtholder’s net loss upon bankruptcy. ¿e time  market value of this net loss,( cDr − A¯)(AA¯)−β, therefore represents the reduction of the time  total market value
of debt due to default risk. In our model, this is the only source of risk for the debt.
¿e value of equity as the residual claim on the assets is in this setting deter-
mined by








In the classic case of no embedded options, i.e., with a constant bankruptcy
level, Black and Cox () determine the optimal bankruptcy level for a given
capital structure (E, D) from the perspective of the equityholders (found by dier-
entiating expression (..) with respect to A¯) as
A¯= β
β +  cDr . (..)
.. ¿e modied process.
Our initial exercise is to price an embedded, nitely lived option on innite horizon
debt. Due to the nite horizon of this option, the optimal bankruptcy level of the
issuer depends on remaining time to expiration. In order to capture this aspect we
introduce a time-dependent bankruptcy asset level Bt,
Bt = Beγt,
for a given time  level B and a constant γ. ¿e time of bankruptcy is given by the
stopping time τ dened as
τ = inf{t ≥ , Aˆt = Bt}
where Aˆt is given in expression (..).
Bymodifying the asset process this stopping time can equivalently be expressed
as
τ = inf{t ≥ ,At = B},
where At is
dAt = (µ − γ)Atdt + σAtdWt, (..)
Compared to equation (..), the modied process has a a negative dri adjust-
ment of γ. Although γ determines the curvature of the bankruptcy level, it can
formally be interpreted as a constant dividend yield on At. Again formally, this
transformation allows us to analyze the simpler setting of a constant bankruptcy
level B, although no economic fundamentals have been changed. In Section , we
numerically compare our analytical approximation with the actual optimal barrier
deriver numerically from a binomial tree.

. Option formulas for nite options on innite
debt claims
We develop formulas for European options and barrier-options applying the stan-
dard approach from nancial economics. We denote by T the exercise-date of
these European-type options.
As shown below, the market value of the underlying asset, an innite horizon
debt contract, is not lognormally distributed. We solve this problem by reinter-
preting the underlying asset.
Wemaintain the assumption of an exponential bankruptcy barrier before time
T, Bt = Beγt. In section  we showed that interpreting γ as a dividend yield in
the asset price process, see expression (..), allows us to work with a constant
bankruptcy barrier B.
In this section we introduce a general bankruptcy levelM a er the expiration
of the embedded option at time T. At this point we do not consider whetherM is
optimal or not, we only assume that it is above the time  bankruptcy level, B ≤ M.
We have argued in the introduction that this is a reasonable assumption.
We develop the option pricing formulas sequentially: We rst derive formulas
for European plain vanilla options on perpetual debt, disregarding any default- or
credit-risk. Secondly, we follow Johnson and Stulz () and Jarrow and Turnbull
(), and acknowledge the bankruptcy risk of the issuer of the option and the
underlying security at time T by introducing a certain minimum asset value, equal
to the time T bankruptcy level. Finally, we also include bankruptcy risk before
time T by requiring a minimum asset value B before time T, using a barrier
option approach following Bjork (). In our subsequent application of these
formulas we study embedded options on corporate debt where the counterparty-
and credit-risk in the underlying security are inseparable.
.. ¿e generalized debt dynamics
We assume that the underlying asset of our option formulas is given by
Dt = cDr − JFt, (..)

where
Ft = (eλtAtM )−κ.
where At is given in expression (..). Before we explain this expression, observe
that the parameter choices J = cDr − A¯, λ = γ,M = A¯, and κ = β, yield the time t
value of standard Black and Cox () debt as in expression (..).
¿is comparison with standard Black and Cox debt explains why we need the
parameter λ. ¿e time T payo of any option depends on the actualmarket value
of debt, a function of AˆT in expression (..). To incorporate the time dependent
bankruptcy level, as explained above, we work with a modied asset value process{At, t ≥ } in expression (..). Observe that AˆT = eγTAT, thus the parameter λ
allows us to express the time T actual option payo in terms of themodied asset
value process.
¿e constant M represents a xed (but not necessarily optimal) longterm
bankruptcy level. Also Ft is interpreted as the time tmarket value of one unit of
account payable the rst time the process eλtAt hits the levelM from above. ¿e
constant J represents the debtholders’ net loss in case of bankruptcy and depends
typically on other parameters of the model, see the example above. Our option
pricing formulas may readily be used for other debt contracts with dierent net
losses (e.g., as a result of dierent seniority) by applying alternative specications
of J. Finally, κ is the positive solution to the quadratic equation


σκ(κ + ) − κ(µ − γ + λ) − r =  (..)
given by
κ = µ − γ + λ− σ +√(µ − γ + λ− σ) + σr
σ
. (..)
We study nitely lived options embedded in perpetual debt contracts. ¿e
general time T payo of such a call option with exercise price K is
(cD
r
− JFT − K)+{eλTAT > M}{τ > T}).
¿e rst factor represents a plain vanilla payo (DT −K)+ disregarding any default
risk. ¿e rst indicator function cancels the time T payo when eλTAT is less than
the time T bankruptcy levelM. ¿e second indicator function cancels the time T
payo upon earlier default, i.e., if inf,T At ≤ B.

.. Properties of Ft and Dt
An application of Itô’s lemma on Ft using expressions (..) and (..) yields
dFt = rFtdt − κσFtdWt, (..)
which we recognize as a geometric Brownian motion. It has dri parameter r and
volatility parameter−κσ. Furthermore, Ft is a function ofAt, and can therefore also
be interpreted as a tradable asset. Observe that the parameters γ and λ determine
the dierence between the ’true’ Aˆt and the modied process At. ¿ese parameters
enter the Ft process only through the volatility parameter κ. Furthermore, note
that κ depends only on the dierence between these two parameters, see expression
(..).
Applying Itô’s lemma on expression (..) shows that
dDt
Dt
= (r − cD
Dt
)dt + σκ( cD
rDt
− )dWt (..)
which is not a geometric Brownian motion (the right-hand side depends on Dt),
and is thus not lognormally distributed. Options onDt can therefore not be valued
directly using standard option pricing formulas.
¿euse of FT as underlying asset allows us to use the standard option approach
on debt-options and is, as such, fundamental to our results.
.. European call and put options
First we consider the ’plain vanilla’ version of standard European put and call
options. ¿ese call and put options have time T payos
(DT − K)+ = (cDr − JFT − K)+ = J(X − FT)+,
and (K −DT)+ = (K − cDr + JFT)+ = J(FT − X)+
respectively, where themodied exercise price is




We have shown8 that one call option on debt with exercise price K is equivalent to
J put options on FT with a modied exercise price X. Similarly, one put option on
debt with exercise price K is equivalent to J call options on FT with a modied
exercise price X.
From the above expression for the payos of the plain vanilla call and put
options, we see that the following value of AT
A˙= θe−λTM (..)
where




produces payos of zero for both the plain vanilla put and call options. Note that
K represents the exercise price relative to DT, and A˙ similarly can be interpreted as
the exercise price relative to AT, see Figure (.). ¿e factor e−λT scalesM down
to the adjusted At-process.
In general our valuation formulas depend on
• four asset process parameters (µ, γ, σ, δ),
• ve debt parameters (c, D, J,M, λ),
• three option parameters (K, T, B),
in addition to r, in total  parameters.
For notational simplicity we write the expressions as functions of A and K
only.
Proposition . ¿e time zero market prices of European plain vanilla put and call
options on innite horizon continuous coupon paying debt claims as described above
are
PD (A,K) = JCF (F,X) (..)= J( A
M
)−κN(d) − (cDr − K)e−rTN(d)
A similar call/put-relationship was also pointed to by Sarkar ()(page ).

and
CD (A,K) = JPF (F,X) (..)= (cD
r
− K)e−rTN(−d) − J( AM)−κN(−d),
where





d = d − σκ√T
and A= δr−µ .
Proof. We have shown how one call [put] option on DT equivalently can be seen
as J put [call] options on FT with a modied exercise price. Under no-arbitrage
assumptions these options must have (pairwise) the same market value at any
point in time before expiration. Options on FT can immediately be calculated by
the Black-Scholes-Merton formulas, by using F = ( AM)−κ as the time  market
value of the underlying asset, ∣ − κσ∣ = κσ as the volatility parameter9 and X as the
exercise price.
We remarked earlier that κ depends on the dierence between γ and λ. ¿e
above option formulas also depend on this dierence through d (in addition to
through κ).
Compared to the payos from regular options, the payos at maturity T from
options and barrier-options on perpetual debt are non-linear, not piecewise linear,
functions of AT. ¿e payos at maturity T for plain vanilla options are illustrated
in Figure ..
¿ese option pricing formulas do not take into account that the issuer of the
underlying security may be bankrupt at time T, i.e., ifAT is below e−λTM orAt has
hit B before time T. ¿e formulas are still useful building-blocks in the following
formulas which include both mentioned types of default risk.
 Option prices on assets with negative volatility, as Ft, are, in this setting, calculated by








Figure .: ¿e payo at maturity for plain vanilla put and call options on innite
coupon paying debt as functions of the time T market value of the rm AT.
.. European put and call options with time T default risk
Denote the time T cash ow of a European call option on DT with exercise price
K and expiration at time T by CDT (AT ,K). ¿e option only has positive payo if
the issuer of the underlying security is not bankrupt at time T, i.e., if AT > e−λTM.
Similarly to the plain vanilla case, the time T call option cashow is
CDT (AT ,K) = (DT − K)+{AT > e−λTM} (..)= J(X − FT)+{AT > e−λTM} = JPFT(FT ,X).
¿e time T cash ow of a European put option on DT with exercise price K and
expiration at time T is
PDT (AT ,K) = (K −DT)+{AT > e−λTM} = (..)= J(FT − X)+{AT > e−λTM} = JCFT(FT ,X).
To develop option pricing formulas which reect that the issuing company
may be bankrupt at time T, it is useful to distinguish between the cases where
θ >  and θ < , ref. equation (..).
Proposition . In the case when θ >  the time zero market prices of European put
and call options on innite horizon continuous coupon paying debt claims, with
positive payo only when AT > e−λTM, are

P(A,K)θ = PD (A,K) − (J( AM)−κN(f) − (cDr − K)e−rTN(f)) , (..)
where





f = f − σκ√T,
and PD (A,K) is given in expression (..), and
C(A,K)θ = CD (A,K) = (cDr − K)e−rTN(−d) − J(AA¯)−βN(−d), (..)
where CD (A,K) is given in expression (..).
Proof. In the case of the put option we must calculate the time  market value of
the ’chopped’ claim with the pay-o
(K −DT)+{AT > e−λTM}.
First observe that (K −DT)+{AT > e−λTM} =(K −DT)+ − (K −DT)+ − (K − K){AT ≤ e−λTM},
i.e., as a dierence between two plain vanilla put options from which a constant
is subtracted for values of AT less than e−λTM. See Figure (.). Here K is a
modied exercise price calculated as follows: ¿e second put option must have
zero payo for values of AT > e−λTM, and we therefore choose the exercise price,
denoted by K, so that A˙= e−λTM. From expression (..) this is
K = cDr − J.
¿e constant K −K represents the net dierence in the payo of a long position
in the rst and a short position in the second option for values of AT less than
e−λTM. ¿e above identity is then veried.
¿emarket value of the above claim is easily calculated and the result given by
the formula P(A,K)θ above.
¿e call formula has a strictly positive payo only for values of AT > A˙. In this
case θ > , so A˙> e−λTM, thus the inclusion of time T default risk has no eect on







Figure .: ¿e payo at maturity for a vulnerable put option on innite coupon





Figure .: ¿e payo at maturity for a vulnerable call option on innite coupon







Figure .: ¿e payo at maturity for a vulnerable call option on innite coupon
paying debt when e−λTM > A˙ (θ < ), as a function of the rm value AT.
Proposition . In the case when θ <  the time zero market prices of European put
and call options with positive payo only when AT > Me−λT on innite horizon
continuous coupon paying debt claims are
P(A,K)θ = , (..)
C(A,K)θ = (cDr − K)e−rTN(−f) − J( AM)−κN(−f). (..)
Proof. In the case when θ < , A˙ < e−λTM, so the chopped put option does not
have positive payo for any values of AT.
¿e time T payo of the chopped call option is
(DT − K)+{AT > e−λTM}.
¿is can be written as
(DT − K)+ + (K − K){AT > e−λTM},
where K is given in the proof of Proposition . See also Figure (.).
¿e market value of the above claim is easily calculated and is given by the
formula C(A,K)θ above.

.. Down-and-out barrier put and call options
¿e previous section includes the possibility of default at time T. In this section
we also include the possibility of an earlier default. We assume that the issuing
company defaults if the market value process At drops below the constant B before
time T.
We treat the following cases separately. Recall that B < e−λTM by our previous
assumption.
• Case : θ > , B < e−λTM < A˙.
• Case : θ < , B < A˙< e−λTM or A˙< B < e−λTM.
¿e time T cashows of down-and-out barrier put and call options on innite
debt-claims with barrier B for the asset-process At and exercise price K are
PdoT (AT ,K) = (K − cDr + J(eλTATM )−κ)+{mAT > B}{AT > e−λTM}, (..)
and
CdoT (AT ,K) = (cDr − J(eλTATM )−κ − K)+{mAT > B}{AT > e−λTM}, (..)
where {⋅} represents the usual indicator function and the minimum function
mAT =min{At;  ≤ t ≤ T}.
¿e payo at maturity from barrier options is not only dependent on the asset
level AT as plain vanilla options, but also on the two relevant bankruptcy barriers,
B for t < T and e−λTM for t = T.
.. Case : Down-and-out barrier options when θ > .
Proposition . ¿e time zero market values of the down-and-out barrier put and
call options on innite horizon continuous coupon paying debt claims, with B <
e−λTM < A˙(θ > ) and exercise price K are, respectively
Pdo (A,K) = P(A,K)θ − (BA)( (µ−γ)σ −)P(BA ,K)θ, (..)
and
Cdo (A,K) = CD (A,K) − (BA)( (µ−γ)σ −)CD (BA ,K). (..)
Proof. ¿e results follow immediately from¿eorem . in Bjork ().

.. Case : Down-and-out barrier call option when θ < 
Proposition . ¿e time zero market values of down-and-out barrier call options
on innite horizon continuous coupon paying debt claims, with B < A˙< e−λTM and
exercise price K is
Cdo (A,K) = C(A,K)θ − (BA)( (µ−γ)σ −)C(BA ,K)θ. (..)
Proof. ¿e formula follows immediately from¿eorem . in Bjork ().
¿e down-and-out barrier put option in this case has a market value identical
to zero also when including bankruptcy risk before time T.
¿e option formulas in the this section are also applicable in situations where
third parties trade options on corporate perpetual debt. In such situations the
existence of an option contract will neither inuence the pricing of the debt nor
the issuing company’s own optimal choice of bankruptcy level. ¿e option pricing
formulas above can thus be applied by third parties using B = e−λTM = e−λTA¯and
γ = λ = . Recall that A¯ represents the constant optimal bankruptcy level in the
case of innite horizon debt claims with no embedded call option.
. Value of perpetual debt including embedded
option
In this section we analyze the case with an issuer’s European call option as an
integrated part of the debt contract, i.e., the option is written by the debtholders in
favor of the equityholders. ¿us, the existence of the option will inuence both the
issue-at-par coupon and the issuer’s bankruptcy level before the option’s expiration
date. Intuition suggests that the coupon is increased to compensate for the added
option, whereas the optimal bankruptcy level is decreased - both compared to
the case without an option. As long as the option has a positive market value
equityholders will rationally keep the company going for lower asset levels than
without an option.
We analyze a company with a simple capital structure, equity and one class of
Black and Cox ()-debt with net loss J in case of bankruptcy.

In this section we assume that no further options are present a er time T.
We are at that time then back to the classic Black and Cox () setting and the
bankruptcy level from time T onwards is given by A¯ in expression (..).
Let DcT denote the time T payo of perpetual debt including an embedded
option to repay debt at par value D, given no prior bankruptcy. Also denote the
time zero value of cashows before time T, i.e., coupon and potential bankruptcy
payments, by L(A). ¿e time zero value of debt including the embedded option
Dc(A) equals the time zero value of the time T cashow DcT plus L(A), i.e.,
Dc(A) = V(DcT) + L(A), (..)
where V(⋅) represents the market value operator.
In this section we make no assumptions regarding if, or how, the hybrid capital
is renanced at time T if the embedded option is exercised. We assume thatM = A¯,
the constant, optimal, longterm bankruptcy level.
.. ¿e time T payo of debt with embedded option
We assume that D > A¯, i.e., that the debt is risky in case of liquidation. ¿e time T
payo of perpetual debt including an embedded option is
DcT =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 for τ < T,
eλTAT for τ > T and AT < e−λTA¯,
DT for τ > T and e−λTA¯< AT < A˙,
D for τ > T and AT > A˙,
where DT is given by expression (..) and τ is the time of bankruptcy as dened
in Section . ¿e time T payo DcT is depicted in Figure (.). ¿is expression can
be rewritten under the process At as
DcT =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 for τ < T,
eλTAT for τ > T and AT < e−λTA¯,
DT −max(DT −D,) for τ > T and AT > e−λTA¯, (..)
¿is shows how DcT equals DT minus the payo from a call-option on the debt
with exercise price par, in the case where τ > T and AT > e−λTA¯.

.. Calculation of V(DcT)
From expression (..) and standard nancial pricing theory, see, e.g., Due
(), the time  market value V(DcT) can be written as
V(DcT) = EQ[ATe(γ−r)T{τ > T}{AT < e−λTA¯}] (..)+ EQ[(DT − )+e−rT{τ > T}{AT > e−λTA¯}]− EQ[e−rT(DT −D)+{τ > T}{AT > e−λTA¯}].
Below we calculate the three terms on the right hand side separately. We denote
the rst term by Vk and calculate
Vk(A) = EQ[e(γ−r)TAT{τ > T}{AT < e−λTA¯}]= Ae(µ−r)TQ¯({τ > T}{AT < e−λTA¯})= Ae(µ−r)T (N(g) − N(g) + (AB)− (µ−γ)σ −[N(−g) − N(−g)],)
where




















We recognize the second and third terms of expression (..) as down-and-out
barrier call options with common parameters λ = γ,M = A¯ and J = cDr − A¯.
¿e second term is the time zero market value of a down-and-out barrier call
option as analyzed in Section  with K =  and, consequently, θ < . ¿e time zero
market value of this option is calculated in Proposition  as Cdo (A,), equation
(..).

Finally, the third term is the time zero market value of a down-and-out barrier
call option with K = D and, consequently, θ > . ¿e time zero market value of
this option is calculated in Proposition  as Cdo (A,D), equation (..).
To summarize our calculations so far, we have that
V(DcT) = Vk(A) + Cdo (A,) − Cdo (A,D).
.. Calculation of L(A)
We now turn to the calculations of the time zero value of cashows before time T,
L(A) = EQ[∫ τ∧T

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)−κ − Cdo (A,).
¿is represents the time  market value of coupon payments and any compen-
sation in case of bankruptcy before time T. Q(τ > T) is a standard result and
included in Mjøs and Persson (). ¿e bankruptcy compensation to debthold-
ers during this period is the time-dependent bankruptcy level(barrier) Bt = Beγt.
¿e down-and-out barrier call option for θ <  is given in equation (..), using
M = B, λ =  and J = cDr − B.
.. ¿e time market value of perpetual debt with
embedded option
Proposition . ¿e time  value of innite horizon continuous coupon-paying debt
claims including an embedded option to repay debt at par value D at time T is
Dc(A) = Vk(A) + Cdo (A,) (..)

−Cdo (A,D) + cDr − (cDr − B)(AB)−κ − Cdo (A,).
Our expression for Dc(A) can be interpreted as follows: ¿e rst term rep-
resents the time  value of bankruptcy payo if τ ≥ T i.e. the rm has survived
until time T, but eλTAT < A¯ and bankruptcy occurs at time T10. ¿e second
term represents the time  market value of a call option on debt at time T with
exercise price . ¿e third term represents the short, embedded, call option on
debt exercisable at time T with a strike equal to par value D. ¿is possibility to
renance in case of improved available terms at time T is exactly the purpose of
the embedded option included in the time  debt contract. ¿e last two terms
represent the time  market value of all cashows before time T, modelled as the
dierence between immediately starting perpetual debt and a forward starting
perpetual debt expressed as a barrier call option with exercise price  at time T.
¿is combined expression allows for calibrating both the "issue-at-par" coupon rate
reecting the embedded option and a time-dependent endogenously calibrated
issuer bankruptcy level before the option expires.
. Base case parameter calibrations
In this section we calculate calibrated coupon rates and bankruptcy levels for
realistic parameter values. In particular, we test whether our closed form produces
correct coupon rates compared to more exact numerical solutions. ¿e dierence
between the coupon rates is a benchmark for the precision of our closed form
approach.
In order to calibrate the bankruptcy barrier parameters B and γ, we implement
a binomial tree following the binomial lattice methodology from Broadie and Kaya
(). ¿ey assume that debt coupons are paid from a rm’s cashow and that any
shortfalls are covered by new equity either from existing or new shareholders as
long as the market value of equity is positive. ¿is approach also provides an exact
coupon-rate, denoted by cn, which is independent of any analytically assumed
shape of the bankruptcy barrier.
We generally assume that the bankruptcy level is continuous at time T due
to the correlation between asset levels and option payo. ¿e payo-prole in
If the bankruptcy barrier is assumed to be continuous at time T, this terms equals .

Figure . shows that the levels of AT for which the option is in-the-money are
well above any optimal bankruptcy levels and will therefore have no impact on
optimal bankruptcy. Equivalently, distressed rms with asset values approaching
the bankruptcy level will not expect any option payos.
¿e derived value of B, the initial bankruptcy level, is then used in the closed
form solution to calculate the coupon-rate, here denoted by cc. We do this by
adjusting the coupon-rate cc in equation (..) to achieve Dc(A) = D, i.e., that
the market value of debt with embedded option is par.
In our binomial approach we apply the base case parameters in Table .
and run , steps per year for  years. ¿e chosen level of asset volatility is
taken from Leland (), whereas the level of riskfree interest rate is common in
similar illustrations. ¿e base case time to expiration of the option resembles the
actual option maturities in most publicly listed perpetual bonds issued by nancial
institutions.
Table .: Base case parameters, all rates are annualized.
δ  Initial EBIT
µ  % Dri of EBIT
D  Face value of debt
T  Expiration date of option
σ . Volatility of EBIT
r  % Riskfree interest rate
A  Total asset value at time 
Consistent with our assumed analytical form of the bankruptcy barrier Bt =
Beγt we calculate γ = T ln(BTB ), where B is calculated by the binomial approach and
BT is equal to the long-term bankruptcy level, A¯. Observe that by this formulation
γ only depends on the time  and time T values of the bankruptcy barrier and not
on intermediary values.
We also test the functional form Bt = Beγt by using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) to estimate γ. ¿e estimation is based on the complete sequence of numeri-
cally calculated values of Bt and regress ln(Bt) on ln(B) + γt.
Figure . shows the development of Bt as a function of elapsed time to expi-
ration from the binomial approach, the analytical approximation and the OLS-
















































Figure .: ¿e numerically calculated optimal, and the analytically solved
bankruptcy asset level Bt as a function of elapsed time until expiration of the call
option embedded in perpetual debt. ¿e lower line represents an OLS-regression
of the numerically calculated Bt-values. See Table . for parameter values.

regression. ¿e latter is shown by the lower line. We include two illustrations
of the barriers to emphasize the limited impact of the time-dependencies com-
pared to the long-term bankruptcy level. ¿e appropriate choice of bankruptcy
assumptions is discussed in the next section.
Table .: Calibrated values of the coupon-rates and long-term bankruptcy levels
using the base case parameters.
Alternative solutions: B γ cc/cn A¯
Analytical
- regular(B&C’) Not applicable . % .
- with option, B from model . . . % .
- with option, B from tree . . . % .
Binomial
- with option . . . % .
Table . compares the calibrated coupon-rates and bankruptcy barriers for
alternative approaches. ¿e simplication in our analytical model of assuming a
xed level of γ yields a very low starting-level B and high level of γ, compared to
the binomial solution. We have le for future research to develop an analytical
solution that better captures the time-variations of this barrier, and choose to apply
the starting level of B from the tree as an input-variable in our calculations. Given
this approach, our structural model generates results that are very close to the
binomial solution and gives us condence in analyzing sensitivities on this basis.
¿e results support our intuition that an embedded option increases the closed
form coupon cc (from . % to . %) even when in a model where the only
source of risk is the loss in case of bankruptcy. ¿is increase also changes the
long-term bankruptcy-levels A¯. As an overall assessment, we nd that the coupon-
rates cc and cn are reasonably close (the dierence is less than  basispoints).
¿e OLS-approach yields γ = ., B = ., and R = .%. ¿e high
value of R supports the assumed linearity of ln(Bt). ¿e estimated γ′s from the
two approaches are close (¿e ratio is ..), and as expected, the OLS-approach
underestimates the starting point B.
Observe in Figure . that both the numerically calculated and the modelled
bankruptcy levels are below the constant long-run level A¯. Additional analysis

shows that for large T, the eect of the option disappears and B approaches A¯.
. Relevance of the time-dependent bankruptcy
barrier
An important assumption in our analysis is the exponential shape of the time-
dependent bankruptcy barrier before the expiration of the embedded option. In
this section, we compare the numerically calculated coupon-rate cn to the closed-
form coupon-rate cc for variations in maturity and volatility to illustrate the eects
of alternative assumptions regarding time-dependency. We compare our base case
bankruptcy barrier to two alternatives proles, a constant barrier and a constant
barrier with two levels, illustrated in Figure .. ¿e numerical results produce the
correct bankruptcy barrier before time T whilst our analytical model necessarily
will represent an approximation.
We initially in Table . show the sensitivity of the time-dependency growth
parameter γ for changes in volatility and option maturity. ¿e values of γ are
calculated from our binomial solutions as a benchmark for the choice of analytical
assumptions. We nd that γ is positively related to the value of our barrier-options,
increasing in volatility σ and decreasing in option maturity T. As γ increases with
volatility, time dependency becomes increasingly important in these situations.
Table .: Numerical values of the time-dependency parameter γ using alternative
parameters for maturity(T) and annual EBIT(δ)-volatility (σ). , steps per
year.
γ - sensitivities Volatility(σ)
Maturity(T) . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
In Table . we show the coupon-rate dierences, cc − cn. ¿e dierences are





Case C: Two-step constant level
Case B: Constant level
Case A: Time dependent
Figure .: Alternative bankruptcy barrier proles with dierent degrees of time
dependency for t < T.
values of σ and T and by alternative bankruptcy barrier assumptions. ¿is test
illustrates the relevance and precision of our assumed time-dependent bankruptcy
barrier by comparing the following alternatives:
• Case A:¿e base case time dependent approach with assumed exponential
barrier, B /= A¯ and γ /= . B is found by solving a binomial tree, as explained
in Section .
• Case B: A constant barrier for all t, B = A¯ and γ = . ¿is alternative
disregards any impact the nite option may have on the optimal bankruptcy
level.
• Case C: A two-step constant barrier with dierent levels before and a er
time T, B /= A¯ and γ = . ¿is approach recognizes that the bankruptcy
level may be lower before time T because of the option, but disregards any
additional time dependencies.
¿e table shows that the dierences are relatively insensitive to the choice of
barrier. When analyzing the longest maturities,  and  years, both alternatives
with constant barriers (Cases B and C) produce comparably good results. As-
suming a  year horizon, Case B with one, constant barrier performs best. We

Table .: Dierences in basispoints between the closed form calibrated coupon
rates cc and the numerical solution cn using alternative parameters for annual
EBIT(δ)-volatility (σ) and alternative approaches for bankruptcy barriers denoted
Cases A, B and C and described in the text. cn is calculated using , steps per
year.
∆Coupon-rates, (cc − cn), bp
Volatility (σ) . . .
Maturity:  years
Case A -. . .
Case B -. -. -.
Case C N.A. . .
Maturity:  years
Case A -. . .
Case B -. -. -.
Case C N.A. -. -.
Maturity:  years
Case A . . .
Case B . -. -.
Case C . -. .
are not able to analytically estimate the coupon-rates for Case C with the lowest
volatility and maturities below  years. ¿e overall result is that in applications
where one may test dierent combinations of σ and T, Case B with one, constant
barrier is the preferable choice. ¿is alternative also has the additional benet of
not requiring B as input-variable, as well as computational simplicity. Our base
case (Case A), performs equally well except for the shortest maturity and highest
volatility. For long maturity ( years) all barrier alternatives produce reasonably
correct coupon rates.
Our conclusion is somewhat counterintuitive, but is that the eects of time-
dependency are negligible for realistic parameter values. Our model includes
simplifying assumptions which limits the general validity of this conclusion. How-
ever, the fact that we assume  % debt nancing to magnify the eects strengthen
the conclusion.
In our discussions of sensitivities we apply the assumption of one, constant

bankruptcy barrier, Case B.
. Sensitivities and market reference
Table . shows the sensitivity of the analytically calculated coupon-rate cc for
alternative combinations of EBIT-volatility and time until the option expires. Here
cc is strongly increasing in volatility, in accordance with the classical result of
increasing option values with volatility. Contrary to the standard eect of maturity
on plain vanilla option values, the barrier option specications in our setting
decreases value by longer maturities reecting the risk of bankruptcy. See Figure
. in Section  for an illustration.
Table .: Analytically calculated values of the coupon rate cn for callable perpetual
debt with embedded option expiring a er T years using alternative parameters
for maturity(T) and annual EBIT(δ)-volatility (σ). Assumed constant bankruptcy
level.
Coupon-rates (%) Volatility(σ)
Maturity(T) . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
Table . shows the sensitivity of the long-term optimal bankruptcy level A¯
following from the coupon-rates in Table .. ¿e main dierence in the sensi-
tivities is that A¯decreases both for increases in volatility and in option maturity.
Increased volatility will, at least when viewed in isolation, always increase the
value of equity and thus reduce optimal A¯. Increased maturity reduces optimal
coupon-rate as shown in Table . and A¯ then follows by equation (..).
As a market reference, Figure . shows the yield spreads of Iboxx-indices11 of
UK Tier  perpetual debt securities (hybrid capital) including embedded option
compared to UK banks’ senior debt, both relative to UK government bonds(Gilts)
reported weekly for the period December  - September . ¿e hybrid
Index yields are sourced from Iboxx via Datastream

Table .: Analytical values of the longterm bankruptcy asset level A¯ for callable
perpetual debt with embedded option a er T years using cn and alternative pa-
rameters for maturity(T) and annual EBIT(δ)-volatility (σ). Assumed constant
bankruptcy level
Bankruptcy level A¯ Volatility(σ)
Maturity(T) . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
capital yield-spread produced by our stylized model is of the same magnitude as
the observed yield-spreads in the latter part of the period, except for the most
recent months. ¿e higher riskiness of the hybrid security is exemplied both by
the standard deviation of this annualized spread being  basispoints compared to
 basispoints for senior debt, and the relatively larger increases towards the end
of the period. ¿e latter relates to the credit-crisis in Summer . Both reect
that Tier  securities are more risk-exposed than senior bonds, as expected.



























































































Figure .: ¿e graph shows the redemption yield spread of the Iboxx-indices for
UK banks’ senior debt and UK banks’ Tier I capital a er deducting the yield on
the UK Gilts index for maturities - years. Weekly observations for the period
December  until September . Source: Iboxx(via Datastream).
. Concluding remarks and further research
We show how a European embedded option in perpetual debt impacts both
the value of debt and the issuer’s rational economic behavior with regards to
bankruptcy. Specically, the embedded option impacts the bankruptcy decision,
level of debt coupons, and the optimal exercise of the option. We derive closed
form solutions based on an approximation of the optimal bankruptcy level be-
fore the option expires. We show that for realistic parameter values an assumed
constant bankruptcy level produces the most robust correct coupon-rates for alter-
native volatilities and option maturities. Perhaps surprisingly, our model, with its
heroic assumptions, produces coupon spreads that appear to be in a realistic order
of magnitude compared to observed market spreads.

¿e equityholders pay for the embedded option through a higher xed coupon
on the perpetual debt, compared to regular perpetual debt. ¿e equityholders
choice of optimal bankruptcy-level is impacted by the debt with embedded option
in two ways; an increased coupon and the existence of a potentially valuable option.
¿e increased coupon raises the optimal long-term bankruptcy-level, whilst the
embedded option lowers it.
¿e market values of perpetual debt with and without option are dierent
a er expiration in the situation when the option has not been exercised. A higher
coupon in the rst case reects the historical cost of the expired option and is a
major motivation for the exercise of such options. ¿is higher coupon rate causes
exercises also in signicantly worse future states compared to the situation at time
of issue. It is common in the marketplace to contractually agree that coupons are
even ’stepped-up’ post-expiry of the option to further incentivice exercise.
For our analytical purpose, we have developed some European option and
barrier option pricing formulas on perpetual debt. ¿e barrier option formulas are
applied to reect default risk before the option expires. ¿ese formulas are quite
general and may be used for valuing both embedded and third-party options.
Our model can be extended along a number of dimensions such as intro-
ducing frictions (taxes, bankruptcy costs), dierent liquidation priorities (hy-
brid/preferred stock), and American type options.

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.A Present value of  payable at rst hitting time
before a nite horizon.
In this appendix we collect some technical results. Consider the Itô process
Xzt = zt +Wt, (.A.)
where z is a constant, and the stopping time
τ = inf{t ≥ ,Xt = b}
where b is a constant. Dene another constant
w =√z + r,
where r represent the constant riskfree interest rate. We are concerned about
the present value of one currency unit payable at the rst hitting time of a lower
boundary if this occurs before the horizon T and dene
V = EQ[e−rτ{τ ≤ T}].
where EQ[⋅] denotes the expectation under the equivalent martingale measure.
E.g., Lando () shows that
V = eb(z−w)Qw(τ ≤ T),
where
Qw(τ ≤ T) = N(b −wT√
T
) + ewbN(b +wT√
T
), (.A.)
represents the cumulative probability distribution of τ as a function of the param-
eter w. ¿e above result can be rewritten as
V = eb(z−w)N(b −wT√
T
) + eb(z+w)N(b +wT√
T
). (.A.)














¿e revised expression becomes
V = (AB)β+ µ−γ−  σσ N(n) + (AB)−βN(n), (.A.)
where









and β is given in (..).
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of Hybrid Capital
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Abstract
A large class of innite horizon nancial instruments which incorporates
elements of both debt and equity, may collectively denoted "hybrid capital".
¿e Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has devised the fundamental
requirements for how hybrid capital may qualify as a part of core ("Tier ")
regulatory capital for banks. We present valuation models for hybrid capital
in the set-up of Black and Cox () and Leland () and derive new
valuation formulas incorporating these special features. In particular, we
take into account the issuer’s right to omit hybrid coupon payments and
to call the hybrid capital at par value starting from a given date. In doing
so, we build on formulas developed in Mjøs and Persson (). We show
that hybrid capital actually carry risk and clarify interesting links between
their valuation and overall corporate capital structure as guidance both for
market participants and regulators alike.
¿eauthors thank Petter Bjerksund, J. David Cummins, Neil A. Doherty, Elyès Jouini, Kristian
R.Miltersen, AlexanderMuermann, and StephenH. Shore for valuable suggestions and discussions.
Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the FIBE conference at the Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration(NHH), Bergen, January , at the Rosen - Huebner
- McCahan Seminar Series at the Insurance and Risk Management department at ¿eWharton
School, January , at European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists (EGRIE) st seminar
Marseilles, September , University of Bonn, May , at the Norwegian University of Science
and Technology, June , at the European Financial Management Association, Vienna, June
, and at ¿e Nordic Academy of Management Conference, Bergen, .

. Introduction
Increasingly complex structured securities are a consequence of the sophistication
of nancial markets. ¿e commercial drive behind this development is - as always
- to seek any remaining arbitrage opportunities either in terms of risks or rewards.
Complexity is a function of issuer and investor preferences, investment banks’
commercial creativity and nally regulatory, legal or tax frameworks. In the case of
hybrid capital2 which encompass elements of both debt and equity, the regulatory
and tax-considerations dene the most unique characteristics. Typical ’hybrid
capital’ is a perpetual coupon paying security, senior only to common equity,
includes an issuer option to call the security as from  years a er the date of issue
and the right of the issuer to forego coupon-payments without it constituting a
default. In sum, the commercial "raison d’être" for hybrid capital is that it is a
qualifying form of risk-carrying capital which in most cases have tax-deductible
dividends or coupons. In this paper we contribute with better understanding
of the valuation of and capital structure impacts from hybrid capital generally,
and particularly the typical structures issued by banks. Standard asset pricing
models value each separate element included in a complex security and conduct a
security-specic "sum-of-the-parts" valuation. ¿is approach disregards the need
to any resulting eects on the securities and the issuer caused by a combined set
of xed and conditional claims. Our paper models, values and contributes to a
better understanding of hybrid capital and comments on its eect on optimal
shareholder bankruptcy behavior for a given capital structure. ¿e complexity
makes the valuation a particularly challenging research task, even under strict
assumptions regarding to market eciency and symmetric information. Mjøs
and Persson () developed fundamental valuation formulas using a barrier-
options-approach, whilst the contribution of this paper is a completely specied
version of hybrid capital in a complete capital structure setting. ¿e specication
of hybrid capital resembles standard market practice.
Hybrid capital is a class of innite horizon coupon-paying securities for which the value is
bounded above similarly as for debt, but which carry almost the same downside risk as equity.
¿ese securities have many names but the generic structures are very similar on a global basis
due to commonality in the regulation of the issuers, primarily banks and insurers. Preferred
stock, Trust Preferred Stock and Capital Securities are terms used on variants of hybrid capital, in
particular in the US.

.. ¿e market for hybrid capital
As of mid , the (global) stock of outstanding hybrid capital was estimated at
$ billion3 Amongst the issuers were  % banks,  % insurance companies, 
% utilities and  % industrial companies. ¿is dominance of regulated industries
reects both that the securities are tailor-made to specic regulations and that the
innite horizonmaturity is well suited to sectors where regulations and supervision
reduce the expected default risk. An international comparison also shows that this
dominance is even clearer in markets outside the US.
All banks in the developed part of the world are under strict regulations com-
pared to other sectors, in particular regarding risk exposure, risk management
and required capital. ¿e foundation for the global regime for risk capital in banks
is the  Basle Accord on Capital Standards, see Committee on Banking Su-
pervision (). ¿is document laid out the general principles for calculating
the prudent capital requirements for banks and the criteria for what constituted
acceptable forms of risk capital, as well as certain deductions from this capital.
We describe these regulations in more detail below. In addition to strengthening
the global regulatory focus on risk capital in nancial institutions, the Accord
became a standard which secured a large degree of commonality between capital
regulations between jurisdictions. An element of this was a more standardized
global structure for hybrid capital. National variations include criteria for tax-
deductability and contingent control rights in case of nancial distress. ¿is high
degree of standardization of hybrid capital issued by banks and to a large degree
also insurance companies causes us to focus our examples on hybrid capital for
nancial institutions. ¿e valuation formulas and related analysis are generic and
may usefully be applied also in other settings.
We analyze under the assumption that an issuer’s main motivation for issuing
hybrid capital is to optimize between regulatory requirements, a er-tax cost-of-
capital and capital-structure considerations.4 A bank may issue hybrid capital
instead of raising new common equity and thus both potentially save tax and
avoid the direct and indirect costs related to seasoned equity oerings. Benston,
Irvine, Rosenfeld, and Sinkey () analyze  issues of hybrid capital by US
Source: Lehman Brothers "¿e Capital Securities Market. Composition and Trends".
¿e full understanding of drivers of issuance is a separate research subject in itself and not
covered here.

bank holding companies in the years - with regards to what characterizes
issuers vs. non-issuers. ¿ey nd distinct dierences in that issuers are larger,
have higher tax-rates, more uninsured funding and lower equity ratios. ¿eir
event study also nds signicant common stock abnormal returns for issuers who
led a er the Federal Reserve’s new favorable tax-treatment of hybrid capital5 was
announcement on  October . ¿e latter is taken as a conrmation of the
positive shareholder value impact from such issues.
.. Financial institutions’ regulatory framework
Banks and insurance companies are subject to extensive regulations. Lacking a
consensus view as to the full justication of the regulations, Santos () points
to two commonly accepted motivations: Firstly, the risk of a systemic crisis when
the banks as liquidity providers experience a "run" from depositors. Secondly,
fragmented depositors’ limited incentives and ability to properly monitor banks
as lenders, and thus the implicit risk of moral hazard in banks. ¿ese risks are met
by deposit insurance, rules and supervision regulating the creation and operation
of banks, and nally specic capital requirements to capture a sucient part of
the remaining risk exposure of both society and depositors. Under the current
regulations6 the assets of a bank are weighted primarily according to credit risk
and the minimum amount of capital is  % of this weighted sum of assets. ¿is
requirement may be met by capital of dierent priority and risk-exposure. Tier I
includes common equity and hybrid capital, Tier II constitutes subordinated debt
and is split between a perpetual "upper-level" and a dated "lower-level" category.
Tier III is short term subordinated debt which may only cover market price risks.
¿e basic requirements dened by BIS for hybrid capital to qualify as part of
Tier I capital are7:
"Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments. ¿is heading includes a range of
instruments which combine the characteristics of equity capital and of debt. ¿eir
Trust Preferred Securities (TPS)
BIS is well under way with a new set of capital requirements popularly labelled "Basel II"
which includes a broader range of risks evaluated when setting the capital requirements. Basel II
also represents a signicant improvement in how individual institutions may calculate their exact
capital requirements. ¿ese regulations are being implemented gradually during the years to come.
Committee on Banking Supervision () Annex , D, (d), page -.

precise specications dier from country to country, but they should meet the
following requirements:
• they are unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up,
• they are not redeemable at the initiative of the holder without the prior
consent of the supervisory authority,
• they are available to participate in losses without the bank being obliged to
cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated debt),
• although the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay interest that
cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike dividends on ordinary
shareholders’ equity), it should allow service obligations to be deferred (as
with cumulative preference shares) where the protability of the bank would
not be supported.
Cumulative preference shares, having these characteristics would be eligible
for inclusion in this category."
National implementations of these principles are necessarily more practically
phrased in line with the following:
• Hybrid capital is only senior to equity capital in case of distress and liquida-
tion.
• Hybrid capital have to be fully paid-in, any authorized payments are not
included.
• ¿e issuer have the right to call the securities at coupon-payment8 dates
a er  years from the date of issue. ¿e execution of this option requires
explicit approval from the supervisory authority in charge of the bank to
secure that a repayment of the hybrid capital does not make the issuer too
weak in capital terms.
We choose to denote the amounts paid to service the securities "coupons" even though some
versions of hybrid capital are categorized as preference shares which receive dividend payments
and not coupons.

• To absorb risk in nancially distressed situations, non-payment of coupons
should not cause the bank to default.
• Hybrid capital should not exceed  % of total Tier I capital.
¿emain variations between dierent countries’ regulations regards whether
any unpaid coupons are permanently omitted or may be accumulated up to a
maximum period (e.g.,  years) but then constitutes a default, the position of
the capital relative to equity when a distressed bank is renances, the maximum
step-up of the coupon-rate if the call option is not exercised at the rst possible
date, the tax-treatment of coupons for both issuer and investor, and the maximum
amount of hybrid capital accepted as Tier I capital. Some countries allow direct
hybrid issuance where the coupons are fully treated as debt-coupons, these include,
e.g., the Scandinavian countries and Spain. In the USA the most common form
used by bank holding companies (BHCs) has been Trust Preferred Capital which
is issued by a special purpose vehicle which then re-lend the funds to the bank
holding company as Upper Tier II subordinated debt. ¿is structure allows for
Tier I treatment of the funds in the consolidated bank-group accounts and tax-
treatment as for regular debt, but no Tier I eect on the bank holding company
separately.
We model hybrid capital as innite horizon subordinated debt with a nite,
embedded call-option, a step-up in the coupon-rate and an exogenously given risk
of non-payment of coupons. ¿ese combined features characterize most issues of
hybrid capital. To be able to analyze the impact from hybrid-capital on the issuer’s
other outstanding liabilities, we also include a model of perpetual senior debt.
.. Literature overview
Hybrid capital has been studied from various angles, explaining issuance (e.g.,
Benston, Irvine, Rosenfeld, and Sinkey () as discussed above), understanding
its role in a regulatory perspective (e.g., Santos ()) and some event-studies of
the eect of issuance on common stock values (e.g., Krishnan and Laux () as
commented earlier).
¿emost direct precedence to our work is the paper by Emanuel () which
develops a valuation of preferred stock, equivalent to our termhybrid capital, based

on the option-methodology of Black and Scholes. Emanuel applies a geometric
Brownian motion for the development of the total value of the rm and develops
partial dierential equations for the value of equity, debt and preferred stock. ¿e
paper gives a comprehensive motivation for management’s dividend payment deci-
sions and argues that in this context, preferential dividend rights and voting rights
conditional on passed dividends are equivalent. ¿e basic model assumes that as
soon as rm value exceeds initial value, current and any accumulated preferred
dividends will be paid. ¿e derivative of preferred stock with respect to rm value
is subject to current rm value and the size of any arrearage of unpaid preferred
dividends, exemplifying the mix of debt and equity features. In comparison, we
provide an alternative way of modelling passed hybrid coupons. Common to both
approaches is that hybrid coupons are passed when the asset value process hits an
exogenously dened boundary which is assumed to be somewhat above the opti-
mal bankruptcy/liquidation level. ¿e choice of the rst boundary, the omission
level, aects the optimal bankruptcy level in our model. Another contribution
compared to Emanuel’s paper is the analysis of the issuer’s embedded call option
commonly found in practice. We develop closed form formulas for this option
and also show how the existence of this option aects the optimal bankruptcy
level and valuation of other contingent claims on the rm, in particular debt.
Regarding the existence and impact of hybrid capital per se, some specic
papers are worth mentioning:
Engel, Erikson, and Maydew () analyze the issuance of trust preferred
stock using a sample of  issuances for the period -. ¿ey nd that
issuers are willing to incur on average USD million in direct and USD million
in indirect costs to reduce the debt-to-asset ratio by . % and also that the Net
Present Value of the tax-benets in replacing traditional preferred stock with trust
preferred stock are around  %. ¿ese tax benets are partially transferred to
investors (implicit taxes) through a higher pre-tax yield on tax-advantaged vs.
regular preferred stock.
Krishnan and Laux () study the impact of issuance of trust preferred stock
on the return of common stock. ¿ey nd signicant positive abnormal return
when the issuer gains specic nancial benets from the issue.
Beatty () analyze whether changes in accounting treatment of hybrid
capital impacts banks’ propensity to issue hybrid capital when capital regulations

are unchanged. ¿e paper shows that market discipline is important in that bank
behavior actually changed following the accounting changes.
Engel, Erikson, and Maydew (), Benston, Irvine, Rosenfeld, and Sinkey
() and Krishnan and Laux () all include extensive descriptions of the
market for and structure of hybrid capital, in particular as seen in a US perspective.
.. Focus of the paper
Lack of contingent control rights when coupon-payments are defaulted, subor-
dination a er all debt, perpetual maturity and non-cumulative coupons are all
’equity-like’ features of hybrid capital. On the other hand, seniority before common
equity, tax-deductible coupons, issuer call-features and no proportional share in
any prots are clearly ’debt-like’ features. We develop formulas for the valuation
of these instruments in a given capital-structure setting, including its impact on
optimal shareholder bankruptcy behavior. Interesting topics like agency-problems
and issuance dynamics are le for later research.
Our model is based on the Merton ()/Black and Cox () models as
extended by Leland () and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland () although we do
not introduce market frictions like tax or bankruptcy costs. Our model cannot in
its current form be used to directly analyze optimal capital structure.
In our model, risk is represented by the volatility of the EBIT-process following
the tradition of, e.g., Ingersoll () and this diers from more recent research
on callable bonds (see e.g., Acharya and Carpenter ()) which use a stochastic
interest rate-process. Wemotivate our choice of process by two dierent arguments.
Firstly, hybrid capital are typically an issuers most risky securities and capture far
more of the issuer’s credit risk than regular senior bonds. Secondly, market practise
indicates that issuers of hybrid capital, either directly or through an interest rate
swap, pay a xed credit margin plus a oating market interest. Issuers are thus
hedged against the nominal interest rate level. ¿ese factors implies that an EBIT-
process which replicates the rm specic credit quality developments replicates
well hybrid capital risk.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section  presents our specications of
hybrid capital. Section  reproduces the standard results of Black and Cox ()
with one class of debt. Section  explains our main results. Section  presents

numerical examples. Section  discusses various specic features of hybrid capital
inmore detail. Section  contains numerical sensitivities and graphical illustrations
and section  concludes. Some calculations are le for in an appendix.
. Our specication of hybrid capital
We include the following properties of hybrid capital:
. Hybrid capital is a perpetual, continuously coupon-paying debt instrument
that has priority a er senior debt, but before equity. In terms of priority it is
similar to regular junior or subordinated debt. To incorporate this property
hybrid capital is modelled as Black and Cox () junior debt. In cases with
several classes of debt with dierent priorities, hybrid capital will always
have the lowest rank.
. Issuer has the right to call the hybrid capital at par at coupon-dates (usually
quarterly) a er a xed period (usually  years) from the date of issue. For
simplicity we assume that this option is European and only exercisable at
the rst possible date. Our assumed exercise strategy is in correspondence
with observed market practice, see Mjøs and Persson (), who develop
valuation formulas capturing this aspect of hybrid capital.
. Unpaid coupons represent an irrevocable loss for the investor. ¿ey do
not trigger bankruptcy, nor are they accumulated as additional debt9. To
explicitlymodel the possibility to omit payment of hybrid capital couponswe
introduce an exogenous asset threshold level under which coupon payments
are not paid.
. If the call option is not exercised at the rst possible date, the annual coupon-
rate is increased by a contractually agreed step-up (typically  -  bp).
In the USA and some other jurisdictions, also hybrid capital for nancial institutions with
either cumulative interest or certain rights to the investors following a dened number (e.g. ) of
consecutive missed coupon payments qualies as core/Tier  capital whilst most European and
other supervisory authorities require no cumulation of missed coupons. We choose to focus on
the non-cumulative setting. In Norway, issuers may omit coupons provided no dividends are paid
on common stock.

It is well known that also regular perpetual junior debt may contain a call
option and coupon rate step-up. ¿e dening dierence between junior debt and
hybrid capital is the issuer’s right to omit coupons without causing an event of
default. BIS as well as leading rating agencies consider this feature as critical to
accept hybrid capital as the highest ranking (Tier I) risk capital and not just as
junior(Tier II) debt for nancial institutions.
. ¿e valuation model and basic results
We consider the standard Black-Scholes-Merton economy and impose the usual
perfect market assumptions:
• All assets are innitely separable and continuously tradeable.
• No taxes, transaction cost, bankruptcy costs, agency costs or short-sale
restrictions.
• ¿ere exists a continuously compounded constant riskless rate of return r.
We study a limited liability company with a capital structure consisting of
three claims, innite horizon debt, hybrid capital, and common equity. In line
with Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (), we assume that the assets generates an EBIT
(earnings before interest and tax)-cashow denoted by δt given by the stochastic
dierential equation
dδt = µδtdt + σδtdWt, (..)
where µ and σ are constants representing the dri and volatility respectively, and δ
is given. HereWt is a standard Brownian motion under the equivalent martingale
measure. ¿e total time tmarket value At of the assumed perpetual EBIT stream
from the assets equals




r − µ .

¿is quantity is elsewhere in the literature referred to as the unlevered value of the
rm’s assets. ¿is market value follows the process
dAt = (rAt − δt)dt + σAtdWt (..)= µAtdt + σAtdWt
Observe that the volatility parameter of this market value is identical to the volatil-
ity of the cashow process. We use the notation A= A = δr−µ .
A general claim f on the assets under these assumptions satises the partial
dierential equation, see, e.g., Merton (),


σAt fAA + µAt fA − r f + ft + C(At, t) = , (..)
where ft denotes the partial derivative of f with respect to (elapsed or calendar)
time, fA the partial derivative of fwith respect to At, and fAA the partial derivative
of fAwith respect toAt. HereC(At, t) represents the time t continuous net coupon
rate received by the owner of the claim f.
.. A recollection of the Black and Cox () results.
We review the results of Black and Cox () and Leland () for the simple
case with one class of regular innite horizon debt. Observe that we assume an
underlying EBIT-process following Goldstein, Ju, and Leland () and that
equity-holders receive any cashows in excess of debt coupons as dividends. ¿is
assumption leads to a dri parameter µ dierent from the risk free rate r in the
asset price process.
We denote the face value of the debt by D and assume that contractual debt
payments per unit of time are given by cD, where the coupon rate c is assumed
constant.
Let A¯denote the lower boundary of At where debt payments are stopped and
the shareholders transfer the assets of the rm to the debtholders. We refer to A¯
as the bankruptcy level.
¿e time t market value of one monetary unit paid upon bankruptcy, i.e., when
the process At hits the boundary A¯ is
Ft = Ft(At, A¯) = (AtA¯ )−β, (..)

where10
β = µ − σ +√(µ − σ) + σr
σ
> . (..)
.. Valuation of debt and equity




− JDF(A, A¯), (..)
where
JD = cDr − A¯.
Expression (..) for the market value of debt carries a nice intuition. cDr is
the time  market value of innite horizon default-free debt receiving a coupon
payment rate of cD. In the case of risky debt (A¯ < D), the debtholder upon
bankruptcy looses a stream of innite coupon payments which at the time of
bankruptcy has market value cDr . ¿is loss has a time  market value of F
cD
r . ¿e
time  market value of debt when A¯=  is then the dierence between the market
values of these two coupon streams. In a more realistic setting, A¯>  and this is
also the liquidation payo to debt in case of bankruptcy. We can therefore interpret
JD = ( cDr − A¯) as the debtholder’s net loss upon bankruptcy. ¿e time  market
value of this net loss JDF represents the reduction of the time  market value of
riskfree debt due to default risk. ¿is is the only risk-exposure of lenders in our
model, assuming constant riskfree interest rate and liquid, ecient markets.
Since we have not included any market ineciencies, e.g., taxes, liquidation
costs, or strategic debt service opportunities, the time  value of equity is the
market value of assets less the market value of debt, or
E(A) = A−D(A) = A− cD
r
+ JDF(A, A¯), (..)
using equation (..).
It can actually be shown that β > µσ .

.. ¿e optimal bankruptcy level
Given c and D, we assume that the equityholders choose A¯ so that the value
of equity is maximized. By maximizing expression (..) with respect to A¯we
determine the optimal A¯∗ as
A¯∗ = β(β + ) cDr . (..)
. Main results
We model hybrid capital including the properties described in section  and
assume a more realistic capital structure including both innite horizon senior
debt, hybrid capital and equity. Our valuation results facilitate, for a given capital
structure, the calibration of optimal bankruptcy levels and coupon rates.
We develop our valuation formulas stepwise by rst determining payos and
market values of all claims at time T, the time of expiry of the hybrid capital
embedded option. We subsequently determine the time zero value of all claims,
partially by applying barrier option formulas with the time T market values as
underlying assets.
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the bankruptcy asset level before
the expiration of the option is constant, but possibly dierent from the long term
bankruptcy asset level. ¿is assumption ignores any further time dependencies
caused by the decreasing time tomaturity of the hybrid capital embedded option. A
companion paper, Mjøs and Persson (), demonstrate that this assumption has
negligible inuence on the resulting calibrated coupon rates in a simpler set-up for
reasonable parameter values. ¿ey also nd that a common, constant bankruptcy
level was most robust. In this paper, we study a more complex security and capital
structure and choose to apply two constant bankruptcy levels tomaintain analytical
exibility.
We dene the stopping time τ as
τ = inf{t ≥ ;At = B}. (..)
Here τ can be interpreted as the time of bankruptcy if τ ≤ T.

.. Time T valuation of the claims.
¿e market values of senior debt, hybrid capital and equity at time T represent
the rst step in the valuation of the nancial claims at time zero. ¿ese valuation
formulas implicitly assume that the issuing company has not gone bankrupt before
or at time T, i.e. τ > T. ¿e value of any payout in case of bankruptcy at time T
will be included in the time  valuation formulas.
Valuation of senior debt at time T.
Proposition . ¿e time Tmarket value of senior debt with face valueD and coupon
rate cS for a given bankruptcy asset level A¯ is
D∗T(AT) = cSDr − J∗DFT(AT , A¯), (..)
where
J∗D = cSDr −min(A¯,D),
and FT is dened in expression (..).
Proof. ¿is is the standard result for regular Black and Cox () debt from
expression (..)where the bankruptcy payo term is replaced withmin(A¯,D) to
explicitly include the case when senior debt carries no default risk, i.e., A¯> D.
Valuation of hybrid capital at time T.
¿e payo to hybrid capital at time T is
H∗T = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
HT −max(HT −H,) for τ > T
 otherwise,
(..)
where HT is given by expression (..) for standard Black and Cox () debt.
Note, however, the following dierences: ¿e face value of debt D is replaced by
the face value of hybrid capital H. ¿e coupon rate c is replaced by the stepped up
coupon-rate cH + k. Here cH represents the coupon rate of hybrid capital before
time T and k represents the increase (step-up) in this rate at time T provided
that the option to call the hybrid capital has not been exercised. U represents the
exogenous asset level below which hybrid capital coupons are not paid.

¿e total time T payo from hybrid capital H∗T equals innite horizon debt
less the payo from a European call-option on the hybrid capital exercisable at
time T with exercise price H, provided the company is not bankrupt at or before
time T.
Proposition . ¿e time T market value of hybrid capital with face value H and
priority a er senior debt with face value D, coupon rate cH, time T coupon rate
step-up k, for a given bankruptcy asset level A¯, and given asset threshold value level
U below which hybrid capital coupons are not paid, is
H∗T(AT) = (cH + k)Hr − J∗HFT(AT , A¯), (..)
where
J∗H = (cH + k)Hr (βy−α + αyβ)(α + β) − (A¯−D)+, (..)






and β is given in expression (..).
Proof. SeeAppendixA. Expression (..) follows fromequation (.A.), replacing
c by cH + k to include the coupon-rate step-up at time T, and G by (A¯− D)+ to
adjust the liquidation payo due to the existence of senior debt.
As opposed to JD in the original debt expression (..), J∗H represents the
potential net loss to holders of hybrid capital both from bankruptcy and unpaid
coupons, i.e., when A¯< A< U.
¿e constant y represents the ratio between the coupon omission asset levelU
and the longterm bankruptcy asset level A¯. In the case when k =  (no coupon rate
step-up) and y =  (no risk of omitted coupons) expression (..) is simplied to
the standard case of junior and senior debt. ¿e term (A¯−D)+ in expression (..)
reects that hybrid capital has priority a er senior debt in case of bankruptcy.

Valuation of equity at time T.
¿e market value of equity at time T follows from the identity E∗T(AT) = AT −
D∗T(AT) −H∗T(AT) and equations (..) and (..)
E∗T(AT) = AT − cSD + (cH + k)Hr + (J∗D + J∗H)FT(AT , A¯). (..)
¿e optimal long term bankruptcy level at time T, denoted by A¯∗, is found by
dierentiating expression (..) with respect to A¯. ¿e solution is
A¯∗ = β
β + (cDDr + (cH + k)Hr y−α). (..)
In the case where k =  and y = , A¯∗ is identical to the similar quantity in the
standard case with junior and senior debt.
.. Time  valuation of the claims.
We now value the dierent claims at time  and include the eect of the embedded
option in hybrid capital. ¿e embedded call option has a xed maturity, and its
market value depends on remaining time to expiry.
We assume a constant, lower, bankruptcy level B before time T reecting the
value of the embedded option. ¿e long term bankruptcy level A¯∗ is aected by
this assumption through the coupon rates cH and cS.
Valuation of senior debt at time .
¿e time  value of senior debt is equal to the time  market value of receiving D∗T
at time T if the company has not gone bankrupt, plus the time  market value of
cashows received before time T, as well as any bankruptcy payment at time T.
¿e last item is the payo if the rm has survived until time T, but AT < A¯, and
bankruptcy occurs.
Proposition . ¿e time zero market value of senior debt is
D∗(A) = cSDr − JDV(B) − J∗DV(A¯) +Vs(A), (..)
where
V(B) = (AB)αN(d) + (AB)−βN(d),









V(A¯) = (AA¯)−βN(−d) − ( A¯B)β(AB)αN(d),
JD = cSDr −min(B,D),
Vs(A) = Ae−rT (N(gs) − N(gs) + (AB)− (µ)σ −[N(−gs) − N(−gs)],)
where




















and β is given in expression (..) and J∗D in Proposition .
Proof. ¿e time  market value of debt consists of the market value of time T
debt plus the market value of coupon payments and a potential bankruptcy payo
before or at time T, i.e.,
D∗(A) = EQ[D∗Te−rT{τ>T}] + EQ[∫ τ∧T

cSDe−rsds] (..)+ EQ[min(B,D)e−rτ{τ≤T}] + EQ[ATe(−r)T{τ>T}{AT<A¯}].
Denote
V(B) = EQ[e−rτ{τ≤T}],
where τ is dened in expression (..). From equation (..) we can write the
rst term of expression (..) as
EQ[D∗Te−rT{τ>T}] = cSDr Q(τ > T)e−rT − J∗DEQ[e−rTFT(AT , A¯∗){τ>T}].

Denote
V(A¯) = EQ[e−rTFT(AT , A¯){τ>T}].
¿e integral in the second term of expression (..) can be written as
EQ[∫ τ∧T

cSDe−rsds] = cSDr ( −Q(τ > T)e−rT −V(B))
¿e nal term equals
Vs(A) = EQ[e−rTA{AT<A¯}{τ>T}].
¿e calculations of V(B), V(A¯) and Vs(A) are standard, see e.g., Mjøs and
Persson (). ¿e result follows by collecting terms.
¿e valuation expression for senior debt at time  may be decomposed into the
value of a perpetual, riskfree coupon-stream, less the loss in case of bankruptcy
before or a er time T, plus any bankruptcy payout at time T in the case when
B < AT < A¯ and τ > T.
Valuation of hybrid capital at time .
¿e time  value of hybrid capital is equal to the time  market value of receiving
H∗T at time T plus the time  market value of cashows received before time T
and any bankruptcy payout at time T. H∗T is given in expression (..).
Proposition . ¿e time  market value of hybrid capital is
H∗ (A) = (cH + k)Hr Q(τ > T)e−rT − J∗HV(A¯) (..)− C + L+ (B−D)+V(B) +Vh(A),
where
C = C(A,H) − (BA)β−αC(BA ,H),
C(A,H) = ((cH + k)Hr −H)e−rTN(−d) − J∗H(AA¯)−βN(−d),





dh = dh − σβ√T,

Q(τ > T) = N(dh) − (AB)α−βN(−dh),














α + β(AU )−β( − Qˆ(τ > T,AT > U) + e−rTQ(AT > U, τ > T)+ β
α + β ((AU )αQ¯(AT > U, τ > T) + ( BU )αV(B)) ,
Vh(A) = Ae−rT (N(gh) − N(gh) + (AB)− (µ)σ −[N(−gh) − N(−gh)]))−
Ke−rT (N(gh) − N(gh) + (AB)− (µ)σ −[N(−gh) − N(−gh)]),)
where









































α and J∗H are from Proposition ,V(B) is from Proposition , β is given in expression
(..) and Q(AT > U, τ > T), Qˆ(τ > T,AT > U), and Q¯(AT > U, τ > T) are
from Mjøs and Persson ().
Proof. ¿e time  market value of hybrid capital consists of the market value of
hybrid capital at time T including an embedded call option plus the market value
of coupon payments and a potential bankruptcy payo before time T, i.e.,
H∗ (A) = EQ[H∗Te−rT{τ>T}] − EQ[(H∗T −H)+e−rT{τ>T}] (..)+EQ[∫ τ∧T

cHH{As>U}e−rsds] + EQ[(B−D)+e−rτ{τ≤T}]+EQ[(AT −D)+e−rT{AT<A¯}{τ>T}].
Observe that equation (..) diers from equation (..) in two ways. First, it
includes the hybrid capital embedded call option (the second term on the right
hand side). Second, the coupon payments before time T only take place if At > U.
Denote
C = EQ[(H∗T −H)+e−rT{τ>T}]
and




EQ[H∗Te−rT{τ>T}] =(cH + k)H
r
Q(τ > T)e−rT − J∗HEQ[e−rTFT(AT , A¯){τ>T}],
C and L are calculated in Mjøs and Persson (). ¿e result follows by collecting
terms using the notation previously introduced.
Valuation of equity at time .
¿e market value of equity as the residual claim follows from equations (..)
and (..)
E∗ (A) = A−D∗(A,) −H∗ (A)) (..)

.. Default risk of senior debt and hybrid capital.
To better understand the dierences in default risk in senior debt and hybrid
capital, we discuss the case when t > T and disregard the embedded call.
In case of liquidation, At = A¯, and the absolute priorities dene the payos to
the dierent claimants as⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
DL =min(D, A¯)
HL =min(H,(At − (A¯−D))+)
EL = (A¯−HL −DL)+,
where DL, HL and EL represent the liquidation payos to debt, hybrid capital and
equity, respectively. Equation (..) and intuition makes it reasonable to assume
that for an optimally leveraged rm, A¯ < D + H, i.e., equityholders receive no
payos in case of bankruptcy. ¿e analytically relevant cases in our setting are the
following:
• Case A: A¯< D, no payo to hybrid capital and senior debt is risky in case of
bankruptcy.
• Case B: A¯ > D, positive liquidation payo to hybrid capital and senior debt
is risk-free in case of bankruptcy.
¿e riskiness of hybrid capital in Case A is closer to equity, whilst hybrid capital
in Case B resembles conventional junior debt. Our valuation formulas are generic
and applicable in both situations.
Senior debt carries the conditional control rights in case of unpaid coupons,
whilst hybrid capital in our specication does not. ¿e issuer will still pay hybrid
capital coupons to be permitted to pay dividends on common equity11. In our
model, bankruptcy occurs if and when equity-holders nd it no longer optimal to
service the senior debt and hybrid-capital and therefore declare bankruptcy. In
case of senior debt, the results are standard. For hybrid capital, we may assume
two dierent asset-levels of distress. ¿e rst, previously denotedU, is when the
company stop paying coupons. ¿e bankruptcy asset level, A¯, represents the state
¿is is a common requirement to discipline equityholders from immediately exploiting
holders of hybrid capital, although such behavior would eectively terminate any market for
hybrid capital.

when the equityholders stop paying all coupons and let the company enter into
bankruptcy. ¿is level necessarily causes immediate default on all claims on the
company. In a capital structure with both senior debt and hybrid capital, we have
three levels of coupon payment:
A> U: All coupons are paid.
U ≤ A> A¯: Only senior debt coupons are paid.
A≤ A¯: No coupons are paid and the company enters bankruptcy.
We assume that all coupons are treated equally in the rst and the latter situa-
tions and thus that the bankruptcy asset level A¯ is optimized with respect to all
coupon payments. However, as equation (..) shows, the risk of unpaid coupons
to hybrid capital impacts the calculation of the optimal bankruptcy level through
y−α which reects the relationship between the hybrid capital distress-levelU and
the bankruptcy-level A¯.
. Base case numerical example.
We illustrate our ndings by showing the calibrated coupon-rates for senior debt
and hybrid capital for a set of reasonable parameter values, given in Table ..
¿e calibrations meet two criteria. ¿e rst optimization nd the short term
bankruptcy level, B, which minimizes the combined value of senior debt and
hybrid capital, the equivalent of maximizing the value of equity. Simultaneously,
the coupon-rates of senior debt, cS, and hybrid capital, cH, are adjusted to achieve
’issue-at-par’for both claims. ¿e valuation formulas for hybrid capital, equa-
tion (..), and senior debt, equation (..), as well as the combination, has
global minimum values for B for reasonable parameter values which allows for
optimizations. We will return later to discussions of sensitivities and alternative
assumptions.
¿e comparison shows that hybrid capital featuring junior position, risk of
lost coupons, embedded call option and coupon-rate step-up is a riskier claim
demanding a signicantly higher coupon rate compared to straight perpetual debt.
Equivalently, senior debt becomes less risky if the capital structure includes hybrid
capital than the case with only equity, demanding  bp lower coupon-rate for the

Table .: Base case parameters
Parameters Values Explanations
δc  Initial EBIT
µ  % Dri of EBIT
σ . Volatility of EBIT
r  % Riskfree interest rate
A  Total asset value at time 
D  Face value of senior debt
H  Face value of hybrid capital
E  Face value of equity
T  Expiration year of option
k  Hybrid coupon rate step-up at time T
y . ¿e factor on the relevant bankruptcy levels
indicating the asset level where hybrid coupons are unpaid.
Table .: Numerical calibrations
Coupon- Barrier levels
Alternative calibrated claims rates B A¯ U
Senior, (Black&Cox) debt:
- Par value:  . % n.r. . n.r.
- Par value:  . % n.r. . n.r.
Capital structure with senior debt and
fully specied hybrid capital:
- Senior debt (D = ) . % . . n.r.
- Hybrid capital (H = ) . % . . .

same share of the nancing. If hybrid capital were replaced by the same amount
of senior debt, senior debt becomes riskier and demands a rate-increase of  bp,
both due to increased share of nancing and the loss of hybrid capital in absorbing
risk. ¿e risk-absorption by hybrid capital helps explain its high coupon-rate.
. Discussion of certain hybrid capital properties
In this section we discuss the most important features of hybrid capital separately.
We focus on issues above and beyond those covered by Mjøs and Persson ().
.. ¿e risk of unpaid coupons
¿e obligation to pay regular coupons is one of the dening characteristics of
debt and equivalently motivates why hybrid capital typically need to have non-
cumulative interest payments to qualify as Tier I risk capital. ¿e critical implica-
tion is that any missed payment does not cause a default irrespective of whether
coupons are permanently lost or just accumulated. An issuer will have to trade
o any savings from missed coupon payments against any possible reputational
damage potentially impacting future capital market access.12 We do not explore
these considerations further, but choose to treat the equityholders’ decision when
to stop paying coupons as exogenous in our model.
¿e asset threshold U, denoted the omission level, represents the level where
hybrid coupons are dropped.13If asset values rst drop below U and then again
increase aboveU, only hybrid coupon payments for this period will remain unpaid
.
When U = A¯, y =  and the optimal bankruptcy level equals the optimal
bankruptcy level in the case of regular debt, cf. equation (..). For large values
of U and y, y−α approaches zero. In the limit the optimal bankruptcy asset level
also goes towards zero since no hybrid coupon payments would ever be paid.
For any other value of U, the optimal bankruptcy asset level will also be lower
than with no risk of omitted coupons. ¿e introduction of coupon risk via U
Issuers considering dropping coupons are probably is such a critical position that the impor-
tance of future regular nancing is comparatively small.
In our formulas, we utilize the ratio y on the short term bankruptcy level B to dene the
omission level before time T.

into the model highlights the important connection between securities valuation
and capital structure eects when analyzing hybrid capital. ¿e omission level,
U, impacts not only the value of hybrid capital as a claim on the company, but
also bankruptcy risk, coupon rates and values of any other claims issued by the
company. In the case of nancial institutions, this relationship illustrates how
hybrid capital with coupon-risk may reduce the bankruptcy risk compared to, e.g.,
regular subordinated debt and may therefore be a useful part of the risk-carrying
capital. We analyze this in Section .
¿e coupon rate for the hybrid capital given A¯ and U is calculated from ex-
pression (..) and applying (..) as
ch = rFyα−β − (F A¯y−βH − ). (..)
Equation (..) shows that ch is falling in y since (α− β) > −β, both exponen-
tials being positive as discussed inAppendixA.¿e intuition behind this somewhat
surprising result is that the reduction in the optimal long term bankruptcy level A¯
for an increasing y contributes more to the market value of hybrid capital than
the lost value of the omitted coupons.
.. Embedded issuer’s call option and coupon rate step-up
To increase the value of the option and thus the probability that the hybrid capital
is called, most hybrid capital securities include a - basispoints coupon rate-
increase as from the rst possible expiration date of the option. ¿e step-up reects
a natural dierence in views between capital markets and regulators. ¿e former
prefers predictable, nite maturities for risky securities. ¿e regulators, on the
other hand, expects risk-carrying capital to have long maturities. Regulators solve
this disagreement by limiting the size of the step-up to support the permanence of
the hybrid capital.
In our valuation-formula (..) the step-up rate, k, only directly impacts
payos and values as from time T since no step-ups happen earlier.
A hybrid issuer whose situation has deteriorated at the expiry of the option
will not exercise the call, leaving the investor with nite maturity only in the cases
where the credit has improved and the investor generally would have preferred to

remain invested. It is intuitively easy to see why this call feature has value for the
issuer.
¿e lower the eventual time T market value of the rm’s assets, AT, is, the
higher the required coupon-rate of newly issued hybrid capital would be. It is
therefore only optimal to let the option expire without exercise when the observed
market issue-at-par-coupon rate at time T is higher than the existing contract
coupon rate, including any agreed step-up. ¿is situation will in our model occur
for relatively low values of AT, i.e., when the company is in a bad state. ¿e
existence of the step-up, k, will further reduce this level and make options called
more frequently.
. Analysis of alternatives and sensitivities
In this section we apply the common set of base case parameters from Table . in
Section . ¿e common set of assumptions provides comparability between the
various examples, but the relatively small size of the hybrid capital will naturally
cause the variations in the observed coupon rates to be small.
.. Sensitivities.
Figure . shows the calibrated coupon-rates for senior debt and hybrid capital
assuming alternative levels of annual EBIT-volatility. ¿e graph shows that the
hybrid capital coupon rates are - as expected - very sensitive to rm volatility
whilst senior debt coupon rates are not.
Table . shows the sensitivities of the calibrated coupon-rates for perpetual
senior debt and hybrid capital for combinations of option maturities and EBIT-
volatilities. As expected, the coupon rates for hybrid capital grow in both volatility
and maturity, reecting increased risk exposure. ¿e senior debt coupon-rate
is close to the risk free rate with rates which grow in volatility but fall in option
maturity.
Figure . shows how the coupon rates change for dierent assumed ratios y
between the coupon omission level and the bankruptcy level. As expected, the
senior debt coupon rate has a very limited sensitivity to increased risk of lost
coupons. ¿e more surprising result is that the hybrid coupon rate increases only

Coupon rate sensitivity to volatility
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Figure .: ¿e gure shows the analytically calibrated issue-at-par coupon rates for
hybrid capital and regular perpetual senior debt for assumed discrete levels of annual
cashow(EBIT)-volatility ranging from .% to .%. See Table . for parameter values.
for fairly high levels of y. ¿is reect the results from (..) that increased risk of
lost coupons is balanced by an overall reduction in bankruptcy asset level.
We have also analyzed the coupon rate sensitivities to changes in the hybrid
coupon-rate step-up at time T if the option is not exercised. An increase in the
step-up from  to  bp decreases the senior debt coupon by  bp whilst the
hybrid capital coupon increase by  bp.
.. A bank depositor’s exposure.
¿e regulatory rationale for accepting hybrid capital as part of the risk capital
of nancial institutions is its eect on the overall riskiness of the institution and
exposure of the depositors. In our model, the calibrated coupon-rate of senior

Table .: Calibrated values of the coupon rates for senior perpetual debt and
callable perpetual debt with embedded option, coupon rate step-up and exoge-
nously dened risk of omitted hybrid coupons.
¿e table shows combinations of number of years to expiry of the option (T) and annual EBIT(δ)-
volatility (σ). Parameters are given in Table .
Coupon-rates (%) Volatility(σ)
. . .
Maturity(T) Senior Hybrid Senior Hybrid Senior Hybrid
 years . . . . . .
 years . . . . . .
 years . . . . . .
debt (’quasi-deposits’) may be seen as a reasonable proxy for the risk-exposure of
depositors. We do a simplied test of the eects of hybrid capital by comparing
the calibrated senior debt coupon rate for three stylized bank cases14:
• Case A: A traditional bank with % equity capital and the remainder as
senior deposits.
• Case B:A bank that raises % hybrid capital as additional risk-capital whilst
retaining the equity ratio from Case .
• Case C: A more aggressive bank that replaces / of the equity by hybrid
capital leaving the sum of risk-carrying capital constant at %.
¿e capital structure compares reasonably well to a simplied nancial institu-
tion and the results are shown in Table ., assuming an optimized short term
bankruptcy level B.
Our illustration shows that the required senior debt coupon rate is reduced if
a stylized bank increases its risk-capital by raising hybrid capital in addition to
its existing equity capital. We also see that replacing one half of equity by hybrid
capital actually leads to a marginal reduction in the coupon rate required by senior
claimants (’depositors’). ¿is eect is obviously captured by the hybrid capital
which requires a coupon rate increase of  bp in compensation for the increased
¿e actual equity-ratio is somewhat larger than typically found in regular banks.

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Figure .: ¿e gure shows the analytically calibrated issue-at-par coupon rates for
senior debt and hybrid capital for increasing risk of omitted hybrid capital coupons. ¿e
risk of lost coupons is modelled as an exogenous asset level above the optimal bankruptcy
level. If the asset process is between these two levels, no coupons are paid nor accumulated.
¿e ratio between these levels is denoted y and represents the x-axis in the graph. See
Table . for parameter values.
risk of Case C compared to Case B.¿is result, although preliminary, is supporting
the usefulness of hybrid capital in absorbing risk in the capital structure of nancial
institutions.
We nd in the regressions, except for the lowest volatility, that the calibrated
levels of B and A¯ are very close. ¿is indicates that a model with one, constant
bankruptcy level might be suciently precise as was the conclusion in Mjøs and
Persson (). We have not studied this closer as of now.

Table .: Calibrated values for the coupon rate cH for hybrid capital and cd for
senior debt for alternative capital structures.
¿e coupon rates are calculated assuming a short term bankruptcy level B that minimizes the value
of senior debt and is reported separately. Remaining parameters are given in Table ..
Bank depositor’s exposure Cases
Capital structure: A B C
Senior debt   
Hybrid capital   
Equity capital   
Senior debt coupon . . .
Hybrid capital coupon n.r. . .
B - short term bankruptcy n.r. . .
A¯ - long term bankruptcy . . .
. Conclusions and further research
Hybrid capital/preferred stock forms a signicant part of the capital of many
companies, particularly nancial institutions, and is a challenging research area.
¿e valuation of this highly structured instrument also impacts the optimal capital
structure of the issuer. We believe that our paper represents a rst attempt to
develop complete theoretical valuation models for hybrid capital including the
common features found in the marketplace, notably issuer call-option, increased
coupon-rate at the expiry date of the option and the right to omit coupon payments.
¿emethodology is developed by using barrier call options to allow for bankruptcy
risk before the exercise date. ¿e exogenous decision by the company to omit
coupons on hybrid capital impacts bankruptcy level and cost-of-capital across all
claims issued. ¿is feature, together with the junior rank in liquidation, are critical
requirements when regulatory bodies acknowledges hybrid capital as part of the
solvency capital for banks and insurance companies.
We have le many areas for future research, in particular the issue regarding
when a company will choose to omit coupons. Insight from game theory or
informational economics can probably be applied in this respect. ¿e eects of
taxes and various bankruptcy practises are also le for future research. ¿ere is

obviously also a need for research into both the theory and the empirical evidence
regarding the issuing decision. ¿e valuation models will need to be empirically
tested on actual values and yields both in the primary and secondary market of
such securities.
¿is paper represents the rst comprehensive valuation paper on hybrid capital
including itsmany features. Weprovide closed form solutions for values and insight
into what drives values and risk-elements.

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
.A Derivation of the market value for hybrid
capital with risk of omitted coupons
In this case the hybrid coupons are only paid when At > U. ¿e actual coupon-
payment is thus dependent on At. We solve equation (..) separately for each
region.
¿e general solution of equation (..) for the two regions is:
H(A) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
cH
r + KAα + KA−β for A≥ U
CAα + CA−β for A¯≤ A≤ U. (.A.)
where α,β > , and are the positive solutions to the following equations:


σα(α − ) + µα − r = 


σβ(β + ) − µβ − r = 
¿e solutionsmay be expressed as α = λ+ξ and β = −λ+ξ. Observe that α+β = ξ,
where





√(σ − µ) + σr
¿e constants C and K in expression (.A.) can be found from the boundary
conditions
lim
A→∞H′(A) = ⇒ K = .
For A = A¯, i.e. in bankruptcy, the boundary condition is H(A¯) = G, where G
represents the payo to hybrid capital in case of bankruptcy. We obtain
CA¯α + CA¯−β = G
C = A¯−α[G − CA¯−β].
By inserting these expressions into the equation (.A.) we get
H(A) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
cHH
r + KA−β for A≥ U,
C(A−β − AαA¯α+β) +G(AA¯)α for A¯≤ A≤ U. (.A.)

¿e rst of the two additional equations necessary to determine K and C are
found by assuming H(A) is continuous for A= U, yielding
cHH
r
+ KU−β = CU−β + (UA¯)α[G − CA¯−β] (.A.)
K = C( − (UA¯)α+β) − cHHr Uβ +GUα+βA¯α .
¿e second equation is found by the smooth pasting condition, i.e., assuming that
the rst derivatives of H(A) are continuous at A= U,
−βKU−(β+) = αU(α−)A¯−α[A¯− CA¯−β] − βCU−(β+),
K = C( + αβ(UA¯)(α+β)) −Gαβ Uα+βA¯α (.A.)
¿e solution to equations (.A.) and (.A.) is found by equating them and
solving for C:
C = GA¯β − cHr β(α + β) A¯α+βUα
¿e expression for C may now be inserted into the expression for K:
K = GA¯β − cHr Uβ(α + β)[β( A¯U )α+β + α].
and the complete solution based on equation (.A.) is
H(A) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
cHH




α+β( AU )α − [ cHHr βα+β( AU )α −G](AA¯)−β for A¯≤ A≤ U.
(.A.)
¿is equation equals expression (..) when U = A¯.

Default of multiple degrees: ¿e risk
of lost debt coupons

coauthored with Svein-Arne Persson 1
Abstract
Motivated by the risk of stopped debt coupon payments from a leveraged
company in nancial distress we dene a multi-level annuity contract which
pays an annuity at a rate depending on the value of an underlying asset.
¿e range of possible values of this asset is divided into a nite number
of regions. ¿e annuity rate is constant within each region, but may dier
between the regions. ¿e annuity payments end at a nite time horizon or
upon an earlier bankruptcy, i.e., if the asset value process hits an absorbing
boundary. Such annuities occur naturally in models of debt with credit risk
in nancial economics. Suspension of debt service under the US Chapter 
provisions is one well-known example. We present closed-form formulas for
the market value of multi-level annuities contracts when the market value
of the underlying asset is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion.
¿e authors thank Zheng Huang and Bernt Øksendal for comments and discusssions.

. Introduction
Debt obligations are commonly defaulted on by companies in nancial distress. A
default may be dened as stopped or reduced coupon payments. ¿e reduction in
coupon payments may even be contractual for particularly risky debt. Irrespective
of the specic causes of these non-payments, they represent a challenge for the
valuation of corporate debt. Chapter  in the US bankruptcy code is an important
example of regulations that allow a company to default without necessarily being
declared bankrupt and liquidated.
Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan () determine debt and equity values in
a model which distinguishes between default and liquidation, motivated by US
legislation. ¿ey analyze conicts of interest between debtholders and shareholders
and solve their model numerically using the binomial approach of Broadie and
Kaya (). An example of contractual non-payments is hybrid risk capital for
nancial institutions which incorporates elements of both equity and debt. One
common feature of such claims is the issuer’s right to omit coupon payments under
certain conditions, see e.g, Mjøs and Persson (a).
Motivated by the risk of lost coupon payments we dene a multi-level annuity
contract with a nite number of asset value levels of ’nancial health’. As such, it
allows for dierent, but constant, coupon rates between the dierent levels. Both
coupon rates and nancial health levels are assumed to be exogenous. We derive
closed form solutions for the market value of the multi-level annuity contract both
in the cases of nite and innite horizons. ¿e choice of the market price process
of a company’s assets rather than a common nancial market factor such as, e.g., a
interest rate, as exogenous stochastic process is motivated by the fact that distress
is primarily caused by rm specic factors rather than general market factors.
Mathematically we solve a boundary value problem, see e.g., Øksendal (,
Chapter ). First, we nd the market value of the multi-level annuity contract in
the case of an innite horizon using the standard assumption of smooth-pasting, see
e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (). ¿emulti-level annuity contract can be decomposed
into a portfolio of simpler annuities. ¿e market value of the multi-level annuity is
calculated as the sum of the market values of these annuities. In the case of a nite
horizon T we apply the standard argument that a nite annuity may be considered
as an immediately starting innite annuity from which another innite annuity

starting at time T is subtracted. To take into account the possibility of bankruptcy
before the maturity date T, we replace the innite annuity starting at time T with
a call option on this annuity with exercise price equal to zero, exercisable only at
time T. Given our model this option is a European down-and-out barrier call.
Such options in a similar setting for debt with credit risk have been analyzed in
Mjøs and Persson (b).
¿e bankruptcy asset level is modeled as an absorbing barrier In the structural
debt modeling framework of Black and Cox () and Leland () . Both
Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan () and Mjøs and Persson (a) apply
one additional nancial distress (default) level. In this paper we extend this idea
to multiple, although exogenous, nancial health levels, see Figure . In order to
interpret these levels as various degrees of nancial distress the natural assumption
is that the initial asset value is above all these levels. Our approach is general and
our formulas are applicable for other assumptions regarding the initial asset level
as well.
Our analytical solution may be applied to parts of the valuation problem of
Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (), although their model contains time-
dependencies which severely complicate the use of closed-form solutions. Closed
form solutions, as the ones we present, may increase computational speed, provide
benchmarks for numerical solutions, and enhance economic understanding of the
problems.
¿is paper is organized as follows: Section  contains the set-up. Section 
treats the case of innite horizon. Section  develops the results for the case of
forward starting annuities. In Section  results from sections  and  are combined
into results for nite horizon annuities. Conclusions and areas for further research
are indicated in Section . Some technical results are collected in an appendix.
. Set-up
A ltered probability space (Ω,F ,{Ft},Q) is given. In particular, Q represents
a xed equivalent martingale measure. We furthermore impose the standard
frictionless, continuous time market assumptions of nancial economics, see e.g.,
Due ().

We assume that the underlying asset process is given by a geometric Brownian
motion
dAt = µAtdt + σAtdWt,
where the initial value A = A is a constant. Here µ and σ are constants andWt
represents a standard Brownian motion.
Let T be the nite time horizon, let the constant C be the bankruptcy barrier,
and dene the stopping time τ as
τ = inf{t ≥ ,At = C}.
¿ere are n additional constant levels or non-absorbing barriers B, . . . ,Bn
so that B > ⋯ > Bn > C. ¿e constant annuity rate is c when At > B, ci when
Bi− > At > Bi, i = , . . . ,n, and cn+ when Bn > At > C. All ci’s are constants. ¿e
initial value of the process is above the highest barrier, i.e., A> B.










Figure .: An illustration of the case where n = . ¿e picture contains an example of a
path of At and indicates in which regions the annuity rates are c, c, and c, respectively.
Also, A, B, B, C, T, and τ are depicted.
We study the problem
V(A) = E [∫ τ∧T

n+∑
i= cie−rs{Bi− > As > Bi}ds] ,
where {⋅} denotes the standard indicator function, E[⋅] denotes the expectation
under the equivalent martingale measure. For notational convenience B =∞ and
Bn+ = C.
. ¿e innite case
In this section we consider innite horizon claims, assuming that T =∞. Let f be
the market value of an arbitrary innite horizon claim on At, and denote the rst
and second order partial derivatives by fA = ∂f∂A and fAA = ∂ f∂A , respectively. ¿en

the partial dierential equation


σA fAA + µAfA − r f + c(A) =  (..)
holds, subject to appropriate boundary conditions. Here c(A) represents the
annuity payment rate (to be interpreted as dividends or coupons, depending on
the nature of the claim) to the owner of the claim f. ¿e general solution to the
homogeneous part, obtained by letting c(A) = , of equation (..) is
f∗(A) = KAα + KA−β, (..)
where
α = σ − µ +√( σ − µ) + σr
σ
(> ) , (..)




> ) . (..)
and constantsK andK determined by boundary conditions. ¿e general solution
to equation (..) is f(A) = f∗(A) + fs(A), where fs(A) is any special solution
of equation (..).
First we derive market values of some simpler claims, which subsequently will
be used in the valuation of the multi-level annuity. We denote initial market values
by capital letters, possibly with subscripts, e.g., U, or U(A,B) to emphasize the
dependence on the initial value of the process and on the barrier.
.. ¿e value of  at the initial hit of a barrier
Let U denote the time  market price of a claim which pays  when At = B for the
rst time.
U(A,B) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ua = (AB)−β when A≥ B,
Ub = (AB)α when A≤ B (..)
¿e superscripts a and b signify that At hits the barrier from above or below,
respectively. ¿ese results are standard, but we include a proof for the completeness
of the exposition.

Proof. U does not pay any dividend so c(A) =  in expression (..). Ua is
calculated from equation (..) using the boundary conditions limA→∞Ua =
 ⇒ K =  and Ua(B) = . Ub is calculated from the boundary conditions
limA→Ub = ⇒ K =  and Ub(B) = .
We remark that U(⋅,B)) is continuous at B, but does not satisfy the smooth
pasting condition at B.
.. ¿e value of an above-annuity
Let VA denote the time  market price of an annuity which pays the rate c when
At > B (above-annuity).
VA(A,B) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
VaA = cr( − αα+β(AB)−β) when A≥ B,
VbA = cr βα+β(AB)α when A≤ B. (..)
Observe that VbA =  when B =∞.
Proof. VA pays c only when At > B, so in expression (..) c(A) = c when At > B,
and c =  otherwise. Observe that fS(A) = cr solves equation (..) when A> B.
¿e relevant boundary conditions are limA→∞VaA = cr ⇒ K =  and limA→VbA =
 ⇒ K = . To determine K for VaA and K for VbA we require continuity and
smooth pasting at B, i.e., VaA(B) = VbA(B) and ∂∂AVaA(B) = ∂∂AVbA(B).
.. ¿e value of a below-annuity
Let VB denote the time  market price of an annuity which pays c when At < B
(below-annuity).
VB(A,B) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
VaB = cr αα+β(AB)−β when A≥ B,
VbB = cr( − βα+β(AB)α) when A≤ B. (..)
Observe that VbB = cr when B = ∞. Also observe that VbB = cr − VbA , if A < B, an
innite annuity with payments below B equals an innite annuity from which an
annuity with payments only above B is subtracted. Also VaA = cr −VaB , if A> B, an
annuity with payments above B equals an innite annuity from which an annuity
with payments only below B is subtracted.

Proof. VB pays c only when At < B, so in expression (..) c(A) = c when At < B,
and c =  otherwise. Observe that fs(A) = cr solves equation (..) when A< B.
¿e relevant boundary conditions are limA→∞VaB = ⇒ K =  and limA→VbB =
⇒ K = . To determine K for VaB and K for VbB we also here require continuity
and smooth pasting at B, i.e., VaB (B) = VbB (B) and ∂∂AVaB (B) = ∂∂AVbB (B).
.. ¿e value of a corridor-annuity
Let VC(A,Bi) denote the market value of an annuity which pays c when Bi+ <
At < Bi (corridor-annuity).
VC(A,Bi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
VaC = cr αα+β(( ABi )−β − ( ABi+ )−β), A≥ Bi,
VcC = cr[ − βα+β( ABi )α − αα+β( ABi+ )−β] Bi+ ≤ A≤ Bi,
VbC = cr βα+β(( ABi+ )α − ( ABi )α), A≤ Bi+.
(..)
Here VcC denotes the market value when the initial value A is inside the corridor.
Proof. ¿e corridor annuity is equivalent to a below annuity with barrier Bi from
which a below annuity with barrier Bi+ is subtracted,
VC = VB(A,Bi) −VB(A,Bi+).
Equivalently, the corridor annuity can be seen as an above annuity with barrier
Bi+ from which an above annuity with barrier Bi is subtracted,
VC = VA(A,Bi+) −VA(A,Bi).
.. ¿e values of the above, below, and corridor annuities in
the case with bankruptcy risk
Let Dj denote the value of claim Vj where j ∈ {A,B,C}, including the lower
absorbing barrier C representing bankruptcy.
Dj(A,Bi) = Vj(A,Bi) −Vbj (C,Bi)Ua(A,C) (..)

Proof. Upon bankruptcy, i.e., at time τ, the value of the claim Vj is Vbj (C,Bi).
BecauseC < Bi for all i ≤ n,Vj = Vbj . Vbj (C,Bi) therefore represents the reduction
in value of the claim Vj due to bankrupty at the time of bankruptcy. ¿e initial
value of this claim is found by discounting by U = Ua because A> C.
Below we calculate the market values of the three annuities considered, includ-
ing an absorbing bankruptcy barrier C. First the result for the above-annuity
DA(A,B) = (..)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
DaA = cr [ − ( αα+β(CB)−β + βα+β(CB)α) (AC)−β] when A≥ B,
DbA = cr βα+β [(AB)α − (CB)α(AC)−β] when A≤ B.
We then calculate the market value of the below annuity as
DB(A,B) = (..)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
DaB = cr [ αα+β(CB)−β + βα+β(CB)α − ] (AC)−β when A≥ B,
DbB = cr [ − βα+β(AB)α − ( − βα+β(CB)α)(AC)−β] when A≤ B.
Finally, the market value of the corridor annuity is
DC(A,Bi) = (..)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
DaC = cr(α+β) [α(( CBi )−β − ( CBi+ )−β) + β(( CBi )α − ( CBi+ )α)] (AC)−β
for A≥ Bi,
DcC = cr(α+β) [α + β − β( ABi )α − α( ABi+ )−β − β(( CBi+ )α − ( CBi )α)(AC)−β]
for Bi+ ≤ A≤ Bi,
DbC = cr βα+β [( ABi+ )α − ( ABi )α − (( CBi+ )α − ( CBi )α)(AC)−β] ,
for A≤ Bi+.
.. ¿e value of an innite multi-level annuity with
bankruptcy risk
In this section we calculate the time zero market values of two multi-level annuity
with innite horizon. For simplicity we only treat the case where A> B.

Denote the time zero value of the innite version of the multi-level annuity in
the case of no bankruptcy risk (no absorbing barrier) by V∞ (A).
¿e cashows from a multi-level annuity is identical to the cashow of a
particular portfolio of annuities. ¿e annuities are: An above annuity with barrier
B and annuity rate c, n−  corridor-annuities with coupon ci and barriers Bi−
and Bi, i = , . . .n, and a below annuity with barrier Bn and annuity rate cn+.
¿e initial market value of the innite multi-level annuity without bankruptcy
risk is equal to the sum of the market values of the annuities in the portfolio which
replicates the cashow of the innite multi-level annuity.
For A> Bi for all i, the market value of an innite multi-level annuity in the
case of no default risk is
V∞ (A) = cr − αα + β n∑i= ci − ci+r ( ABi )−β. (..)
Proof. As explained above
V∞ (A) = VaA(A,B) + n.∑
i= VaC (A,Bi) +VaB (A,Bn),
where the annuity rates in VA, VC(A,Bi−) for i = , . . .n, and VB are c, ci for
i = , . . .n, and cn+, respectively. ¿e formula follows by direct calculations.
¿e above arguments also hold when there is a constant default barrier C.
Denote the time zero value of the innite version of the multi-level annuity in the
case of bankruptcy risk by D∞ (A).
For A> Bi for all i, the market value of an innite multi-level annuity in the
case of default risk is
D∞ (A) = cr − n+∑i= ci − ci+r(α + β) (α( CBi )−β + β( CBi )α) (AC)−β, (..)
where for notational convenience cn+ =  and Bn+ = C.
Proof. Similar to the previous proof
D∞ (A) = DaA(A,B) + n−∑
i= DaC(A,Bi) +DaB(A,Bn),
where the annuity rates in DA, DC(A,Bi−) for i = , . . .n, and DB are c, ci for
i = , . . .n, and cn+, respectively. ¿e formula follows by direct calculations.

. Forward starting innite annuities
In this section we calculate the time  market values of innite annuities which
start at a future time T > .
.. Some preliminary standard results
In the following section we apply the change of measure technique introduced in
nance by Geman, El Karoui, and Rochet ().
Let Z be any FT-measurable event. Denote its associated indicator function
by Z.
First, the time zeromarket value of a claimwith timeTmarket valueUa(AT ,B),
given in expression (..), receivable at time T only if the event Z occurs is
Vβ(B) = E[e−rTUa(AT ,B)Z],= Ua(A,B)E[Ze−  σβT−σβWT],= Ua(A,B)Qβ(Z), (..)
where the probability measure Qβ is dened by ∂Q
β
∂Q = exp(− σβT − σβT), and
the dynamics of At underQβ is dAt = (µ−σβ)Atdt+σAtdWt (abusing notation
by lettingWt also denote a standard Brownian motion under Qβ).
Similarily, the time zero market value of a claim with time T market value
Ub(AT ,B), given in expression (..), receivable at time T only if the event Z
occurs is
Vα(B) = E[e−rTUb(AT ,B)Z],= Ub(A,B)E[Ze−  σαT+σαWT],= Ub(A,B)Qα(Z), (..)
where the probability measure Qα is dened by ∂Q
α
∂Q = exp(− σαT + σαT) and
the dynamics of At under Qα is dAt = (µ + σα)Atdt + σAtdWt (repeatedly
abusing notation by lettingWt also denote a standard Brownian motion under
Qα).

¿e time  market value of a claim which pays  upon bankruptcy (when At
hits C) if bankruptcy occurs a er time T is
Vτ(C) = E[e−rTUa(AT ,C){τ > T}],= Ua(A,C)E[e−  σβT−σβWT{τ > T}],= Ua(A,C)Qβ(τ > T),
= (A
C
)−β[N(dβ ) − (AC)(α+β)N(−dβ )],= (A
C
)−βN(dβ ) − (AC)αN(−dβ ),
where N(⋅) represents the cumulative standard normal distribution function and
dβ and d
β
 are dened in Appendix A.
Finally, the time  market value of a claim which pays  upon bankruptcy
(when At hits C) if bankruptcy occurs before time T is
Vτ≤T(C) = Ua(A,C)Qβ(τ ≤ T),= (A
C
)−βN(−dβ ) + (AC)αN(−dβ ).
.. Forward starting above annuity
Denote the time zero market value of a forward starting above annuity byWA.
¿en
WA = cr (e−rTN(d) − αα + β(AB)−βN(dβ ) + βα + β(AB)αN(−dα )) .
Proof.
WA = E[e−rTVA(AT ,B)]= E [e−rT (VaA(AT ,B){AT > B} +VbA(AT ,B){AT < B})] .
= E [e−rT c
r
(( − α
α + βUa(AT ,B))){AT > B} + βα + βUb(AT ,B)){AT < B})] .
= c
r
(e−rTQ(AT > B) − αα + βVβ(B) + βα + βVα(B)) ,
where the event Z is specialized to {AT > B} for Vβ(B) and {AT < B} for Vα(B).
Observe that
e−rTQ(AT > B) = e−rTN(d),

where d is dened in Appendix A. ¿e result follows from the expressions (..)
and (..).
.. Forward starting below annuity
Denote the time zero market value of a forward starting above annuity byWB.
¿en
WB = cr (e−rTN(−d) + αα + β(AB)−βN(dβ ) − βα + β(AB)αN(−dα )) .
Proof.
WB = EQ[e−rTVB(AT ,B)]= EQ [e−rT (VaB (AT ,B){AT > B} +VbB (AT ,B){AT < B})] .
= EQ [e−rT c
r
( α
α + βUa(AT ,B){AT > B} + ( − βα + βUb(AT ,B)){AT < B})] .
= c
r
e−rT (Q(AT < B) + αα + βVβ(B) − βα + βVα(B)) ,
using similar denitions of Z as in the previous proof. By symmetry Q(At ≤ B) =
N(−d) and the result follows from the expressions (..) and (..).
.. Forward starting corridor annuity
Denote the time zero market value of a forward starting corridor annuity, which
pays c when Bi+ < At < Bi byWC. In this case we alter the notation of the d
arguments of the standard cumulative nprmal distribution function to emphasize
the dependence on the barrier, i.e., we write d(B) instead of just d.
¿en
WC = cr e−rT[N(d(Bi+)) − N(d(Bi))]− c
r
α
α + βA−β[Bβi+N(dβ (Bi+)) − BβiN(dβ (Bi))]+ c
r
β





.. Forward starting default claims
Denote by X the time zero market value of the forwarding starting claim V deliv-
ered at time T upon no prior default. ¿en
X = EQ[e−rTV(AT){τ > T}].
Forward starting above annuity
Denote the time zero market value of a forward starting above annuity with default
risk by XA. ¿en
XA = E[e−rTVA(AT){τ > T}]= E [e−rT (VaA(AT ,B){AT > B} +VbA(AT ,B){AT < B}) {τ > T}]
= c
r




α + β(AB)αQα(AT ≤ B, τ > T),
where the Q, Qβ, and Qα probabilities are given in Appendix A.
Forward starting below annuity
XB = E[e−rTVB(AT){τ > T}]= E [e−rT (VaB (AT ,B){AT > B} +VbB (AT ,B){AT < B}) {τ > T}]
= c
r




α + β(AB)αQα(AT ≤ B, τ > T).

Forward starting defaultable above annuity
Denote the time zero market value of a forward starting above annuity with default
risk by XA. ¿en
XC = E[e−rTDA(AT){τ > T}]= E [e−rT (DaA(AT ,B){AT > B} +DbA(AT ,B){AT < B}) {τ > T}]
= c
r




α + β ((AB)αQα(AT ≤ B, τ > T) − (CB)α(AC)−βQβ(τ > T)) .
Forward starting defaultable below annuity
XD = E[e−rTDB(AT){τ > T}]= E [e−rT (DaB(AT ,B){AT > B} +DbB(AT ,B){AT < B}) {τ > T}]
= c
r









¿ese above and below annuities can in the, by now, familiar way be combined
into corridor and multi-level annuities.
. ¿e case of a nite T
In this section we give some examples of how the results for the previous annuities,
all with innite horizon, can be combined into results for annuities with nite
horizon. Our results are based on the idea that a nite annuity may be considered
as an immediately starting innite annuity from which the time zero value of
another innite annuity starting at the future date T, is subtracted if τ > T, i.e.,
bankruptcy has not occurred prior to time T.
We assume in this section that A> B.

.. Finite above annuity without default risk
¿e time zero market price of a default free nite above annuity is calculated as





(e−rTN(d) + αα + β(AB)−βN(−dβ ) + βα + β(AB)αN(−dα )) .
.. Finite below annuity without default risk
¿e time zero market price of a default free nite below annuity is calculated as
VTB (A,B) = VB(A,B) −WB(A,B)
= c
r
(−e−rTN(−d) + αα + β(AB)−βN(−dβ ) + βα + β(AB)αN(−dα )) .
Observe that the time zero value of a nite annuity which pays both above and
below B is VTA (A,B) +VTB (A,B) = cr( − e−rT, a familiar result.
.. Finite corridor annuity without default risk
¿e time zero market price of a default free nite corridor annuity is calculated as




ξ = e−rT(N(d(Bi) − N(d(Bi+))+ α
α + β (( ABi )−βN(dβ (Bi)) − ( ABi+ )−βN(dβ (Bi+)))+ β
α + β (( ABi )αN(−dα (Bi)) − ( ABi+ )αN(−dα (Bi+))) .

.. Finite above annuity with default risk
¿e time zero market price of nite above annuity with default risk is calculated as




ψ =  − α
α + β(AB)−β( −Qβ(AT > B, τ > T))− β
α + β (Qα(AT ≤ B, τ > T) + (CB)α(AC)−βQβ(τ ≤ T))− e−rTQ(AT > B, τ > T).
.. Finite below annuity with default risk
¿e time zero market price of nite above annuity with default risk is calculated as





α + β(AB)−β( −Qβ(AT ≤ B, τ > T))+ β
α + β (Qα(AT ≤ B, τ > T)(AB)α + (CB)α(AC)−βQβ(τ ≤ T))− e−rTQ(AT ≤ B, τ > T) − (AC)−βQβ(τ ≤ T).
. Conclusions and areas of further research
We present closed form solutions for the market value of multi-level annuities
applicable to debt with credit risk. Possible applications include US Chapter 

regulations, hybrid capital for nancial institutions, and strategic debt service.
Our results may also be applied to more sophisticated situations with endogenous
coupons and nancial health levels.
It is also straight forward to generalize our results to the case where all barriers,
including the bankruptcy barrier, are time dependent and exponential, i.e., on the
form Bt = Beγt for a constant γ, identical for all barriers. We may also envision
other mathematical forms of the barriers.
An interesting extension of our results would be to include jumps in the
underlying asset value process.

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
.A Some standard results
In this appendix we consider the process below under dierent probability mea-
sures. Consider
Xt = ln(At) = ln(A) + µˆt + σWt,
whereWt is dened under a xed probability measure P, and ln(A), µˆ, and σ are
constants. ¿e process Xt represents the logarithmic version of the process At
used in the paper. Dene the stopping time
τ = inf{t ∶ Xt = ln(C)}
¿e following results are standard











P(Xt > ln(B), τ > T) =











Observe that limB↓C P(Xt > ln(B), τ > T) = P(τ > T). Trivially,




















.A. Probability measure Q
Under the probability measure Q




Q(τ > T) = N(d) − (AC)α−βN(−d),
where













Q(Xt > ln(B), τ > T) = N(d) − (AC)α−βN(−d),
where











Q(Xt < ln(B), τ > T) = N(d) − N(d) + (AC)α−β(N(−d) − N(−d)).
.A. Probability measure Qα
Under the probability measure Qα




Qα(τ > T) = N(dα ) − (AC)−(α+β)N(−dα ),
where
dα = ln(AC) + (µ + σα − σ)Tσ√T ,
and
dα = ln(AC) − (µ + σα − σ)Tσ√T .
Also,
Qα(Xt > ln(B), τ > T) = N(dα ) − (AC)−(α+β)N(−dα ),
where
dα = ln(AB) + (µ + σα − σ)Tσ√T ,
dα = ln(AC) + ln( BC) − (µ + σα − σ)Tσ√T ,
and
Qα(Xt < ln(B), τ > T) = N(dα ) − N(dα ) + (AC)−(α+β)(N(−dα ) − N(−dα )).

.A. Probability measure Qβ
Under the probability measure Qβ




Qβ(τ > T) = N(dβ ) − (AC)(α+β)N(−dβ ),
where
dβ = ln(AC) + (µ − σβ − σ)Tσ√T ,
and
dβ = ln(AC) − (µ − σβ − σ)Tσ√T .
Also,
Qβ(Xt > ln(B), τ > T) = N(dβ ) − (AC)(α+β)N(−dβ ),
where
dβ = ln(AB) + (µ − σβ − σ)Tσ√T ,
dβ = ln(AC) + ln( BC) − (µ − σβ − σ)Tσ√T ,
and
Qβ(Xt < ln(B), τ > T) = N(dβ ) − N(dβ ) + (AC)(α+β)(N(−dβ ) − N(−dβ )).

